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Abstract 
 
This thesis draws on a synthesis of foreign policy analysis (FPA) and 
constructivism in order to demonstrate how post Cold War Mongolia’s relations 
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) can be analysed through a multi-
sectoral approach to explain the dilemmas that a weak state faces when conducting 
its relations with a much more powerful neighbour.  It proposes that the dissonance 
between Mongolia’s social identity and its structures of governance is the basis for 
the Mongolian state’s weakness and that such weakness makes growing economic 
dependency on the PRC more difficult to manage.  Moreover, the resulting 
combination of economic dependency and state weakness seriously limits the 
government’s ability to maintain an effective broader foreign policy.  The 
dissertation draws on government texts, academic and media articles, and 
interviews in Mandarin Chinese, Mongolian, and English. 
        
The thesis looks in detail at the nature of Mongolian identity politics by focusing on 
identity development over la longue durée.  It then demonstrates how the 
international community failed to take account of the dynamics of Mongolian 
identity politics when it came to assisting the Mongolian government with the 
country’s post Cold War transition from communism. This led to an undue reliance 
on what can be termed ‘Washington Consensus’ type political and economic 
reforms that considerably added to the weakness of the state.   
 
The thesis then focuses on Mongolia’s economic relations with the PRC to show 
how such state weakness has resulted in a relationship of growing dependency.  
Building on economic dependency theory, the thesis then further examines the 
implications of Mongolia-Sino relations from environmental, societal, and military 
perspectives.  In conclusion, the dissertation argues that the division between the 
Mongolian state and society has been exacerbated by the country’s adherence to 
capitalism and democracy in ways that have created the potential for domestic 
instability by increasing the depth and breadth of economic dependence on the PRC. 
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This imposes severe constraints on foreign policy options but has also demanded 
some imaginative innovations that give interesting insights into the measures a 
vulnerable state can take to maximise its international presence.  Ultimately, 
however, the disjuncture between social identity and the state acts as a constraining 
factor on such initiatives in the case of Mongolia. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
This thesis takes Mongolia’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as a 
case study to explore how a combination of state weakness and a fragile national identity 
influence a weak state’s foreign policy towards a much more powerful neighbour.  It will 
be proposed that Mongolia’s post-Cold War transition to democracy and adoption of 
Washington Consensus type economic reforms have left the state weak, particularly in 
relation to the PRC. In fact, the shaping of the Mongolian state’s post-Cold War political 
and economic institutions by prevalent international policy orthodoxies rather than by the 
internal forces of the ruling Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) or any 
other Mongolian group has excaccerbated a particular kind of weakness that is derived 
from the way in which externally constructed institutions do not represent Mongolian 
identity politics.  The resulting division between state and society not only threatens to 
become a source of instability but also has to be taken into account when maximising 
Mongolia’s international room for manoeuvre in a neighbourhood increasingly 
dominated by the PRC.    
 
Since the early 1990s, the Mongolian government has sought to mitigate this weakness 
and maintain its autonomy through a foreign policy aimed at maximising its strengths in 
the face of radical regional and international change.  Its success in this regard, however, 
is questionable as close examination of Mongolia’s foreign relations with China indicates 
that the state is ceding aspects of its sovereignty and security for closer economic 
relations with the PRC.  Indeed, evidence suggests that Mongolia is becoming 
increasingly dependent on China through the two countries’ economic relations.  This 
growing dependency extends across the country’s political, economic, societal, military, 
and environmental sectors. 
 
This dissertation will use a pluralist approach to theory in order to address variables at 
both state and society levels.  This use of theoretical pluralism is much in line with 
English School Theory in so much as it assumes a ‘continuous coexistence and interplay’ 
  15 
between society, the state, and the international system the requires theoretical 
‘flexibility’ (Buzan 2004:10).  While the dissertation does not specifically employ 
English School Theory in its analysis, it does draw from the theory’s eclecticism in its 
use of theories and conceptual tools.    
 
In particular, the dissertation will employ a synthesis of constructivism and foreign policy 
analysis (FPA), which has been argued for by Hopf in his work on Soviet foreign policy 
(Hopf 2002:1-38).  It will do so by first determining the degree to which the dissonance 
between Mongolia’s post-Cold War political and economic institutions and Mongolian 
societal identity contributes to the state’s weakness.  It will then examine the 
development of the country’s institutions of control in order to analyse the practice of 
state sovereignty. This dual theory approach is appropriate in that while constructivism 
allow for historical, cultural, and psychological variables to play a part in the ‘culture of 
anarchy’ that shapes the state within the international system, FPA provides a framework 
to examine domestic institutions and their effect on foreign policy (Guzzini & Leander 
2006:246).   
 
In this respect, FPA can be taken to supply the tools needed for looking inside the ‘black 
box’ of policy making while constructivism emphasises the structures within which 
policy has to be made. As Houghton has persuasively argued, a marriage of the two is 
suitable as ‘neither is complete without the other, and neither can fully claim to represent 
the process of making foreign policy in isolation’ (Houghton 2007:43). The result is a 
more robust understanding of contemporary Mongolia’s state-society relations as well as 
its domestic and foreign policy goals.   
 
Having established state weakness through this theoretical approach, the dissertation will 
then draw on weak state and dependency theories to help explain Mongolian foreign 
policy.  Both theories provide useful frameworks that are largely applicable to post-
transition Mongolian foreign policy in that they provide insight into weak state strategies 
while identifying potential policy failings that could further contribute to weakness.  
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The analysis will focus on Mongolia’s foreign policy relationship with the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) as it is in many ways Mongolia’s most important and 
challenging foreign relationship.  It will do so by analysing the two countries’ relations 
from a multi-sectoral perspective.  The dissertation will draw on government and non-
government documents, whitepapers, media articles, academic texts, and public opinion 
polls in Mongolian, Chinese, and English.  It will incorporate first-hand information 
attained during interviews with Chinese, Mongolian, and Western officials and experts.  
To support the qualitative findings, the dissertation will employ statistics derived from 
the Mongolia and China Statistical Yearbooks, the National Statistics Office of Mongolia, 
the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank.  The use of Mongolian and Chinese 
in addition to English allows for a wider, less biased approach that contributes to a more 
balanced understanding of the contemporary Mongolian state and society.  
 
1.1  Why Use Theoretical Pluralism? 
 
The argument for the use of methodological pluralism is that single IR theories lack the 
explanatory power to fully explain the complexities and nuances that exist in 
international relations.  Whereas a theory such as realism offers a robust explanation of 
security in the international system, it does so without fully developing concepts of 
society.  Conversely, while constructivism focuses on the effects norms, behaviour, and 
identity have on the state and international society, it does so only after negating the role 
material forces play in states’ decision making processes. Rather than restricting analysis 
to one single paradigm, ‘methodological pluralism transcends the assumption often made 
in the so-called inter-paradigm debate, that realist, liberal and Marxist approaches to IR 
theory are incommensurable’ (Buzan 2001: 476).  
 
Theoretical eclecticism, or methodological pluralism, seeks to address these theoretical 
deficiencies by drawing together varying, sometimes conflicting, theories that best 
explain empirical evidence (Bellamy 2005:47).  Indeed, such a theoretical pluralist 
formulation ‘takes the focus away from the oppositional either/or approaches of much IR 
theory…and moves it towards a holistic, synthesizing approach that features patterns of 
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strength and interplay’ (Buzan 2004:10).  The result is a more deductive approach to 
analysis driven by evidence rather than ideology (Yonay 1998:34).        
 
Such methodological pluralism is particularly useful when examining the relation 
between society, states, non-state actors, and the regional/international community.  In 
this regard, English School Theory provides a useful guide as its theoretical pluralism 
incorporates both Hobbesian/Realist elements of international systems theories and 
Grotian/Rationalist elements of a socially constructed order (Buzan 2001:476).  This 
theoretical eclecticism allows for a holistic approach to theory that can account for 
interaction between society, the international system, and the international society 
(Neumann 2001:503).     
 
As this dissertation will examine such variables as Mongolian identity and society, the 
Mongolian state, and the country’s foreign policy, a theoretically eclectic approach is 
entirely appropriate.  In particular, the dissertation will draw on concepts from 
constructivism, foreign policy analysis, weak state theory, and dependency theory to 
construct a framework for analysis.    
 
1.2 Constructivism: Domestic Norms and Social Identity 
 
In contrast to both realist and liberalist approaches to the study of IR that tend to view 
states holistically and as exogenously given, constructivism allows for the importance of 
identity, norms, and culture as key components in understanding state formation and 
behaviour (Hopf 2002:294).  Whereas in most realist or liberalist studies the self-
interested state is taken as an ontological certainty in which society ‘contains only a 
reproductive logic, but no transformational logic’, constructivism is more concerned with 
the state’s identity and how such identity shapes, and is shaped by, domestic and 
international norms, cultures, and histories and how these collectively influence the 
state’s foreign policy (Ruggie 1983:285). 
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Indeed, social identity formation is central to constructivism’s approach to understanding 
foreign policy in so much as it provides the basis for further understanding institutional 
practices as related to norms, language, and ideas.  For constructivism, that ‘foreign 
policy encompasses the complicated communications within governments and amongst 
its diverse agents, plus the perceptions and misperceptions, the images of other countries, 
and the ideologies and personal disposition of everyone involved’, any comprehensive 
analysis cannot begin at a state or institutional level, but must consider the domestic 
factors that change and shape state identity (Kubalkova 2001:18).  Constructivism’s 
claim in this regard is that taking into consideration variables previously ignored at a sub-
state level allows analysts greater insight into rule-governed behaviour and ‘into matters 
of long standing concern, such as the formation of (national) interests’ (Kowert 
2001:267).  In stark contrast to neorealist and utilitarian-liberal approaches to foreign 
policy which stress that norms, ideas, and values only play a role as ‘instruments for 
asserting and justifying given interests’, constructivism emphasises the ‘independent 
influence of these variables’ (Boekle, Rittberger, & Wagner 2001).              
 
As with regard to state identity formation, Wendtian constructivism, or a ‘thin’ 
constructivism, is insufficient in offering a constructivist interpretation of foreign policy 
as ‘thin’ constructivism decidedly concentrates on ‘international system theory and thus 
on identities in the sense of the general meaning of “state”, of “sovereignty” or of 
“anarchy”’ (Wæver 2002:21).  This ‘anthropomorphised’ perception of states as unitary 
actors with a single identity and single set of interests does not allow for detailed 
understanding of discontinuous change or how states with similar cultural and historical 
background can have such radically different foreign policy (Wæver 2002:22);(Weldes 
1999:9).  For ‘thin’ constructivism, the state is ‘pre-social’ in its four stated priorities: 
security, autonomy, economic wellbeing, and collective self-esteem.        
 
In response to these perceived shortcomings, constructivist scholars have sought to adapt, 
modify, and ‘thicken’ Wendtian constructivism so as to provide a constructivist approach 
with explanatory power to deal with foreign policy.  In order to provide a more internal 
concept of identity formation, one stressing the ‘bottom-up’ development of identity 
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often influenced by, but otherwise exclusive of, international norms, constructivist 
theorists turned to society as their source of study rather than the state. As this 
dissertation treats social norms as essential components of a social identity, social 
constructivism’s stress on social norms is a good starting point for the larger discussion 
of identity formation and the role it plays in Mongolia’s modern foreign policy.  It also 
provides insight into potential state weakness.       
 
Social constructivists believe states’ foreign policy behaviour is best explained by norms 
shared throughout domestic society as these norms, those resulting from the domestic 
identity, have greater influence on how various states’ agents conceive of and conduct 
foreign policy.  This ‘bottom-up’ approach stresses domestic norms’ ‘immediate 
orientation to behaviour’ thereby making them ‘the appropriate independent variable of a 
constructivist theory of foreign policy’  (Boekle, Rittberger, & Wagner 2001:106).   
 
Having shifted the focus to look at domestic rather than international norms, societal 
constructivists use the term ‘intersubjectivity’ to distinguish social norms from social 
ideas.  This distinction is critical for societal constructivism as ideas, defined as ‘beliefs 
held by individuals’, require a cognitive approach not included in societal 
constructivism’s theory (Boekle, Rittberger, & Wagner 2001:108).  Indeed, societal 
constructivists believe that individual belief systems are impossible to conceptualise 
outside the realm of their social and cultural roots without the structure norms bring to 
such identity.  Only through using norms to give identity shape, and subsequent 
measurability, is it possible to view foreign policy from the perspective of identity 
politics.           
 
Social norms have ‘counterfactual validity’ in so much as they incorporate morals, ethics, 
and issues of justice that distinguish them from ‘non-value based expectations of 
behaviour that results from consequentialist considerations, such as prudence’ (Boekle, 
Rittberger, & Wagner 2001:108).  Their strength is measured by degree of commonality, 
i.e., how many people adopt the norm, and specificity, which determines ‘how precisely a 
norm distinguishes appropriate from inappropriate behaviour’ (Boekle, Rittberger, & 
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Wagner 2001:109).  Norms are introduced into a state’s foreign policy through a process 
called ‘societal socialization’ through which government officials internalise societal 
norms and the subsequent value-based behaviour shared by the state’s citizens.  This 
internalisation of norms takes place through ‘political socialisation’ which stresses that 
government officials already share socially agreed upon behaviour guidelines before 
taking office, further refine these beliefs throughout their political careers, and constantly 
seek to embody the norms’ behaviour in order to maintain the legitimacy of acting as a 
state representative.  Indeed, if a government official does not meet the domestic and 
social norms’ expectations when dictating the state’s foreign policy, he runs the risk of 
delegitimizing his claim to leadership (Boekle, Rittberger, & Wagner 2001:113).   
 
If social norms are the end product of identity, it is now necessary to take one step 
backward to establish a theoretical basis for identity in general.  For as stated above, 
societal constructivism does not deal directly with identity formation or culture and, as 
such, cannot provide for a more cognitive understanding of identity.  In order to fill this 
gap between social norms and social cognitive structure, the dissertation will draw 
heavily on Hopf’s work on the social construction of Soviet foreign policy.   
 
According to the theoretical perspective used by Hopf, ‘a social cognitive structure 
establishes the boundaries within a society, including how individuals commonly think 
about themselves and others’ and is, therefore, ‘a fundamental domain of social action’ 
(Hopf 2002:6).  In this sense, one can also consider the social cognitive structure as the 
socially constructed version of the ‘Self’ from which norms are further formed.  The 
difference here between the social cognitive structure and norms, therefore, is clear.  
While, according to Finnemore, norms are ‘a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors 
with a given identity’ further divided into ‘regulative’ norms, which regulate and order 
behaviour, and ‘evaluative’ or ‘perscriptive’ norms that embody the ‘oughtness’ that sets 
norms apart from rules’, the social cognitive structure is more basic in that it is based in 
history, culture, language, and ethnic identity and is not concerned with regulating 
behaviour so much as it is behaviour’s very construct (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998:891) 
For Hopf, a cognitive account of identity includes ‘the unthinking, unintentional, 
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automatic, everyday reproduction of the self’ that does not depend ‘on the conscious 
selection of behaviour based on a particular norm’ (Hopf 2002:11).  It is inclusive of 
identity’s many parts, including ethnic, national, and individual identities.   
 
For Mongolia, this distinction between norms and identity is essential for a clear 
understanding of the role identity plays in state weakness and foreign policy.  While 
norms are important in that they offer a guide as to how various aspects of identity play 
in with social structure, they are in many ways corrupted accounts of identity in that they 
have been in part materially shaped and, therefore, are not clear indicators of the 
underlying identity forces that shape them and that are needed for their maintenance.  
Norms occupy the middle ground between identity and the state’s structure and, as such, 
are a useful means to gauge the interaction between the two in relation to the domestic 
source of foreign policy.  Based in identity, they are culturally specific.  Yet maintained 
in structure, they are dependent on a state’s immediate environment. 
 
Identity, in contrast, is a free floating abstraction based more in history and concepts of 
ethnic and national belonging.  Yet to categorise identity as a passive agent in any state’s 
modern foreign policy, assuming it is fixed and only applicable to analysis in the sense it 
constitutes more tangible norms, it is a dangerous mistake.  Despite what might at first 
seem a relative distance from everyday foreign policy matters, according to Hopf’s social 
cognitive theory identity is the fundamental basis for understanding a state’s interests 
from an endogenous perspective (in contrast to the more exogenous approaches often 
applied) in that it constitutes ‘a social cognitive structure that makes threats and 
opportunities, enemies and allies, intelligible, thinkable, and possible’ (Hopf 2002:16).  It 
is, therefore, an active and powerful component of state capacity and foreign policy 
making.      
 
Identity becomes particularly important between two nations where one plays a 
significant role in constituting the ‘Other’ in contrast to concepts of the state’s ‘Self’.  
Nowhere is this more tangibly felt than in dealing with the Mongolian identity as half its 
legitimacy rests in opposition to the Chinese identity.  A nomadic versus static culture, 
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herders versus agriculturalists, small against large, nature versus industry: all the essential 
elements of a Mongolian society exist in relation to a completely opposing Chinese 
identity point.  In this sense, Mongolia’s identity relationship with China fits clearly with 
Hopf’s position that‘the Self regards the Other as its negation, its opposite’ and thereby 
draws a more reinforced concept of the Self (Hopf 2002:16).  
 
1.3 Foreign Policy Analysis: Sources of State Weakness 
 
Having established the need to treat identity as a central variable in determining state 
weakness and foreign policy, it is now necessary to examine it in relation to the state’s 
institutions of control.  This allows for a greater understanding of state stability and helps 
identify sources of weakness. Indeed, both Migdal and Buzan argue that the division 
between the state’s institutions and social identity is the appropriate starting point for 
understanding the weak state (Migdal 1988:5);(Buzan 1983:62).   
 
Migdal writes of the division between the state and society in terms of a strong social 
base versus weak institutional state particularly evident in post-colonial countries where 
the concept of ‘statehood’ is not a ‘part of the natural landscape’ as it is in the West 
(Migdal 1988:15).  He argues that in some places ‘society (is) a mélange of social 
organisations’ rather than the ‘dichotomous structure that practically all past models of 
macro level change have used’(Migdal 1988:27-28).  He continues in stating that the 
‘state’ structure of a central government charged with maintaining social and economic 
order often goes against the more natural social order defined as the strategy of survival 
which is based on identity and employs ‘myths or symbols [used to] help explain [a 
people’s] place and prospects in an otherwise bewildering world’ (Migdal 1988:27-28).  
The result of such an artificial adaptation to a foreign system of government 
inappropriate to a country’s cultural specifics is a low level of socio-political cohesion 
that hobbles the ability of the resulting state to act as a unitary entity.  As, according to 
Krause, ‘weak states are seldom permitted to exit gracefully from the international scene’, 
and therefore must compete within an international environment with states that are not 
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so structured, this internal division renders the state weak and the government often 
incapable of leveraging social support for its foreign policy (Krause 1998:130). 
 
Buzan agrees with Migdal that the state is not a physical thing, but rather composed of 
three abstract components against which it is possible to measure its weaknesses and 
strengths.  These include the ‘idea of the state’, ‘institutional expression of the state’, and 
the ‘physical base of the state’ (Buzan 1983:40).  While each is an entity separate from 
the others, Buzan notes that ‘statehood’ is only achieved through a combination of the 
three. 
 
Of the three, ‘the idea of the state’ is the most ‘amorphous component of [the] model, but 
in a sense also the most central’ (Buzan 1983:44).  It incorporates the state’s purpose, 
generally agreed upon, and the aims of its existence.  It is the logic behind the question, 
‘why does this state exist’ and, therefore, largely based on social and political identity.  
Of course, ‘the idea of the state’ is central to the functioning of the government, but 
should not be confused with ‘the institutional expression of the state’, which is more 
about the state’s total mechanics.  These ‘mechanics’ consist of a state’s economic, 
legislative, and administrative systems as well as its judicial bodies and ‘the laws, 
procedures and norms by which they operate’ (Buzan 1983:53).  Together, ‘the idea of 
the state’ and ‘the institutions of the state’ serve to regulate the ‘physical base of the 
state’ that includes the people, resources, wealth, and territory.  The ‘physical base of the 
state, in turn influences the formation of the former two entities as well as providing them 
with meaning.  The tripartite, interconnected processes is self-perpetuating and, in the 
case of a strong state, mutually beneficial.     
 
While all three of these components must be in order to constitute what Buzan 
conceptualises as a state, he also argues that ‘these features alone do not, however, add up 
to statehood’ (Buzan 1983:40).  Indeed, deviation between any of the three can lead to 
internal conflict that can, in turn, lead to a weak state.  If, for example, ‘the idea of the 
state’ and ‘the institutional expression of the state’ are unaligned, the state will have a 
weak political identity that can lead to conflict over ideology.  The same is true if the 
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‘physical base of the state’ believes its interests are not being met through either the 
state’s institutions or ‘the idea of the state’.            
 
Migdal and Buzan both put forward useful frameworks for understanding Mongolia’s 
contemporary weakness as a state as well as the role identity can play in the state’s 
foreign policy.  For while Mongolia is a weak power in so much as it lacks material 
strength, its primary weakness comes from its inappropriate domestic political and 
economic system (Migdal’s ‘institutional state’ and Buzan’s ‘institutional expression of 
the state’) and its conflicting social norms and social cognitive structure (Migdal’s ‘social 
base’ and Buzan’s ‘ideas of the state’ and, consequently, ‘physical base of the state’).  
 
The following section will address the development of Mongolia’s ‘institutional state’ 
and ‘institutional expressions of the state’ by offering a brief overview (developed in 
more detail throughout the dissertation) of Mongolia’s post-Cold War institutional 
development.  It will also introduce the concept of identity in relation to the state’s 
political and economic institutions.  The section’s aim is to establish a basis for 
understanding state weakness that will contribute to further analysis of Mongolian-Sino 
relations.     
  
Economy, Democracy, and Identity:  Three Central Tenets of the Mongolian State 
 
Economy  
 
In 1990 and 1991, delegates from the IMF and WB visited Mongolia in order to conduct 
an evaluation of the country’s economic system.  Both organisations agreed that, in order 
to stabilise Mongolia’s failing economy, nothing short of total reform would suffice.  In 
line with the prevailing Washington Consensus doctrine, which pervaded both funds’ 
development reform approach, the IMF and WB agreed to provide conditional aid 
dependent on the Mongolian government’s instituting an economic ‘shock therapy’.  This 
shock therapy reform including the privatisation of state assets, reduction of the state 
budget, dismantling of the planned economy, reformation of the state run banking system, 
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and an introduction of market-oriented system elements (Rossabi 2005:45).  Other 
components of the IMF/WB economic reform consisted of devaluating Mongolia 
currency, implementing a new income tax, suspending all subsidies to producers, 
eliminating trade tariffs, as well as cutting funding for education, health, and welfare.  
Although many MPRP ministers were worried about the displacement ‘shock therapy’ 
might cause the Mongolian people, both institutions argued it was the only feasible way 
forward (Heaton 1991:54). 
 
The IMF and World Bank’s economic policy reforms turned out to be ill conceived and 
ill advised.  They did not take into account what Peet calls the ‘national circumstance, 
such as cultural tradition or social structure’ and forced inappropriate reform regardless 
of ‘previous tradition in the political economy of development’ (Peet 2001:14).  
Moreover, as shock therapy requires a strong institutional framework where ‘strong 
authoritarian regimes were preserved and central planned economy institutions were not 
dismantled before new market institutions were created’, to suggest simultaneous 
governmental and economic reforms, indeed to require them as conditional to aid, was 
entirely inappropriate and harmful (Popov 2007:3).    
 
Perhaps one of the most drastic failures of these international monetary funds was their 
inability to perceive the successful economic policies that Asia’s ‘Four Tigers’—Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore—had followed to achieve extraordinary 
poverty reduction and gains in human capital.  In contrast to free market capitalism, these 
four economies employed what Wade refers to as a ‘governed market’ approach in which 
the government guides ‘market processes of resource allocation so as to produce different 
production and investment outcomes than would have occurred with either free market or 
simulated free market policies’ while investing in ‘infrastructure, technology, and human 
capital’ and employing ‘tariffs to protect a few industries until they became strong 
enough to compete’ (Wade:26); (Rossabi 2005:44).  
 
Democracy 
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In addition to monetary funds, international actors such as the United Nations (UN), 
USAID, the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International, the International 
Human Rights Law Group, and the Asia Foundations—all democratically-minded, 
institutions with roots in Western political thought—lobbied the Mongolian government 
for a clear break with its socialist past and a commitment to a democratic constitutionality. 
The Mongolia Standing State Committee, composed almost entirely of MPRP members, 
eventually succumbed to pressures and drafted a new constitution under direction of 
western political ‘experts’ and ‘advisors’ in line with democratic principles (Rossabi 
2005:55).  The resulting changes to the Mongolian legislature were the establishment of a 
parliamentary democracy consisting of five branches: the President, Parliament (State 
Great Khural), the Government headed by a Prime Minster, a Supreme Court, and a 
Constitutional Court called the Tsets (Bruun & Odgaard 1996:152).   
 
While the Western expertise that contributed to the drafting of the constitution may have 
been well intentioned, the break with seventy years of authoritarian rule was too drastic 
and proved more detrimental to the development of a stable government than a more 
gradual approach might have been.  This is evident in the divisive political developments 
that have characterised Mongolian politics ever since the introduction of a unicameral 
parliament.  
 
Less than fifteen years after the legislative reforms took place, Mongolia’s ‘political 
parties and the multiparty democratic system now face a serious test’ as to whether they 
will prove capable of dealing with the state’s twenty-first century challenges (Noerper 
2007:77). 
 
Identity 
 
As the past section has argued, much of modern Mongolia’s state structure has been 
externally assigned rather than indigenously developed.  While this is a point of weakness 
for the state, the result is that Mongolia is now structured as a democratic state that has 
the framework in place to encourage the deepening of democracy through multiparty 
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representation and a commitment to free market economics.  In this sense, one could 
easily refute the previous section’s argument that Mongolia was not ready to be a liberal 
democracy and that it was forced to adopt international western political and economic 
norms by simply stating the past is the past and what is more relevant to Mongolia’s 
present day foreign policy is how it operates in relation to the foreign community 
considering the system that is unarguably in place.  In short, regardless of the impetus 
behind its transformation Mongolia is a democracy and, therefore, must learn to act as 
one. 
 
From the perspective of the constitutional system this is a hard point to refute.  Yet such a 
view also assumes a desire by the Mongolian people to transform their identities to match 
economic and political reforms from which only a small number of Mongolians have 
truly benefited and a great deal have suffered.  Yet such a desire is not present in modern 
Mongolian political and social discourse to the degree that might imply the Mongolian 
people have embraced capitalism and democracy as the best possible economic and 
political alternatives available to them.  This is evident in a 2008 Sant Maral poll in 
which only 28.5% of Mongolians surveyed nationwide claimed they were satisfied with 
the country’s democracy, while the remaining percentage noted varying degrees of 
dissatisfaction.  So, too, did respondents express disillusionment with capitalism, with as 
many as 69% stating they favoured government ownership of key economic sectors and 
government guaranteed employment (Sant Maral 2008:10-11).  
   
This is not to imply that Mongolian identity is a fixed entity incapable of evolving.  
Indeed, democracy and capitalism have surely played, and will continue to play, an 
important role in the development of modern Mongolian social identity.  What is 
important to note, however, is that identity and norms are not malleable to such a degree 
that they simply change in parallel to newly adopted institutions.  That rather, according 
to Hopf, social identity and social norms should be instrumental in defining national 
priorities and foreign policy (Hopf 2002:294).    
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1.4 Weak State and Balance of Threat Theories: Understanding Mongolian Foreign 
Policy  
 
Having established that the disparity between Mongolia’s present day institutions and 
social identity contributes to state weakness, it is necessary to develop a theoretical 
framework capable of explaining the interplay between the state’s resulting foreign 
policy and identity politics.  In order to accomplish this, the following section will draw 
on concepts from weak state and balance of threat theories.   
 
Moon offers a compelling theoretical account of the limitations of weak state foreign 
policy that, while not entirely applicable to Mongolian post-transition foreign affairs, is a 
worthwhile starting point for analysis.  As with Keohane, he chooses to first approach the 
issue from the perspective of a weak power rather than a weak state by focusing on what 
he calls a ‘bargaining model’.  Moon’s bargaining model relies on the assumption that 
weak powers will align their own foreign policy with that of a greater power’s in 
exchange for economic and military assistance (Moon 1983:317).  
 
This ‘tit-for-tat’, or ‘reciprocal’ weak power strategy emphasises the state’s material 
weakness as it assumes it is acting against its own foreign policy interests while 
supporting the greater power’s agenda in order to add to its material capacity.  Moon 
states, ‘that there exists some hypothetical counterfactual foreign policy which would be 
preferred by the weak state in the absence of the influence attempts’ and that it is directly 
rewarded in line with the level of support it shows the greater power (Moon 1983:319).  
This leads to what Moon calls an ‘asymmetrical dyad’ in which the weak power becomes 
compliant and the dominant state controlling.   
 
In further developing the ‘bargaining model’, Moon highlights some of its limitations.  It 
is based on power politics and does not consider the importance of ideology that played 
such a dominant role in the Cold War (Moon 1985:298).  It is questionable whether 
policy goals are clear enough to warrant ‘tit-for-tat’ rewards.  Some states seemingly do 
not need to bargain for aid, but simply receive it because they are strategically 
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‘important’ in that they are situated well for a strong state’s overall foreign policy 
concerns.  Moon addresses these limitations to the bargaining model’s explanatory power 
by developing what he calls the ‘dependent consensus model’ (Moon 1985:304). 
 
The dependent consensus model breaks from the bargaining model in that social and state 
identities assume a central role.  Indeed, the weak power or state (here the line between 
the two blurs) aligns itself with the dominant power not out of cold, strategic positioning, 
but because of the ‘community of interest that is formed by the ties between the dominant 
and the dependent economy’ (Moon 1985:307).  As the dependent state’s economic 
stability becomes increasingly tied to the dominant state, it becomes within ‘their own 
interest to follow the [dominant state’s] lead on…concrete foreign policy issues’ (Moon 
1985:307).  Moreover, Moon’s dependent consensus model stresses the dependent 
country’s elite’s role and how they form deep cultural ties with the dominant nation 
through education, cultural, and political exchange.  As these elite are ultimately 
responsible for policy making, it is only natural that they tend to follow a path dictated by 
the dominant state, most especially if they believe it is in their country’s best interest to 
do so.   
 
Both Moon’s bargaining and dependency consensus models provide insight into 
Mongolia’s post-transition foreign policy in relation to China in that they assume a weak 
state will opt to bandwagon rather than directly confront a potential threat.  Indeed, the 
Mongolian state’s use of such bandwagoning is evident across multiple sectors in the two 
countries’ relations.  However, of the two, Moon’s dependency consensus model is 
perhaps the more applicable as it stresses economic dependency leading to closer social 
and political relations rather than prioritising the formation of closer ties for the sake of 
future economic cooperation.  This is an important distinction for Mongolian-Sino 
relations as it draws attention to the fact the Mongolian state did not voluntarily opt for 
dependency.  This further suggests that Mongolian dependence contains the potential to 
contribute to social instability if elite interests do not conform with those of other social 
actors.   
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The two models do, however, have significant limitations in roundly explaining 
Mongolia’s post-Cold War foreign policy.  Principally, neither the bargaining nor 
dependent consensus models address what weak states can do to avoid dependency in the 
first place or to lessen its effects once established.  While the Mongolian government 
specifically designed its ‘third neighbour’ strategy of cultivating foreign relationships to 
do just this, it is therefore necessary to find a theoretical approach capable of explaining 
this aspect of weak state behaviour.  Walt’s balance of threat theory provides the 
necessary counterpart. 
 
Walt notes that while weak states do sometimes opt for bandwagoning, many also choose 
to balance against perceived threats (Walt 1987:171).  States accomplish such balancing 
through alliances with international and regional partners as well as with ‘superpowers’.  
While this dynamic has changed since the end of the Cold War in so much that the 
United States is the sole remaining superpower in the international system, it remains a 
valuable tool for understanding how states form alliances aimed at balancing regional 
threats.   
 
An essential assumption in the balance of threat theory is that the more aggressive a 
dominant power, the more likely its neighbouring countries will ally against it to balance 
its threat (Walt 1987:32).  This suggests that it is often in a strong power’s best interests 
to operate within its region as a source of stability when possible.  In doing so, a strong 
state can pursue economic growth as well as diverse alliances that overtime will further 
strengthen its position.  So long as a strong state believes the cost-benefit outcome of 
such posturing is in its favour, weak states have a certain amount of space to pursue 
external relations. 
 
If handled carefully, weak states can use these alliances to mitigate dependency without 
negatively affecting their relationship with the dominant state.  Indeed, a weak state can 
significantly increase its security by diversifying the type and number of actors that have 
an interest in its independence.  While not at all a certain strategy for decreasing or 
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avoiding dependence on any one state, this type of alliance formation and balancing is 
often a weak state’s best option.   
 
The PRC’s commitment to a ‘peaceful rise’ has given the Mongolian government space 
enough to pursue a balance of threat policy.  It has accomplished this by formulating a 
‘third neighbour’ policy aimed at cultivating ties with regional and international states 
and organisations.  While this policy has not prevented the country from becoming 
dependent on China, it is indeed an essential part of the state’s foreign policy strategy.       
 
1.5 The Case for China 
 
Having drawn a framework for understanding Mongolia’s foreign policy, it is now 
necessary to apply that framework to one part of Mongolia’s foreign policy portfolio in 
order to test its validity.  In consideration of Mongolia’s historical relations, its current 
regional position, and its possible future orientation, the dissertation will focus on 
Mongolia’s relations with the People’s Republic of China.  The logic behind this choice 
is both practical and normative.  China is by far the most important of Mongolia’s 
bilateral relations in terms of social, economic, political, military, and environmental 
concerns while the PRC has long been the antagonistic Other against which Mongolians 
formed their identities.  In this sense, it is a particularly challenging and important partner 
for Mongolia as good relations with China are essential for Mongolia’s security while 
over-dependency would be unacceptable socially.  For Mongolia, China represents both 
the ultimate opportunity and greatest threat. 
 
To begin, no country has benefited more from Mongolia’s ‘transition’ to capitalism and 
democracy than China.  Mongolia’s WTO commitments and subsequent elimination of 
trade quotas and tariffs laid the country bare to Chinese investment that came in force.  
While the growing presence of Chinese business and illegal workers has led to a social 
backlash against over-dependence on Chinese investment and labour, the democratic 
government has yet to implement a coherent foreign policy against Chinese business in 
Mongolia and, indeed, seems incapable (or unwilling) of doing so.  For this reason, much 
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of Mongolia’s foreign policy in relation to China is shaped either through the need to 
match Mongolia’s domestic economic policies with Chinese demand or through the 
democratic government’s ineffectiveness in protecting the state’s economic interests from 
becoming dependent on Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI).  As neither Mongolia’s 
economic and democratic institutions were indigenously developed, they are neither 
effective tools against the state’s growing dependency on China nor institutions the 
Mongolian government seems intent on protecting.  In this sense, both capitalism and 
democracy have become more of a hindrance to Mongolian foreign policy in relation to 
China than an instrument for successful diplomacy. 
 
While much the same is true regarding Mongolia’s foreign policy in relation to other 
states, China is of particular importance because of its proximity, the degree to which 
Chinese businesses have penetrated the Mongolian market, and the historical relations 
between the two states.  Moreover, as China grows and becomes more and more 
important in the regional and international economic and political environments, 
Mongolia is likely to find itself increasingly dependent on the PRC as a regional core.  
This could result in increased ties to the PRC’s economic development agenda and 
political objectives. 
 
Arguably, this is a position in which Mongolia has found itself before in relation to the 
former Soviet Union.  As many Mongolians have fond memories of that time as being 
one of efficiency, social equality, and social security, it is tempting to consider whether 
the Mongolian government should tacitly accept a position of dependency in relation to 
the PRC.  This would allow the state to align the country’s domestic policies with 
Chinese demand so as to both maximise its strategic position and to avoid tension with 
Beijing as to the county’s development path.  Regardless of one’s position on how this 
would affect Mongolian sovereignty (which it indeed would), the likelihood of the 
Mongolian government accepting overt dependency on China without unleashing 
potentially destabilising social consequences is nil.  This is due to the fact that modern 
day Mongolian-Sino economic and political relations are complicated by historical 
animosities based on identity.   
  33 
 
For Mongolian social identity, China represents the ultimate Other in that the two 
countries have developed in almost mirror opposition despite having lived in parallel for 
close to one thousand years.   Indeed each country’s essential identity components, when 
broken down to simple stereotypes, exist almost in total contrast.  Mongolia as a herding, 
nomadic people; China as an agricultural, sedentary society.  Mongolia as one of the 
world’s least populated countries; China as the world largest in terms of population.  
While it is difficult to argue that the Chinese identity still relies on conceptualising 
Mongolia as the Other against which it must struggle for definition, that this sense of 
contrast exists in Mongolia is palpable in daily life and ubiquitous throughout society at 
all different social levels.  For Mongolia, China is the neighbouring giant capable of 
consuming the country with relative ease and is, therefore, a great threat.   
 
In regard to Chinese foreign policy, Mongolia is little more than an occasional blip on its 
regional radar, albeit one with particular significance.  Despite high levels of trade 
between the two states, China gains very little from closer economic relations simply 
because the Mongolian market is so small.  Were the two state’s relations simply based 
on economics, Mongolia would hardly register in the Chinese political consciousness at 
all.  That Sino-Mongolian relations do matter to Beijing is the result of the importance 
Mongolia plays in Chinese identity and the geo-political importance of Mongolia’s 
position as a neighbouring state remaining unaligned.  As such, Chinese foreign policy 
towards Mongolia is often framed with these two considerations in mind.   
 
Mongolia has long occupied an important place in the Chinese historical dialogue, as the 
Mongols have been both rulers of China and part of the perceived Chinese historical state.   
Moreover, modern China has a special relationship with Mongolia as the PRC considers 
ethnic Mongolians to be one of the country’s ethnic minorities and, therefore, part of the 
Chinese state’s modern identity.  Arguably, this could indicate that some elements of 
Chinese foreign policy towards Mongolia consist of the Chinese desire to ‘civilise’ the 
Mongols and to incorporate them back into a ‘Greater China’, although it is not this 
dissertation’s position that this is so (Harrell 1995:4).  At the very least, that China’s 
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Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR) borders Mongolia is reason enough for 
the PRC to maintain good relations with the Mongolian government.   
 
Also of importance for China is that Mongolia remained unaligned militarily as the 
presence of foreign troops in Mongolia, and therefore at China’s backdoor, is 
unacceptable for Beijing.  As this is ultimately the Mongolian government’s decision, 
Chinese foreign policy towards the country is designed to make remaining unaligned 
attractive while raising the unspoken consequences of alignment through the threat of 
economic coercion.   
 
This dissertation will develop Mongolia and China’s foreign policy relations in far 
greater detail throughout the remaining chapters.  The main purpose here is to introduce 
how using Mongolia’s economic, political, and identity structures to understand its 
modern foreign policy are particularly relevant in relation to China so as to make a case 
for the selection of China as the dissertation’s focus.  In addition, brief attention will be 
paid to China’s potential foreign policy priorities towards Mongolia as they most 
certainly play a part in shaping the two countries’ relations. 
 
As a final note, it is necessary to clarify how the remaining dissertation employs the term 
‘China’ when writing of Mongolian-Chinese relations as simple use of the term is a 
misnomer considering the varying degree of actors involved in the two countries’ affairs.  
When referring to China, unless otherwise stated, the dissertation is referring to the 
Chinese government, just as when reference is made to ‘Beijing’ or the ‘CCP’.  The 
dissertation will take care to identify non-government, Chinese-based businesses as 
individual actors when appropriate, although this is at times problematic as various firms 
have links either to local, regional, or provincial governments and, as such, do constitute 
distance off-shoots of the central government.  Moreover, as the Mongolian public takes 
little care as to differentiate between Chinese firms and the Chinese government, for the 
sake of analysis in relation to identity and perception such division between government-
backed and private Chinese investors is often a moot point.  Nevertheless, attention will 
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be paid throughout the dissertation to correctly identifying appropriate actors so as to 
differentiate between state and non-state sanctioned occurrences.            
 
Conclusion 
 
The remaining dissertation will show how Mongolia’s post-transition identity together 
with the state’s lack of sovereign control contributes to the country’s weak state status.  It 
will do so by presenting in Chapter Two a detailed examination of Mongolian identity’s 
development from its pre-modern form through the end of the Cold War.  Chapter Three 
will then detail the state’s post-transition political development with a focus on the 
government’s sovereignty.  These two chapters taken together will provide the basis for 
treating Mongolia as a weak state throughout the subsequent analysis.   
 
Chapter Three will then focus on Mongolia’s economic relations with China, which will 
use concepts from dependency theory to explore how the Mongolian government has 
failed to institute or enforce legislation designed to dilute economic reliance on China.  
The chapter will argue that China’s growing economic dominance over Mongolia has the 
potential to translate into indirect power over the country’s other sectors.  This 
supposition is a central component to the following chapters.   
 
Chapters Four to Six will expand the analysis of Mongolian dependence on China by 
looking beyond at how a multi-sectoral dependency ‘syndrome’ is developing across a 
range of sectors beyond the economy.  Chapter Four will do this by by exploring the 
correlation between economic dependency and the country’s environmental degradation.  
Chapters Five and Six will look at Mongolia’s societal and military sectors, respectively.  
In considering the country’s societal sector, the dissertation will once again draw on the 
dissonance between Mongolian social identity and the state in order to examine potential 
sources of further state weakness.  Indeed, Chapter Five’s treatment of Mongolian-Sino 
social relations offers the most compelling evidence for the role identity can play in the 
two countries’ foreign relations.  It also allows for examination of what the chapter will 
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argue is a growing gap between the goals of the Mongolian state’s and social aspirations 
that has the potential to contribute to domestic unrest as the country’s dependency grows.   
 
Chapter Six’s evaluation of the state’s security strategy will draw attention to ways in 
which the Mongolian military forces and government have used alliances with foreign 
partners to minimise the constraints imposed by the country’s physical sources of 
weakness.  It will argue that the state has been successful in implementing a foreign 
policy designed to mitigate China’s growing regional military dominance while 
increasing the country’s overall military security.  In this regard, Chapter Six will show 
how the Mongolian government has been able to implement weak state strategies to its 
benefit. 
 
In conclusion, the dissertation will argue that Mongolia is indeed a weak state and that its 
weakness has allowed it to become dependent on the PRC.  It will argue that the current 
division between Mongolian identity and the state may continue to grow and contribute 
to further weakness.  It will also, however, suggest that the country’s military strategy 
offers insight into ways the state may offset growing dependency through more diverse 
foreign relations.    
 
 
         
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  37 
Chapter Two: The Formation of a Modern Mongolian Identity 
 
 
The following chapter will employ Smith’s ethno-symbolism theory as a framework for 
understanding Mongolian identity and nation development.  Smith’s ethno-symbolism 
approach is useful as it occupies a middle position between ‘primordialist’ and modernist 
views of national identity development.  Through this middle ground, Smith seeks to 
establish a ‘cultural history of nations’ that accounts for both historical and modern 
variables in identity construction.  Such an approach is particularly relevant to any 
discussion of Mongolian identity as both historical and modern causes have affected its 
development.  
 
While both primordialist and modernist accounts of national identity contain useful 
insights into identity development, alone they are unable to account for the Mongolian 
experience.  In particular, both approaches remain too rigid and entrenched in their 
positions to accommodate a national identity with both pre-modern and modern 
components. 
 
Regarding primordialism, its evolutionary approach to national identity formation places 
its roots in the ‘medieval period and in some cases much earlier’ (Llobera 2003:15). In 
doing so, it presents national sentiment based on collective self-consciousness as part and 
parcel of a ‘ethno-cultural nation’ (Smith 2003:26).  This interpretation of national 
identity and nation building as existing in a pre-modern era is in direct contrast with a 
modernist reading, which views nations as entirely modern phenomena. 
 
So, too, does a strict modernist reading of identity formation fall short of explaining the 
Mongolian experience.  In an almost diametrically opposed view of identity formation to 
that of primordialism, modernist view the nation as identity’s crux, paying little attention 
to identity within the nation (Grosby 2003:9).  This allows for a fundamental mis-reading 
of identity that treats it as dependent on the nation.  Such an interpretation of the nation 
subsuming identity is inappropriate for understanding modern Mongolian identity.   
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In contrast, Smith’s ethno-symbolist approach to identity formation draws on ethnicity, 
geography, and culture while acknowledging nations as entirely modern entities.  For 
Smith, the ‘ethnic community’, or ethnos, is the ‘base’ or ‘core’ of a national identity, or 
national consciousness (Smith 2009:26).  This transition from one to the other occurs 
when the already existing ethnos develops parallel political institutions that draw on 
established social and symbolic identities for legitimacy and subsequently reinforce their 
distinction from other groups (Smith 2009:57-58).  The result is the nation, which Smith 
defines as consisting of a ‘unified legal code’, ‘unified economy’, a ‘compact territory’, 
and a ‘political culture’ (Smith 1997:69). 
 
This perception of the nation development breaks distinctly with a modernist 
interpretations, which views nations as entirely modern socio-political entities (Gellner 
2006:5-8).  Smith critiques the modernist approach by arguing that nations in large part 
are held together by concepts of cultural-psychological history that have developed over 
time (Smith 1997:69).  Yet it also breaks with a primordialist interpretation of national 
identity formation by arguing that the nation is a modern entity rather than having its 
roots in pre-modern times.    
 
Smith’s focus on ethnos as the central role in establishing communities fits neatly with 
the development of Mongolian identity.  Indeed, modern Mongolian identity draws 
heavily on a perceived ethnos for legitimacy.  This sense of ethnic ‘belonging’ is based 
on ‘a collective common name’, ‘a myth of common ancestry’, ‘shared historical 
memories’, ‘one or more differentiating elements of a common culture’, ‘an association 
with a specific “homeland”’, and a ‘sense of solidarity for significant sectors of the 
population’ (Smith 1991:21).  So, too, does approaching Mongolian identity through the 
paradigm of an ethnos highlight the developmental challenges it faces.     
 
Smith’s understanding of the nation as consisting of a ‘unified legal code’, ‘unified 
economy’, a ‘compact territory’, and a ‘political culture’, is also useful when examining 
the role the state plays in Mongolian identity formation.  Indeed, Smith’s clear division 
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between ethnos and the nation allows for analysis of potential conflict or tension between 
the two.  Indeed, ethno-symbolism’s stress on the need to analyse the relations between 
what Smith calls the ‘elite proposals’ (the state) and ‘majority responses’ (society) 
provides a useful perspective to understanding internal tensions within Mongolian society 
(Smith 2009:31).    
 
As ethno-symbolism offers a theoretical path for a ‘successful’ ethnic community’s 
transition to a nation, it is possible to conversely infer potential challenges to an ethnos’ 
ability to expand beyond its cultural and ethnic base.  Smith’s perception of an ethnos as 
the ‘core’ of a national identity or nation provides insight into why a divided ethnic 
community, separated geographically within the boundaries of its traditional ‘fatherland’, 
cannot easily manifest into a national identity.  This approach to analysing Mongolian 
identity development is particularly relevant.     
 
The following chapter will draw on historical and present day documents in English, 
Chinese, and Mongolian to establish a holistic understanding of Mongolian identity 
development.   
 
2.1 Pre-Modern Mongolian Identity 
 
The Han Dynasty 
 
Written records from the Chinese Han Dynasty make mention of a nomadic people to the 
north and west, referred to as the Xiongnu, whose raids on Chinese settlements were a 
great cause of concern (Rossabi 1997:55). 1   These Xiongnu, however, were not a unified 
people with a common language and culture.  Rather, the inclusive Chinese concept 
misrepresented a scattering of ethnic Mongols, Turks, and Tungus, who had by the Han 
dynasty developed independent and unrelated customs, languages, and cultures. Yet from 
the Chinese perspective, it is understandable why no attempt was made to further 
                                                
1 For the sake of simplicity, this chapter’s reference to the ‘Chinese’ through the various epochs of Greater China’s 
history includes all those sedentary, agricultural peoples residing within dynastic territory, sharing a common sense of 
culture and ethnic belonging.  
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distinguish between these various ethnic groups.  For the Han Dynasty Chinese, both 
sedentary and agricultural, the northern tribes all shared several common traits that made 
them essentially the same, most specifically their pastoral nomadic lifestyle and 
equestrian skills.   
  
Understanding the differences between the sedentary Chinese way of life and the 
nomadic Mongols, Turks, and Tungus is essential when attempting to define Mongolia’s 
pre-modern identity as, according to Armstrong, ethnic groups identify themselves in part 
by exclusion (Armstrong 1982:5).  Indeed, for the nomadic tribes, Chinese communities 
offered a stark contrast to their own existence.  Whereas the Mongols, Turks, and Tungus 
practiced pastoralism, or animal husbandry, the Chinese were agriculturalists.  While the 
Xiongnu were tribal, belonging to kinship groups based on shared linguistic traits rather 
than aligned to a larger nation, the Chinese of the Han period were part of an empire and 
thus considered themselves part of a larger state (Soucek 2007:104).  This dichotomy led 
to mutual distrust and distaste as the nomadic tribes thought the Chinese weak and the 
Chinese, in return, believed the Xiongnu to be cultureless savages.  
   
Thus from the very beginning of recorded ‘Mongolian’ history, ‘Chinese’ identity played 
a large part in its formation. For it was the Chinese identity that considered the Xiongnu 
as part of a cohesive nomadic opposition to its own sedentary culture while also 
providing the first written accounts of the northern ’barbarians’.  This externally 
imagined community of tribes united against sedentary China would later prove 
invaluable in creating elements of Mongol ethnos such as a perceived shared history and 
the belief in a common cultural foundation.     
 
Chinggis Khan and Mongolian Pre-modern Identity  
   
In the twelfth century, Chinggis Khan united the Xiongnu into a political and military 
entity with a common cultural identity. His success in subsuming inter-tribal conflict in 
order to facilitate a coalition of tribes is one of the great general’s most significant non-
military accomplishments.  Indeed, while the Mongol empire lasted less than two 
  41 
hundred years, Chinggis Khan’s greatest legacy for the Mongol people is in his having 
provided a collective historical narrative that various ethnic Mongolian tribes (or states) 
would draw upon in the future as the basis for defining a common identity.  
 
Yet when Chinggis Khan rose to power, ‘Mongolia’ was more populated with Turkish 
nomads than with Mongolians (Baabar 1999:21).  Mongolian speaking tribes were 
confined to the east of the Tula and Orkhan rivers (the eastern region of modern day 
Mongolia) as far as the Khingan mountain range which separated Mongolia from 
Manchuria (Soucek 2007:104).   Moreover, while these tribes did indeed all speak 
Mongolian, ethnically they included Tatars from Siberia and Turks.  This division of 
tribes united under what history has retroactively labelled the ‘Mongol’ empire 
complicates any attempt to isolate a pre-modern Mongolian identity. 
  
This is not to say, however, that a sense of identity specific to the united peoples did not 
arise during the massive collectivisation and that this identity did not have a specifically 
‘Mongolian’ character to it.  Ethnic Mongols did form the coterie of leadership that 
oversaw the military movement.  Moreover, countries invaded by the Mongolian army, 
from China, to Hungary, to Iran, did not take the time to differentiate between ethnic and 
cultural tribes but rather wrote of the invading forces as a single entity with reference to 
its military commanders and statesmen, not the soldiers.  The result was nothing less than 
the construction of the ‘Mongol’ empire as an entirely ethnic Mongolian war machine 
while, in fact, the opposite is true.  The Mongolian empire was, rather, a hodgepodge of 
various nomadic peoples of many different ethnic backgrounds.  Nevertheless, the 
concept of the Mongol empire and its specifically Mongolian composition is without a 
doubt one of the central pillars of pre-modern and modern Mongolian identity 
composition.  It serves not only as a shared history, but also as a very real and active 
element of Mongolian pride and nationalist sentiment. 
   
Regardless of its actual composition, the Mongolian empire was short-lived.  Indeed, the 
disintegration of Chinggis Khan’s empire began in his own lifetime, the result of his 
decision to divide his kingdom between his sons.  The choice to break up the kingdom 
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into parts, each ruled over by men of different age, familial loyalties, and ability, 
followed the nomadic practice of naming successors rather than the primogenitor 
principle in a hereditary monarchy (Soucek 2007:112).  Ultimately, this decision would 
result in internal strife that, after several generations, would break the kingdom apart as 
brother fought brother for a larger share of the whole.  The eventual cost would be 
nothing less than the forged sense of ‘Mongolian’ identity and the maintenance of the 
empire.   
     
Khubilai Khan and the Yüan Dynasty    
 
Khubilai Khan, while without a doubt a brilliant Mongolian general and ruler, may bear 
at least a portion of the blame for the Mongolian empire’s eventual collapse.  While this 
may seem counterintuitive as he increased the size and power of the Mongolian empire to 
its zenith during his time as ruler, his adoption of several ‘Chinese’ qualities succeeded in 
creating enough of a Mongolian identity ‘crisis’ that, following his death, the empire was 
unable to maintain continuity and broke into pieces of culturally divided ethnic Mongols.   
 
Rising to prominence after the first Mongolian civil war, Khubilai Khan consolidated 
power after the death of his older brother, Mönke, by defeating rival claims to the 
Mongolian throne (Rossabi 1989:46).  He then proclaimed himself qaghan, or ‘supreme 
ruler’, thereby creating for himself a position equal to only that which Chinggis had 
occupied before him.  While Khubilai Khan would spend the rest of his life fighting rival 
claims to the Mongolian leadership, he solidified his position as Khan through his 
conquest of the Southern Chinese Song Empire; the last of the three Chinese empires that 
fell to the Mongols.  With the fall of the Song Empire, Khubilai Khan had effective 
control over the entire Chinese territory.   
 
Consequentially, Khubilai, much less a nomadic spirit than his grandfathers and father, 
moved the Mongolian capital from Qaraqorum in his ancestral northern steppe to Beijing.  
This, coupled with his decision to claim the dynastic title of ‘Yüan’ (Chinese: meaning 
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‘origin, source’), marked a significant shift in Mongolian perceptions of sedentary 
lifestyle, as well as Chinese culture and Mongolian identity (Morgan 1990:121). 
 
Although the Yüan Dynasty lasted for less than one hundred years, it provided a bridge 
between Chinese and Mongolian cultures that deeply influenced both people in regard to 
identity formation.  For the Chinese, the Yüan Dynasty meant rule by a foreign, barbaric 
power and, in this regard, was a dark period in Chinese history.  Indeed, the Mongol 
occupation of China led to widespread anti-foreign sentiments in China that are some of 
the earliest examples of Chinese nationalism.  Yet it is worth noting that some Chinese 
accepted the legitimacy of the Yüan so much so as to actively oppose Ming aggression 
against the weakened empire.  Indeed, many Chinese believed the Mongols presented less 
of a threat the more they grew to accept Chinese sedentary lifestyle, particularly when it 
had what Anderson calls ‘civilising’ affects (Anderson 2006:13).  The division between 
Chinese perceptions of the Yüan Dynasty’s legitimacy, is a paradigm of the period’s 
identity confusion as the boundaries of Khubilai’s Mongol empire blended together with 
Chinese culture and vice versa.            
  
For the Mongols, the Yüan Dynasty meant something quite different.  To begin, a great 
deal of opposition existed within the Mongolian ruling class as to the correctness of 
Khubilai’s decision to move the capital from the Mongolian steppe to Beijing.  A key 
component of the nomadic identity at the time included opposition to sedentary living 
which was considered corrosive and weak (Baabar 1999:47). Thus, a division opened 
between those ethnic Mongolian tribes that preferred assimilation into Chinese society 
and those that held it with disdain.  During the empire’s final years, this division between 
the ‘pro-Chinese’ and the ‘nomadic’ Mongols became far more pronounced.    
  
Second to this division in terms of lasting influences on the pre-modern and modern 
Mongolian identity was the introduction of Buddhism into the Yüan Dynasty.  Facilitated 
by Khubilai Khan’s own sympathies towards Buddhism, the Mongolian ruling class and 
Tibetan spiritual authorities developed what would later become know as the ‘priest-
patron’ relationship.  This symbiotic relationship consisted of Tibetan monks providing 
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Buddhist education to various ethnic Mongolia tribal elites while those same ethnic 
Mongolians guaranteed the Tibetans military support against various aggressors.  This 
relationship continued under various forms until 1717 when the Qing Dynasty succeeded 
in establishing a seventh Dalai Lama under their control and the several large ethnic 
Mongol tribes left were too divided geographically and socially to mount an effective 
collective response (Goldstein 1995:1-15).  Yet despite this break in ‘priest-patron’ 
relations between Mongolia and Tibet, Buddhism remained an essential component on 
ethnic Mongolian identity until the Soviet Union launched a violence campaign of 
repression against Buddhist activity in the twentieth century.  Since Mongolia’s transition, 
however, Buddhism has experienced a revival of sorts in the country and remains a 
central component of Mongolian identity, 
 
Third in terms of pre-modern identity formation at the time was the sense that the 
Mongols and Chinese had become increasingly united in shared historical dialogue.  
While ethnic Mongolian leaders lived separately from the ethnic Han Chinese during 
periods of the Yüan Dynasty, Khubilai’s tolerance towards cultures and religions helped 
marry the pre-modern Mongolian identity to Chinese identity in such a way that neither 
can be conceptualised during the period without reference to the other.  While this sense 
of mutual belonging in no way means that the two ethnic groups achieved overall 
fraternal relations, the sense of ruler/ruled contributed to an already existing sense of the 
Other that deepened the two people’s identity dependency and that continues to do so 
today.      
    
The Ming Dynasty  
 
The rise of the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) marked the end of the Yüan Dynasty and, 
subsequently, what had for a short time been the common identity of Mongols, Tungus, 
and Turks under the Mongolian empire.  Unable to maintain the more sedentary skills 
they had developed during the Yüan Dynasty, and unable to remain in large groups as the 
land could not support the livestock which were the centre of their nomadic economy, the 
northern tribes once united under Chinggis Khan split along geographic lines and spread 
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throughout Central and Inner Asia.  Ethnic Mongolians reverted to tribal levels of 
identification as without the common empire, their collective identity was not strong 
enough to supersede kinship-based groupings.  These tribal divisions scattered 
throughout the region, some staying on in China while others returned to the northern 
steppe. 
 
Although many ethnic Mongolian tribes returned to their nomadic lifestyle after the Yüan 
Dynasty, others, having grown accustomed to certain luxury items which nomadic 
society was incapable of producing, found themselves ever more reliant on trade than 
animal husbandry.  The need for goods such as tea, textiles, and metal tools, put those 
tribes that had become more detached from their nomadic pasts and more content in a 
sedentary culture in a position of dependency in relation to Chinese mercantilism. Further, 
it drew some ethnic Mongol tribes closer to the Chinese empire while creating a sense of 
alienation from those who chose to return to a nomadic lifestyle.  This led to division 
among Mongolian tribes as some fell out of favour with the Chinese while others enjoyed 
favouritism and special rights (Sanjdorj 1980:14).  It also created situations where the 
Mongolian peasantry openly rebelled against their feudal lords thereby creating internal 
strife and animosity within the tribal groups themselves.   
 
Further exacerbating identification discontinuity among ethnic Mongolians was the 
Ming’s policy of division towards the various scattered tribes.  In order to prevent any 
future dynamic leader from gathering enough influence to incite the separate tribes to join 
together against China, the Ming developed relations with the various tribal elites in order 
to use them to balance one against the other.  If at any time the Ming sensed a particular 
tribe was growing too strong, it would throw its support behind its opposition.  Through 
this simple tactic of wavering support, the Ming emperors were able to effectively 
emasculate the Mongol threat and stymie the development of a collective pre-modern 
Mongolian identity.  
  
While there remained a scattering of tribes connected along linguistic lines, not ethnically, 
throughout Greater Mongolia and Central Asia, three distinct groups of ethnic Mongols 
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returned to the steppe and began developing their own cultures and societies in relative 
isolation from one another.2  These were the Khalh, Oirat, and Ordos/Tümet Mongols and 
their distinct separation from one another both geographically and culturally has been 
perpetuated down to the present day.     
 
The Khalh Mongols congregated in the north and east in what is today the modern 
Mongolian state.  In the east, they built a society based on Buddhism and came close to 
extinction as more than thirty percent of the men joined monasteries and became celibate 
monks.  This drastically divided the Khalh even further along non-ethnic based lines, as 
those in the north did not share the same fundamentalist approach to Buddhism.  
 
The Oirat migrated westward towards Kazakhstan and southern Siberia.  Of the three 
distinct groups, the Oirat maintained the closest links to a more traditional concept of 
Chinggis Khan’s united Mongolian identity as well as the closest ties to Tibet (Goldstein 
1995:10).  In the south, the region which later would split from Greater Mongolia to 
become China’s Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region (IMAR), the Ordos and Tümet 
established closer, albeit temperamental, relations with the Chinese (Soucek 2007:167).      
  
This break-up of ethnic Mongols in the 1300s would prove to be detrimental in both the 
formation of a modern Mongolian national identity, as well as instrumental in the 
establishment of Inner Mongolia during the Manchu’s Qing Dynasty.  This division 
essentially created a situation whereby the disconnected tribal units were similar to those 
in the pre-Chinggis northern steppe.  Once again, the tribes found themselves without a 
leader and were further torn apart by Ming manipulations to keep them thus divided 
(Baabar 1999:52).  Ironically, while having shocked the world with their military might 
and widespread victories and conquests, the Mongolians, less than two hundred years 
after Chinggis Khan’s unification and mobilization, were disunited and unable to 
maintain a common ‘Mongolian’ identity or state.    
                                                
2 From this point, the chapter will deal with ethnic Mongolian groups rather than the collective northern tribes that 
formed the Xiongnu.  The reason for this is that tribal unity, essential to understanding the Mongol empire and Yüan 
Dynasty, becomes less important during the Ming and Qing as the tribes become once again divided.  As the chapter is 
interested in the formation of modern Mongolian identity, it is logical to focus exclusively on ethnic Mongols from the 
Ming onward. 
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The Qing 
 
When the Manchu launched an invasion against the Ming Dynasty in the early 1600s, 
they looked to the southern Ordos and Tümet Mongols and the eastern Khalh for support 
(Lattimore 1935:38).  Sharing a common nomadic background, as well as the promise of 
a loftier position in the post-Ming hierarchy, many ethnic Mongols readily joined the 
Manchu and those who resisted were quickly conquered (Lattimore 1955:14).  In this 
regard, the southern and eastern Mongols were an elemental part of the Manchu’ 
successful campaign as they provided a buffer zone between Manchuria3 and northern 
China.   
  
The Manchu captured Beijing in 1644, thus solidifying their hold over the majority of 
China while officially ending the Ming Dynasty.  By this time, the Ordos and Tümet and 
the eastern Khalh were under direct Manchu control.  Unable to extend its domination 
over the Mongols to the north, the Manchu annexed southern Mongolia, thereby 
including it within Qing Dynasty boundaries and geographically dividing the Mongolian 
people along a north-south axis.  This cleft between ethnic Mongolian tribes and the two 
halves of the traditional ‘Mongolian’ territory has never been reconciled and is still 
evident in the division between the PRC’s IMAR, which is composed of Ordos and 
Tümet Mongols, and Mongolia, which is primarily Khalh. 
  
Of course Qing Dynasty policies differed between the southern and northern Mongols, 
creating more division between the geographically divided ethnic groups.  In order to 
maintain good relations with the Ordos and Tümet in the south, the Qing encouraged 
intermarriage between tribal leaders and Manchu princesses.  The Manchu also conferred 
Ordos and Tümet feudal lords with titles and lands in exchange for military support and 
regional stability.  In order to prevent unification among the various Ordos and Tümet 
tribes, the Qing strategically played them one against the other in an effort to undermine 
what they feared could potentially prove a threat to the Manchu domination of northern 
                                                
3 Present day Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning provinces as well as parts of Siberia. 
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China (Kotin & Elleman 1999:39).  The Manchu achieved this division by organising the 
ethnic Mongols into banners—military groups arranged along feudal and tribal lines—
and did not allow inter-banner interaction.  They further rewarded the lords of each 
banner according to their service and loyalty.  This, in turn, led to competition and 
distrust between them.  This purposeful division not only created a sense of animosity 
among the various tribes, but also contributed to disunity among the Ordos and Tümet 
that they were unable to overcome at the fall of the Qing Dynasty.  The result was the 
two groups’ inclusion in the People’s Republic of China (Lattimore 1955:23). 
  
The Khalh Mongols presented different obstacles for integration and, as a result, the Qing 
adopted a policy aimed at establishing suzerainty rather than sovereignty.  The Khalh 
Mongols were far less important to the Manchu’s security as geographically they were 
further removed from northern China and did not pose the same potential threat.  
Additionally, the Gobi desert, which divided the northern Khalh from ‘Inner’ Mongolia, 
created logistical problems for the Qing in regards to maintaining a permanent military 
presence in the region.  The Manchu, therefore, decided the cost of the military and 
administrative resources necessary to incorporate the Khalh into China was greater than 
the benefit of bringing northern Mongolia into the Qing Empire.  As long as the northern 
Mongols remained fragmented and posed no serious threat, the Manchu chose to view 
them as an entity separate from the Ordos and Tümet (Lattimore 1935:61).  The result 
was far less interaction between the Manchu and the Khalh which in turn allowed for a 
greater sense of collective identity to develop than among the more assimilated Ordos 
and Tümet (Lattimore 1955:18).   
  
While the Khalh, Ordos, and Tümet Mongols offered little resistance to the expanding 
Qing Empire, the same cannot be said for the western Oirats.  Indeed, the Oirats offered 
fierce resistance and tried, unsuccessfully, to create a pan-Mongolian response to the 
Manchu conquest.  While proximity to Manchuria undoubtedly contributed to the 
differences in responses between the various ethnic Mongol tribes as the Ordos and 
Tümet directly bordered Manchuria and could not have successfully resisted Manchu 
expansion, the Oirats nevertheless became the vanguard ‘Mongols’ in terms of identity.  
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Indeed, whereas the other ethnic Mongol groups tacitly accepted their subservience to 
Qing rule, the Oirats actively tried to appeal to a Mongol ethnic community to create 
unity where before none existed (Baabar 1999:80).   
  
When examining the development of a Mongolian identity under the Qing Dynasty, the 
western Oirat present a challenge as they were fundamentally the most ‘Mongolian’ of all 
the geographically and ethnically divided Mongolians yet were all but decimated by Qing 
driven genocide by 1760 (Soucek 2007:169).  The Oirat’s lasting influence on Mongolian 
identity, therefore, is impossible to gauge.  While the Oirats did try to form a Pan-
Mongolian opposition to Qing Dynasty expansion in what was the first instance since the 
Yüan Dynasty of attempted ethnic Mongolian unity, they nevertheless failed to appeal to 
the Khalh because of long-standing mutual animosity and distrust (Soucek 2007: 170).  
Rather, in response to the Khalh decision to align with the Qing in order to balance Oirat 
power, the Oirats invaded northern Mongolia forcing the Khalh to temporarily flee to 
‘Inner’ Mongolia.  The invasion proved the decisive factor for Qing intervention in 
northern Mongolian affairs as they intervened to reclaim the Khalh Mongols occupied 
territory (Bawden 1968:78).      
  
Part of the Oirat appeal for a common Mongolian identity came under the auspices of 
Buddhism.  By the seventeenth century, Buddhism had become a common defining 
feature of the Ordos, Tümet, Khalh, and Oirat Mongols and, therefore, provided the 
greatest potential for laying the foundation of a common collective Mongolian identity.  
Instrumental in the push to spread Buddhism throughout the Mongol tribes in the region 
was the Oirat leader, Galdan Khan.  A novice monk, Galdan believed Buddhism could 
serve as a unifying element for the Mongols just as it had for the Tibetans.  He believed 
that, with a common religion, the ethnic Mongols could overcome their mutual distrust 
and establish a formable alliance against Qing aggression.  Yet Buddhism proved 
insufficient to overcome ancient animosities and the conflicting identities that existed 
between the Khalh and Oirat at the time.  The Manchu, with the support from the Khalh, 
launched a massive campaign against the Oirat decimating the population and ending the 
internal drive for a specifically ‘Mongolian’ identity.  The Khalh, Ordon, and Tümet 
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chose, rather than align against a common enemy, to live within an administrative system 
that imposed tribal separation while essentially defining their respective identities. 
 
The Fall of the Qing  
 
In the early stages of the Qing Dynasty, the Manchu’ attitude toward the Mongols, 
especially those of ‘Inner’ Mongolia, was like that of a cousin to his distant kindred.  As 
the Manchu themselves were ‘barbarians’ by Han Chinese definition, they took care to 
elevate the status of the nomadic ethnic Mongols and to insulate them from the Han 
population at large.  The Qing accomplished this through restrictions of Han Chinese 
migration to ‘Inner' Mongolia, going so far as to severely limit trade and restrict 
intermarriage between the two peoples (Lattimore 1955:15).   
  
The Manchu dramatically reformed these policies as part of an effort to strengthen the 
Dynasty following a series of foreign military defeats and growing domestic opposition 
from nationalist and socialist groups (Spence 1991:245-256).  That most affecting a 
Mongolian identity was the Qing decision to allow Han Chinese migration into ‘Inner’ 
Mongolia.  What had before been a semi-protectorate under Manchu control in which the 
Qing encouraged cultural continuity and practiced religious tolerance in support of a 
‘Mongolian’ in contrast to ‘Han’ identity, became little more than another Chinese 
province with traditional pastureland losing ground to an increase in agricultural activity 
that fundamentally changed the region’s economic and administrative systems.  While 
before Ordos and Tümet ethnic Mongols had administered the ‘Inner’ Mongolian region, 
in the late nineteenth century Qing policy changed to where Han Chinese held the 
majority of positions of power (Lattimore 1955:20).  Moreover, Qing relaxation on the 
Banner system (a traditional tribal Mongolian administrative division into which the Han 
were not allowed to intermix) erased most forced divisions between the Han and ‘Inner 
Mongolian’ Mongols, thereby further diluting the Ordos and Tümet identity as they no 
longer enjoyed special privileges within the Qing hierarchy (Smith 1983:16).     
  
The 1911 Revolution 
  51 
 
Sensing that internal rebellion and foreign pressures had greatly weakened the Qing, the 
Khalh Mongols gambled and declared independence in 1911 (Bawden 1968:136).  To 
strengthen their claims, the Khalh looked north to Russia to find a protectorate that could 
balance Chinese claims to ‘Outer’ Mongolia and allow the Khalh space enough to define 
their administrative system based solely on Khalh terms.  The Khalh elected a Buddhist 
monk called the Bogd Javzundamba to lead the newly liberated region and launched a 
unification campaign to incorporate ‘Inner’ Mongolia into a Pan-Mongolian state (Onon 
& Pritchatt 1989:51).  
 
The 1911 Mongolian Revolution marks the turning point of Mongolian identity from the 
elusive ‘pre-modern’ ethnos to the far more tangible ‘modern’ nation (Smith 2001:10-12).  
Indeed, until the time around the 1911 revolution when the idea of a ‘Mongol’ state was 
first realistically conceived of in terms of modern concepts of statehood, the term 
‘Mongolian’ could only be applied loosely to a scattering of unconnected, often warring 
ethnic tribes.  The Manchu had all but annihilated the western Oirat, while ‘Inner’ 
Mongolia remained divided and inundated with Han Chinese.  Even the Khalh Mongols 
were not unified enough to fully support the idea of independence in 1911 as a large 
portion of the northern Mongols did not initially support the idea of an independent state 
under the Bogd Javzundamba and the western Khalh were involved in a separate struggle 
for independence under the revolutionary Ja Lama (Fritters 1949:163).     
  
In this sense, the pre-1911 concept of ‘Mongolian’ identity was a fragmented and 
constantly shifting entity because it included and excluded ethnic and tribal groups based 
more on geographic proximity than strict ethnic or linguistic lines. The weakness of a 
divided people systematically fractionalised for the better part of two hundred years, 
geographically separated by the immense Gobi desert, and shaped by varying degrees of 
Qing administrative freedom or repression, made forging a common national identity 
more or less impossible.4  
                                                
4 This is not to say that the divided Mongol tribes did not maintain a common cultural identity.  Whereas a national 
identity requires political unity to some degree, cultural identity can exist in different geographical regions without 
diminishing.   
  52 
 
The Mongolian revolution of 1911 provides, therefore, the first modern attempt to unify a 
group of ethnically similar tribes into what was conceptualised as a Mongolian state.  It is 
also a definitive moment in the history of Mongolian identity formation when one group 
of Mongolians, the Khalh, declared the formation of a sovereign regime intent on 
forming a state and national identity exclusive of an equally large number of ethnic 
Mongols.  While attempts were made by both sides to unify into a Pan-Mongolia, the 
Republic of China quickly intervened and quelled the movement.  1911, therefore, marks 
a turning point in modern Mongol identity from which Khalh Mongols, in what would 
shortly become the Mongolian People’s Republic, began to see ethnic Mongols within 
China as inherently not Mongolian (Bulag 1998:34).  The 1911 revolution in this sense is 
a useful starting point when considering the foundation upon which the modern 
Mongolian national identity was formed.5 
 
2.2 Modern Mongolian Identity   
 
Mongolia experienced three dramatic events surrounding ethnic identity in the twentieth 
century that merit examination when determining the role identity plays in regard to the 
modern state’s weakness.  First was the formation of a Mongolian sacred community 
based on Buddhism that occurred early in the twentieth century and was largely focused 
around the Khalh Mongols.  Second was the seventy-year period during which Soviet 
influence inspired the Mongolian government to institute strict demographic policy and 
forced migration aimed at weakening regionally based ethnic identities and replacing 
them with socialism (Bulag 1998:33).  Third was the resurgence of Mongolian identity 
based on a perceived ethnos following the end of the Cold War. While each instance 
contributed to the development of Mongolian identity, so, too, does each contain 
elements of ethnic disunity that contribute to divisions within the modern Mongolian 
identity. 
                                                
5 For the remainder of this chapter, I will use the term ‘Mongolian national identity’ to refer to the Mongols, Khalh or 
otherwise, residing within northern, or Outer, Mongolia.  Additionally, I will use the term ‘Mongols’ to refer to those 
Mongol tribes living Khalh dominated ‘Outer’ Mongolia while employing ‘Pan-Mongolia’ to include those ethnic 
Mongolians in Inner Mongolia and various other geographically divided regions.  Any deviation from these revised 
definitions will be qualified.      
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The Khalh Mongols and The Formation of the Mongolian ‘State’ 
 
As the Khalh Mongols found themselves in an advantageous position from which they 
could pursue a sovereign state independent of China, they assumed ‘Mongolian’ identity 
in full by looking at an imagined ‘Mongolian’ past of which they were only a small part.  
In order to successfully appropriate the Mongolian ethnos as their own, however, the 
Khalh needed to exclude large portions of ethnic Mongolians from the modern 
Mongolian identity.  Through this self-identification with a Mongolian identity rather 
than one focused exclusively on the smaller ethnic group, the Khalh drew on a larger 
historical narrative as well as signs and symbols that helped transcend the divisions 
within the Khalh while also establishing the basis for what had the potential to become a 
‘Mongolian’ nation.  
 
Following the country’s 1911 Revolution, the Khalh Mongols, led by the Buddhist 
spiritual leader Bogd Javzundamba, formed a quasi-state centred around Buddhism.  
Lacking formal institutions of control, the ‘state’ was more accurately what Anderson 
calls a ‘sacred community’ that used religion to shape a common sense of history and 
time and in turn a communal identity (Anderson 2006:22). Yet as the Bogd 
Javzundamba’s sacred community excluded the IMAR’s ethnic Mongols, it contained 
elements of weakness from its inception that were vulnerable to exploitation by external 
power.  Indeed, the Khalh’s decision to form a ‘sacred’ community at the expense of the 
larger ethnos solidified a division between the two largest ethnic Mongolian groups that 
exists into present time.  This weakness was even more pronounced as the Bogd 
Javzundamba’s sacred community lacked the means to establish a state capable of 
translating the burgeoning ‘Mongolian’ identity into a nationalist identity and a 
subsequent Mongolian nation.   
 
Indeed, while the collapse of the Qing Dynasty afforded the Khalh the opportunity to first 
declare independence in 1911, it was the Russian Revolution of 1917 that provided the 
newly emergent Mongolian state with a doctrine by which to lay the foundation for an 
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administration system, social order, and a subsequent national ideological agenda.  In this 
regard, while the events in and around 1911 helped shape modern Mongolian identity, the 
Russian Revolution was far more important for the construction of the Mongol state.  
 
Early Soviet influence in Mongolian state building created a situation in which Mongolia 
became dependent on the Soviet Union militarily, developmentally, administratively, and 
ideologically.  Before Mongolia was able to build its own internal mechanisms for 
sovereign control—mainly establishing a rule of law, a primarily ‘Mongolian’ system of 
governance, cultivating foreign relations with various actors to balance one another, or 
developing an alternative ideology to that imposed from Moscow—it found itself under 
strong Soviet influence and involved in the international Marxist-Leninist revolution. As 
Mongolia was dependent on the Soviet Union for protection against China, as well as to 
buttress its claim at being a sovereign state, it entered into what Bruce Moon calls a 
Bargaining Model with the USSR.  The essence of the bargaining model, according to 
Moon, is that ‘powerful nations secure the cooperation of weaker states chiefly through 
the use of reward and punishment behaviour’ (Moon 1983:317)  
 
Yet in many ways Soviet communism often failed to impress the Mongols, particularly 
those in the countryside who could not see any tangible benefit come from the imposed 
socialist policy.  Indeed, communism seemed ill adapted to fit the Mongolian economic 
model as more than 70 % of the Khalh were herders and there was no proletariat class to 
lead a communist revolution.  Early attempts to structure Mongolian animal husbandry 
around a collective system led to widespread revolts and famine while anti-clerical 
campaigns launched in the name of socialist doctrine caused massive resentment towards 
Soviet interference. 
 
The result was an emergence of localism focused on geographic and ethnic relations that 
grew among Khalh Mongols in response to what many viewed as communist inspired 
policy failure.  This localism, in turn, provided a direct threat to Soviet influence in 
Mongolia.  It was, however, equally full of opportunity for the Soviets as it also 
contained an element of deep-seated anti-Chinese sentiment that helped maintain 
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Mongolian dependency on Russia in light of the need to balance Chinese power.  For this 
reason, so long as the Khalh Mongolians believed they were vulnerable to Chinese 
expansionism, and the Mongolian elite was pro-Moscow, the Soviets sought to redirect 
Mongolian localism to best serve their regional policy goals.  Only when such localism 
was directed against the Soviet Union was it aggressively denounced as being contrary to 
Marxist principles by reminding the Mongols that Marx claimed ‘working men have no 
country’ (Marx 1998:36). 
 
The Soviet Union and the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party  
 
Established in 1920 by the Khalh revolutionaries Sühbaatar and Choybalsan among 
others, the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) inherited an ideological 
base from the Bolsheviks and accordingly adapted the nationalist movement to fit with 
communist principles (Ballis 1956:299).  As Bolshevik communism provided a 
framework of national organisation, as well as the promise of raising the Mongols to a 
position of self-sufficiency in the theoretically non-hierarchical international communist 
system, the appeal of such an ideology is clear.  The result, as with the state’s decision to 
adhere to democratic capitalism some seventy years later, was domestic political 
acceptance of an ideology conceptualised and shaped in a foreign milieu that was entirely 
foreign to existing Mongolian identity politics. 
  
The Soviet presence began in Mongolia in 1921 with the MPRP’s request for military and 
financial support from the Bolsheviks to expel the White Russian forces that had been 
occupying Mongolia’s capital, Ulaanbaatar, for nearly a year.  This invitation created a 
Mongolian sanctioned opportunity for the Red Army to establish a military presence in 
Mongolia for support against the Chinese ‘threat’ of re-invasion.  Therefore, once Red 
troops drove the White Russians from Ulaanbaatar and disbanded their forces, they 
remained in place as advisors and a military deterrent against regional aggressors.  The 
same year, the Mongols declared independence for the second time under MPRP 
leadership thereby breaking with the already established, quasi-sovereign Buddhist 
regime (Lattimore 1930:320).  While the declaration came from such revolutionaries as 
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Sühbaatar and Choybalsan, most scholars agree that it was instigated by the Bolsheviks 
and only retroactively attributed to an internal call for revolution (Isono 1976:394).  
Regardless of the actual process, the result remained the same: a Soviet Union supported 
coup d'état against the existing Khalh sacred community and fledgling Buddhist-based 
Mongolian identity.   
 
It is important to note that the growing Soviet influence in Mongolia did not go unnoticed 
by China which still, under a 1915 agreement with Tsarist Russia, claimed suzerainty 
over the region.  In 1921, the Republic of China, through the Chinese attaché to Moscow, 
Li Gongzan, made what would be its last attempt to re-establish a military and diplomatic 
presence in Ulaanbaatar by demanding that Red Russian troops withdraw from Mongolia 
so that Chinese troops could replace them (Elleman 1993:548).  The Russian 
plenipotentiary, Aleksandr K. Paikes, responded that Red troops would withdraw at the 
request of the Mongolian government. This defiant stance, supported by the Soviet 
military presence, effectively established Mongolia’s independence from Chinese rule 
and Russia’s position as a third-party ‘mediator’ between the two states.  While 
diplomacy continued for several more years, China’s relatively weak position at the time 
left it little leverage and it eventually succumbed to Russian dominance in Outer 
Mongolia (Elleman 1993:561). As a result of the loss, however, China did tightened its 
hold on Inner Mongolia, thereby further separating the two regions and further inflaming 
Outer Mongolian anti-Chinese sentiments. 
 
This development had a huge impact on modern Mongolian identity.  First, it allowed the 
country to consider itself as formally detached from China and, thereby, officially hold 
itself in opposition against the Other.  Second, it forced a closer bond between Russia and 
Mongolia that would last throughout most of the twentieth century and that still plays an 
important role in Mongolian identity today.  Lastly, it helped the Soviet Union and the 
MPRP to consolidate what up to that point had been localism, or multi-nationalism, into a 
national identity based on communist ideology.     
 
The Death of the Bogd Javzundamba, ‘Class Struggle’, and Collectivisation  
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The Bogd Javzundamba died in 1924, marking the end point of Buddhism as an 
organizing principle for Mongolian society.  While between 1911 and his death, the Bogd 
Javzundamba’s influence as a politician and spiritual leader had largely balanced the 
socialist MPRP in so much that he represented an alternative Mongolian identity to 
socialism, his death allowed the MPRP to consolidate its power and force the country 
down a purely socialist path (Rahul 1989:9).   
  
The MPRP did so at the first meeting of the Great People’s Khural (assembly) on 8 
November 1924 when it declared Mongolia a republic (Sanders 1987:20).  Acting further 
under the advice of Soviet advisors, the MPRP declared that the Bogd Javzundamba 
would not have a successor and that Mongolia would thereafter be called the Mongolian 
People’s Republic (MPR).  This decision effectively nullified the position the Bogd 
Javzundamba had held for more than a decade with the purpose of weakening the 
Lamaist church and the popular support it received as the centre of the Mongolian sacred 
community and a Buddhist-based Mongolian identity (Ballis 1956:303).   
  
The MPRP also used the Great People’s Khural, attended by Comintern representatives, 
to adopt a new constitution modelled after the Soviet constitution (Ballis 1956:305).  The 
new constitution, ‘nationalized lands, mineral wealth, forests, and water resources; it 
cancelled individual and hoshun (collective) debts to foreign traders, and abolished the 
system of mutual guarantee of debts; it established a state monopoly of foreign trade, to 
be introduced gradually; and it declared the determination of the state to end the “feudal 
theocratic regime” of Outer Mongolia’ (Murphy 1966:98).  The constitution deprived the 
clergy and nobles of their titles and political rights while expelling Chinese merchants 
from Ulaanbaatar (Ballis 1956:305).  Thus the MPRP moved one step closer to 
institutionalising a communist-based nationalist identity through policies that sought not 
only to administer the country’s political and economic development, but also limit the 
legitimacy of alternative forms of identity through institutional restriction.  
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In 1927, Soviet advisors sought to push the MPRP even further as it warned the party of 
Buddhism’s conflicting ideology and interference with Marxism-Leninism and suggested 
total eradication of the Lamaist church (Sandag & Kendall 2000:70).  While many 
Mongolian leaders feared the ramifications of an overt attack on Buddhism, most 
especially as lamas represented a large portion of the overall population and upwards of 
one hundred lamas were members of the MPRP, Soviet pressure mounted to the point 
where inaction was no longer possible (Bawden 1968:328).  In 1932, the Soviet 
Comintern Executive Committee and the All-Union Communist Party Central Committee 
demanded that the MPRP adhere to the socialist principles of its 1924 constitution and 
launch an anti-clerical and anti-feudalist campaign in order to assure true ‘egalitarianism’ 
in the MPR.  Led by the Mongolian Secret Police, of which the future prime-minister 
Horloogiyn Choybalsan was head, the MPRP accepted Moscow’s directive and instigated 
an intensive programme of persecution of lamas and destruction of Buddhist temples 
(Gellner 1987:383).  The campaign lasted from 1932 until 1939, at which time all the 
lamaseries were closed and organised Buddhism in Mongolia all but destroyed (Bawden 
1968:328).   
  
An additional Soviet inspired policy that would have a significant effect on Mongolian 
identity was collectivisation.  In line with a 1929 Soviet-Mongolian agreement, the 
motivation behind collectivisation was to exclude private and foreign investment from 
the Mongolian economy while nationalising private herds (Kotin & Elleman 1999:110).  
Mongolian herders were forbidden to trade or sell with any country other than the Soviet 
Union while those with excessive livestock were considered feudal and ‘struggled’ 
against.  The results were disastrous as those with herds large enough to find themselves 
accused of being ‘feudal’ slaughtered their livestock en mass and millions of animals 
died from lack of vigilance and food on communal farms.  Moreover, forced 
collectivisation acted in direct opposition to nomadism, one of the central tenets in 
Mongolian identity. 
  
These three developments—the Bogd Javzundamba’s death, ‘class struggle’, and 
collectivisation—had a tremendous impact on modern Mongolian identity.  Taken 
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together, they constituted a definitive break with the existing sacred community based on 
Buddhism as well as directly challenging important nomadic traditions that were 
elemental in imagining a historically ‘unbroken’ thread of pre-modern Mongolian 
identity.  Indeed, the end effect was nothing less than the complete break down of the 
Mongolian identity’s last remaining non-socialist institutions and the undoing of 
important historical ties to an alternative imagined past (Bulag 1998:33-34).   
 
Choybalsan and the Satellite State            
  
By 1932, Mongolia was divided by civil war.  Localism, before confined to the 
countryside, threatened to turn into an anti-Soviet nationalism that could challenge 
communism by appealing to signs and symbols based in the Khalh sacred community and 
nomadism. In response, the MPRP and Mongolian Revolutionary Army, supported by 
and acting on behalf of the Soviet Union, launched a campaign against those opposing 
communist realignment by labelling them ‘rebels’, Japanese spies, and saboteurs.  These 
‘rebels’ consisted of countryside herders, lamas, and a few anti-Soviet officials.  They 
were undisciplined troops lacking any cohesive structure other than their disconnected 
localism and their common resistance to Soviet and MPRP policies. The MPRP, however, 
could not quell the scattered violence alone and, therefore, had to request units of the 
Soviet army to intervene.  The MPRP’s decision to call on Soviet support to quell 
domestic unrest effectively handed control of the military and state to the Russians 
(Bawden 1968:290).  The Russian army was, of course, able to bring the countryside 
under control with little effort and re-establish communist-based nationalism throughout 
the MPR with a credibility it did not have before.   
  
Although the MPRP and Mongolian ‘rebels’ were directly in conflict during the 
Mongolian civil war, it is an oversimplification to present them as diametrically opposed.  
A clear indication of the ways in which the MPRP’s leadership at the time sympathised 
with the Mongolian people’s sense of a different ‘Mongolian’ identity based on a sacred 
community is visible in Prime Minister Peljidiin Genden’s attempts to step back from the 
aggressive Soviet-inspired policies.  Further indicative of Soviet control in Mongolia at 
  60 
the time is how Genden’s attempt to break with Russian interference in Mongolian 
national policy led to his being purged, executed, and replaced with the more malleable 
Choybalsan. 
 
Indeed, as the Japanese launched an invasion into China in 1937, it was essential that the 
Soviet Union have a Prime Minster in Mongolia who would actively support Soviet 
policy, direct nationalist sentiment, and maintain the military advantage Russia had in 
Mongolia (Carlson 1941:103).  In 1937, Horloogiyn Choybalsan was quick to fill this gap 
and managed to hold possession of the position until his death in 1952.  In addition to 
Prime Minster, by 1939 he held the posts of minister of war, minister of internal affairs, 
and chief of staff of the Mongolian Army (Ballis 1956:312).  Thus, by the end of the 
1930s, Choybalsan had successfully consolidated power, making himself the ‘Stalin’ of 
Mongolia without any serious rivalry capable of challenging his predominance.     
  
The source of Choybalsan’s political power was his willingness to accept direction from 
Moscow regarding policy, both foreign and domestic, without opposition.  In 1940, he 
reformed the Mongolian constitution to be more in line with the 1936 USSR Constitution 
(Ginsburgs 1961:142).  He instituted large-scale purges against members of the MPRP 
who expressed hesitation about a socialist path for the country.  Following the Russian 
model, Choybalsan opened gulags in the countryside to imprison dissident intellectuals 
and politicians (Sandag & Kendall 2000:70).  Within a few short years, Choybalsan 
turned Mongolia into a satellite state under Soviet control (Lattimore 1956:39). 
 
It is difficult to judge the degree to which Choybalsan affected the modern Mongolian 
identity, although he almost certainly had a lasting influence on the country’s norm 
development, social identity, and cognitive structure as he held dictatorial powers over 
the country for close to twenty years.  While it is not in this dissertation’s scope to 
examine the effect of his personality as a leader, his fiercely pro-Russian stance as well as 
his instrumental role in deepening Mongolia’s dependency on the Soviet Union 
economically, political, and, subsequently, socially, is a legacy easily measured by the 
state’s institutional development at the time of his death.  
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The People’s Republic of China 
 
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Mao Zedong overthrew the 
Guomindang (KMT) and established the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  This shift in 
Chinese government greatly changed the region’s dynamics as China’s relations with the 
Soviet Union improved and it recognized and established diplomatic relations with the 
MPR (Geisler 1959:183).  Whereas the Mongolian government had long considered 
China a direct threat, the major change in Chinese leadership, as well as Russia’s 
improved relations with the PRC, provided the MPRP with a chance to further develop 
ties to China.  Whereas Mongolia before had to act as a buffer between Russia and China, 
Russian-Sino détente in the 1950s allowed the MPRP to assume a more neutral position 
between the two great nations (Smith 1970:26).   
 
This allowed Mongolia to enjoy a very favourable position between the USSR and PRC 
for much of the 1950s (Rupen 1973:465). Indeed, increased cooperation between the two 
states directly benefited the MPR in terms of the country’s development and revenue.  
The most tangible example of this is the 1956 Sino-Soviet agreement to complete a 
railroad from Ulaanbaatar to Beijing, thereby connecting Russia and China through 
Mongolia for the first time.  The significance of the railroad is hard to overstate as it 
allowed the Mongolian government to collect transportation duties on goods passing 
between China and Russia while connecting previously isolated Mongolian towns and 
villages to a main line of transport.  Such infrastructure development contributed to the 
MPRP’s ability to develop important secondary cities such as Darkhan and Erdenet, 
thereby diversifying its centres of production (Rupen 1957:349).    
    
During this time, the PRC made a series of political overtures towards the MPRP based 
on policies that sought to further develop a sense of common identity based on the Yüan 
Dynasty, Chinggis Khan, and the IMAR.  In 1956, delegates from the PRC, MPR, and 
IMAR met to arrange a project to write a joint Sino-Mongolian history (Rupen 1957:344-
5).  The PRC agreed to adopt the use of the Cyrillic alphabet (in use since 1941 in 
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Mongolia) in Inner Mongolia so as to encourage cooperation between the MPR and 
China’s Mongols (Green 1986:1347).  In 1961, the Chinese celebrated the 800th 
anniversary of Chinggis Khan in the IMAR in an attempt to arouse Mongolian nationalist 
sentiment that would lead to calls for reunification with the IMAR Mongols (and 
subsequent closer relations with China).   
 
This appeal to identity did not, however, increase Mongolia-Sino relations at the cost of 
Soviet influence in the country.  By the late 1950s, Sino-Soviet relations began to sour as 
Mao Zedong sought to remain independent from Soviet control and expressed his 
dissatisfaction with several of Khrushchev’s China-related policies such as a détente with 
the United States.  Tensions between the two countries’ increased when Khrushchev 
reneged on his former promise to help China develop nuclear weapons (Zagoria 
1974:147).  In response to these developments, the MPRP expelled all Chinese workers 
from the MPR in 1964 in order to show it remained unequivocally aligned with Moscow 
(Haggard 1965:19).   
 
The period of Sino-Mongolian rapprochement is informative as to the role Mongolian 
identity played in the MPRP at the time in so much as Beijing sought to appeal to a 
common ethnos.  In doing so, the CCP offered the MPRP a chance to develop closer 
political relations with a state that not only encouraged an ethnic national identity, but 
also one that allowed for greater connectivity between the Khalh and Oirat Mongols.  Yet 
the MPRP declined closer relations, opting to maintain its authoritarian domestic regime 
rather than break ties with the Soviet Union.  This, in turn, further emphasises Mongolian 
ethnic identity’s weakness during the time it was a Soviet satellite state (Bloom 1991:61).  
  
Towards the Transition                             
 
By 1971, Mongolia was a virtual Soviet military colony housing bases, missiles, and 
troops (Rupen 1973:458).  Anti-Chinese propaganda was virulent through the 1970s and 
there was a clear discourse among MPRP officials that centred around the assertion that 
China’s influence on Mongolian culture, and the shared history between the two, was 
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largely exaggerated (Rupen 1979:82).  Indeed, the 1970s saw some of the first attempts to 
differentiate Khalh Mongols from Oirat Mongols, effectively denying that the Qing 
Dynasty had ever exerted political control in what was the contemporary MPR.  This is 
significant in so much that at this time the differences between Inner Mongolia and the 
MPR became more important for many ‘Outer’ Mongolians than the desire for 
unification.  Whereas Mongolian identity in the MPR was based in large part on 
socialism, the IMAR was without a doubt ‘Chinese’ and any sense of collective identity 
gave way to a desire for distance between the divided ethnic groups (Rupen 1979:97).       
 
The 1970s were, therefore, the apex of the MPR’s position as a Soviet constructed nation-
state.  Russia had succeeded in suppressing and fragmenting Mongolian ethnic identity 
and establishing socialism as the country’s unquestionable foundation of political 
legitimacy.  The result was nothing less than complete Mongolian dependence on the 
Soviet Union and subsequent linkage between the two state’s foreign policies.  Most of 
Mongolia’s key governmental institutions, from its judicial system, which was largely 
administrated according to the Soviet model and under Soviet advisory, to its very 
constitution, were based on Soviet models (Heaton, Jr. 1974:497).  Soviet interests 
dominated Mongolian policy to such an extent that, by 1970, the MPR had dropped its 
plans to develop an industrial sector and shifted its development priorities towards 
agriculture in order that it might produce the meat Russia deemed that country’s most 
valuable export.  Moreover, Soviet exports to Mongolia created a huge trade deficit for 
the MPR as it imported over 80 % more in value than it exported.  This position, clearly 
unbeneficial to Mongolia as it created a deep seated dependency on the USSR, 
nevertheless continued unchecked by Mongolian leadership (Heaton, Jr. 1974:498). 
    
Mongolia’s socialist identity was, however, once again challenged with the second Sino-
Russian détente in the early 1980s.  The tit-for-tat acts of aggression both countries 
engaged in throughout the 1960s and 1970s decreased by 1983 when Deng Xiaoping’s 
economic reform policy began to affect Chinese foreign policy.  On the Russian side, 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to power following Leonid Brezhnev’s death helped facilitate 
better relations between the Soviet Union and China (Batbayar 2003:954).  Both nations 
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engaged in efforts aimed at easing tension while Russia encouraged the MPRP to 
improve relations with the PRC.  While this is somewhat of an oversimplification as 
Sino-Soviet relations did not improve to such a degree that the two countries interacted 
without reservation, Soviet pressure to curb Mongolian anti-Chinese campaigns did 
indeed lead to Moscow’s removal of Tsedenbal’s from power in 1984 (Batbayar 
2003:954).  
 
In the last years of the Soviet Union, both perestroika and glasnost weakened the 
Communist Party by causing it to lose control over the command economy while 
exposing the party’s misrepresentation of the state’s economic stability (Koslowski & 
Kratochwil 1994:212).  Widespread revolution in Eastern Europe in 1989 led to the 
ouster of many communist governments and, consequentially, a weakening and ultimate 
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.  In December 1991, the Soviet Union was dissolved and 
replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent states (CIS).  Ironically, just as socialism 
became an established element of the MPR’s modern social identity, the Soviet Union-
led international communist movement began to unravel.  
 
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Mongolian government faced the 
prospect of economic collapse and political crisis.  In order to mitigate the crisis, the 
MPRP collaborated with international financial funds such as the IMF and World Bank.  
Such a realignment of government and economic doctrine dramatically diverged from the 
existing Mongolian identity. 
 
According to Bulag, elements of Mongolian society responded to the state’s transition 
and the threat of economic collapse with a resurgence of ethnic sentiment based on signs 
and symbols associated with its earlier sacred community as well as a common historical 
understanding of ‘Mongolian’ history as related to Chinggis Khan and the Mongol 
dynasty (Bulag 1998:52).  This burgeoning nationalism was, however, largely 
unsuccessful in forming a national identity as it did not align with the state’s existing 
political and economic structures.  Despite the identity continuity that came from drawing 
on a common history and symbols of a collective past, this buregeoning nationalist 
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identiy remained marginalised as it lacked institutional support.  The result was a division 
between Mongolian identity and the post-Cold War Mongolian state that remains a 
source of weakness today. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Modern Mongolian identity is complicated by a number of external variables that stymie 
its development into a national identity.  It lacks the ability to establish a solid ‘social 
base’ for a system of government more in line with a Mongolian ethnos than the existing 
democratic state. This, in turn, has contributed to a dissonance between the Mongolian 
government and Mongolian society that plays a part in the state’s post-transition 
weakness.    
 
Central to Mongolian identity’s weakness is the division between Mongolian ethnic 
groups, the Khalh Mongols failure to turn its early twentieth century sacred community in 
a nation-state, the Soviet Union’s active campaign to subsume Mongolian ethnic identity, 
and the state’s transition to democracy and capitalism.  While each occurrence singularly 
constitutes a ‘obstacle’ to Mongolian national identity formation, viewed together they 
provide a basis for understanding its position in the modern state.   
 
Of these themes, the division between geographically separated Mongolian ethnic groups 
has had the most enduring effect on Mongolian identity.  That the separation between the 
Khalh and the Oirat remains a persistent issue for Mongolian identity is evident in the 
division between Mongolian and the IMAR.  Indeed the pan-Mongolian movements 
following the 1911 Revolution and the country’s transition to capitalism and democracy 
are evidence that many still believe Mongolian identity is somehow incomplete without a 
marriage between the two groups.  As this chapter has shown, however, the ethnic groups 
have largely been separate for most of history, which greatly complicates calls for 
‘reunification’ based on a common past.  
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As such historical division between the ethnic groups makes it difficult for Mongolian 
identity to find a root in a ‘Mongolian’ common past, such movements as pan-
Mongolianism and Mongolian nationalism have tried to construct the concept of a 
Mongolian ethnos as the foundation for political legitimacy.  Yet in many ways, this 
Mongolian ethnos has not proven strong enough to form a common Mongolian ethnic 
identity capable of becoming a nationalist identity even when the opportunity presented 
itself.  The 1911 Revolution provides an example of this as internal division among the 
Khalh stymied the Bogd Javzundamba’s sacred community from progressing into a state, 
much less a nation.  So, too, did the ethnos fail to provide a sufficient nationalistic 
foundation for state legitimacy following the country’s transition to democracy.    
 
Further complicating Mongolian ethnic identity were the Soviet Union’s violent anti-
Buddhist campaign and forced migration policies as both attempted to undermined an 
ethnic-based identity for the sake of a socialist Mongolian state.  Indeed, for nearly 
seventy years, the MPRP followed this directive by successfully suppressing ethnic 
identity for one based on socialism with little coordinated resistance from the Mongolian 
population as a whole.  While the state’s success in the manner did help establish what 
was as close to a nation-state (based on socialism) as Mongolia has come, the Soviet 
Union’s dissolution and the collapse of the international communist movement forced the 
MPRP and Mongolian people to abandon socialism as a means of organising the state and, 
therefore, as a base for social identity. 
 
The move from socialism provided Mongolian society with the opportunity to push 
forward a national identity as means to organise the state.  Yet the movement failed to 
displace the existing capitalist and democratic institutions and has since lost momentum. 
What has emerged from Mongolia’s post-Cold War order is a Mongolian identity 
construct based almost entirely on an imagined concept of pre-modern Mongolian ethnic 
continuity, a memory of nearly seventy years of socialist government, and a fear of China 
as the Other that exists in opposition to the state.  
 
  67 
This is not to argue that Mongolian identity in Mongolia is not inherently ‘Mongolian’.  
In many ways, modern Mongolian identity in Mongolia draws successfully on what have 
come to be accepted as purely ‘Mongolian’ historical attributes, such as the image and 
symbol of Chinggis Khan as well as concepts of nomadism and Buddhism.  What this 
chapter does argue is that Mongolian identity has failed to translate its ‘historic territory’, 
‘common, mass public culture’, comprehensive ‘homeland’, and ‘historical memories’ 
into a nationalist identity and subsequently social base for organising the state’s political 
and economic institutions. While modern Mongolian identity does maintain concepts of 
an ethnos, it appears too weak to challenge the existing state’s construction.   
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Chapter Three: The Development of Sovereignty in the Post Cold War 
Mongolian State 
 
 
Examining Mongolia’s sovereignty is important in so much as it contributes to a greater 
understanding of the country’s foreign and domestic policy and its internal economic 
development.  In a country with strong sovereignty, government can use what Krasner 
calls the ‘logic of appropriateness’, or logic based on the country’s identity and norms, to 
formulate domestic policies.  In a country with weaker sovereignty, governments are 
more limited by the international system and must approach its domestic policy decisions 
with a ‘logic of consequence’ based on ‘calculating behaviour designed to maximize a 
given set of unexplained preferences’ (Krasner 1999:5).  In this sense, determining 
whether a government’s sovereignty is strong or weak can contribute to a basic 
understanding of whether its domestic and foreign policy is designed to meet a domestic 
agenda or whether it is aimed at maximising the country’s advantages in the international 
system without consideration of the state’s social identity.   
 
In order to facilitate analysis, the remaining chapter will employ Krasner’s four-part 
categorisation of sovereignty.  This typology includes international legal sovereignty, 
Westphalian sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, and domestic sovereignty 
(Krasner 1999:3).  This approach allows for a comprehensive examination of 
sovereignty’s multiple components.      
 
The first aspect of Mongolia’s sovereignty considered will be Mongolia’s international 
legal sovereignty. At present this is the least contested and the most fully established 
aspect of its sovereignty as Mongolia has been recognised by the United Nations since 
1961 and has enjoyed international diplomatic relations with its most important regional 
and international partner states for several decades.  The chapter will examine 
Mongolia’s international legal sovereignty from a post-Cold war perspective.     
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Secondly, the dissertation will examine Mongolia’s Westphalian sovereignty, which is 
concerned with the role of international actors on the development of domestic 
institutions of authority.  To achieve this, the chapter will analyse the country’s 
administrative, judicial, and legislative systems’ formation post-Cold War.  
 
The chapter will then segue from a focus on Mongolia’s legitimacy (legal and 
Westphalian sovereignties) to its control (interdependence and domestic sovereignties).  
It will do this by offering accounts of the country’s post-transition development of 
interdependence sovereignty, which is concerned with the country’s control of its borders, 
and domestic sovereignties, which focuses on the state’s ability to govern.   
 
3.1 Post-Cold War Political Development of Mongolia’s Political Parties and 
Institutions of Authority 
 
In addition to challenging the Mongolia’s social identity, the country’s transition from 
socialism also forced a fundamental realignment of the ruling Mongolian People’s 
Revolution Party (MPRP) as well as the country’s legislative, judiciary, and 
administrative systems.  It also led to the establishment of a multiparty system of 
government with the Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP) emerging as the MPRP’s 
largest political opposition group.  While heralded as a successful transition from 
socialism to democracy in western journals and by western politicians and institutions, 
Mongolia’s post-transition political system contained numerous shortcomings that have 
overtime contributed to a domestic government that is essentially weak. 
 
To begin, opinion polls indicate that the Mongolian public has largely lost faith in the 
MPRP and MDP and increasingly views the country’s two largest parties as inefficient 
(table 3.1). This loss of faith is due, in part, to the continually declining quality of the 
country’s education, health, and social welfare systems together with simultaneous 
increases in unemployment (Rossabi 2009:245).  Public opinion has also turned against 
the government for what it perceives as persistent corruption and nepotism.  Indeed, a 
2006 Asian Foundation and Sant Maral poll on the Mongolia public’s attitude towards 
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corruption in government notes that 67 % of respondents believe that corruption has 
fundamentally inhibited the government’s ability to perform affectively (Asia Foundation 
& Sant Maral 2006:6).   
 
The Mongolian public’s loss of support for the country’s two leading political parties has 
further translated into a loss of faith in their ability to govern (Rossabi 2009:240).  This is 
apparent in that more than 75 % of respondents in a 2008 poll noted that the government 
either ‘always’ or ‘often’ fails to solve the country’s most important problems (Sant 
Maral 2008b:5).  An increasing number of respondents also claim that the government 
does not act in the citizenry’s best interest (table 3.2).   
 
 
 
 Source: Sant Maral Foundation, Politibarometer, 2000-2008. 
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Source: Sant Maral Foundation, Politibarometer, 2000-2008. 
 
Similarly, public support for both the country’s legislative and judiciary systems is 
equally low as it perceives them inefficient, corrupt, and unjust (table 3.3 and 3.4). 
Studies at the USAID and Transparency International have further traced social 
perceptions and have concluded that the majority of the Mongolian public believes 
corruption and opaqueness in the country’s institutions of authority are endemic and 
increasing in severity (Rossabi 2009:243).     
 
 
 Source: Sant Maral Foundation, Politibarometer, 2000-2008. 
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 Source: Sant Maral Foundation, Politibarometer, 2000-2008. 
 
While a myriad of variables contribute to the Mongolian government’s current state, it is 
this dissertation’s position that the root cause for its ineffectiveness is the country’s 
adoption of Washington Consensus-aligned political and economic reform following the 
country’s transition from socialism.  As the international community shaped and applied 
Mongolia’s post-Cold War political institutions, the countries’ political parties were 
unable to ‘reclaim’ and shape the state’s political institutions so that they could ‘build 
emotional and psychological support for [its] legal and institutional apparatus’ (Iigen 
2003:8).  The result of this development is that the current political system was formed 
outside Mongolian identity and is, therefore, out of line with Mongolian social needs 
(Smith, Solinger, & Topik 1999:20).  Moreover, as a growing majority of Mongolians are 
dissatisfied with the country’s current government and political system, that the MPRP 
and MDP both increasingly adhere to market based economic principles and liberal 
democracy indicates that the parties are moving even further away from public support 
(table 3.1, 3.5) (Rossabi 2009:249).   
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Source: Sant Maral Foundation, Politibarometer, 2000-2008. 
 
 
This dissonance between Mongolia’s post-Cold War political institutions, political parties, 
and public opinion casts doubt on the viability of Mongolia’s overall sovereignty.  If, for 
example, Mongolian political parties and institutions are weak because international 
organisations and financial institutions formed them, has this weakness extended to the 
government’s ability to maintain autonomous domestic and foreign policies?  Within the 
confines of these same institutions, are Mongolia’s ruling parties, whether the MPRP or 
MDP, capable of maintaining the country’s geographic boundaries while also limiting the 
extent to which foreign actors are involved in domestic affairs? 
 
The remaining chapter will examine the development of Mongolia’s sovereignty, post-
Cold War in order to answer these important questions. It will do so by providing a 
thorough, detailed analysis of the Mongolian state’s political security strengths and 
weaknesses to determine whether the state has the authority capable of maintaining its 
sovereign jurisdiction.  The chapter will pay particular attention to China’s influence on 
Mongolian political autonomy and the degree to which it played a constructive, or 
detrimental, role in the development of Mongolia’s sovereignty.  It will do so with the 
understanding that the Chinese government did not play a substantial role in Mongolia’s 
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post-Cold War political transition, but that it is Mongolia’s largest neighbour and likely 
to be the greatest challenge economically, socially, and geographically to the country’s 
sovereignty.   
 
3.2 International Legal Sovereignty 
 
As Mongolia is an internationally recognised state, its legal sovereignty is as legitimate as 
any other states’ regardless of strength, size, or wealth (Harrison & Boyd 2003:26).  
Since 1961, Mongolia has been a recognised member of the United Nations and is, 
thereby, entitled the security and state’s rights that accompany membership in the 
organisation.  It has enjoyed increasing support, particularly since the end of the Cold 
War, from a variety of states all with the intention of further buttressing the nation’s 
independent and non-aligned status.   
 
As the stability of an independent Mongolian state is increasingly important for a balance 
of power in East Asia, it is safe to say that Mongolia’s international legal sovereignty is 
well established.  Indeed, as Mongolia has become an integrated regional actor 
economically, militarily, socially, and environmentally for a number of states, that any 
one state would act overtly against the Mongolian government to undermine its legal 
sovereignty is extremely unlikely.  Such aggression would constitute a direct challenge to 
the integrity of the East Asian community and likely draw intense regional and 
international condemnation.   
 
Yet to say that Mongolia’s international legal sovereignty has not been challenged and in 
some ways does not remain challenged is to overstate the degree of security a state is 
guaranteed through its legal sovereignty.  For unlike domestic sovereignty, of which 
more will be written later, legal sovereignty is about recognition, not control (Krasner 
1999:4).  Legal sovereignty is, therefore, one aspect of sovereignty bestowed rather than 
taken and, while able to organise the international system, is a very limited means by 
which a state can hope to organise its interstate relations (Reinicke & Witte 2000:76).  
This creates a paradoxical situation in international law in which a state is guaranteed 
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equal rights in relations to all other states in the international system, but only in so much 
as external actors are willing to admit the state’s rights.   
 
In the years immediately following the country’s transition away from socialism, the 
Mongolian government debated how best to preserve the country’s international legal 
sovereignty in light of its geographic proximity to Russia and China.  While not directly 
threatened, Mongolian policy makers and scholars understood that in order to remain 
independent from either one of its larger neighbours, it had to learn from its historical 
lessons and implement a foreign policy that could capitalise on its strengths while 
minimising its weaknesses.  This realisation led to an internal debate as to how it could 
best achieve these goals (Batbayar 2002:332).   
 
The debate revolved around three alternative policies.  The first suggested realignment 
with Russia, which sought to capitalise on existing economic relations and the country’s 
near seventy-year position as a satellite state to the Soviet Union.  The second alternative 
was to pursue regional neutrality based on the Swiss model.  Policy makers rejected both 
options as essentially limiting the country’s options in pursuing international partnership 
(Batbayar 2002:332).   
 
In the end, the Mongolian government adopted the third option, which focused around a 
concept called the ‘balanced relationship’ (Batbayar 2002:333).  This policy called for a 
stated insurance from Ulaanbaatar that it would respect Russian and Chinese sovereignty 
and independence in exchange for a mutual assurance.   
 
In 1993, the MPRP signed an agreement with Russia in which both countries promised to 
respect one another’s independence and not to participate in a military alliance aimed at 
their respective countries (Elleman 1997:113).  In order to balance the Mongolia-Russian 
treaty, the MPRP signed a similar treaty with the PRC is 1994 in which it recognized the 
PRC as the legitimate Chinese government and promised not to pursue formal ties with 
Taiwan.  In exchange, China promised not to use nuclear weapons against Mongolia 
(Elleman 1997:113).            
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The Chinese government’s approach to Mongolian international legal sovereignty in the 
years immediately preceding the Soviet Union’s collapse was at least partially driven by 
security concerns related to ethnic unrest in Inner Mongolia (Glasner 1993:262).  In order 
to mitigate these concerns, and as part of a general security strategy aimed at managing 
its regional security concerns, the Chinese government adopted a policy of increasing 
diplomatic and economic ties with Ulaanbaatar while stressing its desire for regional 
stability and partnership (Glasner 1993:268).  In order for these policies to be effective, 
the Chinese government sought to strengthen Mongolia’s international legal sovereignty 
by officially recognising its borders and downplaying previous Chinese patriotic 
historical teachings that noted Mongolia had only achieved independence from China by 
illegitimate means (Yahuda 1999:655).     
 
While Mongolia’s ‘balanced relationship’ approach has been largely successful in 
ensuring the country’s international legal sovereignty, it is worth noting that the 
Mongolian government’s position remains inherently weak in so much as its future is 
largely dependent on Russian and Chinese internal initiatives (Elleman 1997:113).  
Moreover, the country remains dependent on Western political and financial support to 
provide it with a conceptual ‘third neighbour’ that it can use to balance both Russia and 
China (Batbayar 2002:333).  This does not, however, undermine what is largely a 
Mongolian government success in so much that the Mongolian government has worked 
within the confines of its political system to form a foreign policy that capitalises on its 
weakness while playing to its strengths.    
 
3.3 Westphalian sovereignty 
 
Westphalian sovereignty is a measure of the state’s legitimacy and effectiveness in 
limiting the influence of external actors over domestic authority structures (Galligan, 
Roberts, & Trifiletti 2001:21).  A country enjoys Westphalian sovereignty when the 
development of its domestic institutions is propagated and implemented by the state in 
direct relation to the state’s own perceived priorities and needs.  In this sense, a state can 
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compromise its Westphalian sovereignty either in response to external pressure or 
voluntarily and may chose to do so temporarily in order to strengthen its more broadly 
defined sovereignty (Alagappa 1998:130).  As with international legal sovereignty, weak 
or newly formed states often opt for a limited degree of Westphalian sovereignty for the 
more tangible ability to strengthen their domestic and interdependence sovereignty—both 
of which require direct control.   
 
This is largely true of Mongolia in the early 1990s.  The precarious political and 
economic environment the Mongolian government found itself occupying after the 
withdrawal of Soviet support, as well as the lack of domestic experience in managing a 
market economy, gave it little option other than to seek foreign support to bolster its 
rapidly dissolving ability to provide basic services for the Mongolian people.  As the 
Mongolian government feared a renewed dependence on China more than any other 
scenario, it turned to the Western community of democratic nations, financial institutions, 
and non-government aid agencies (NGOs) for development expertise and aid.  These 
various agencies were to have a significant influence on the development of Mongolia’s 
domestic institutions.   
 
The effects international actors had on the development of Mongolia’s political system, 
including its legislative, administrative, and judicial institutions, were especially 
pronounced as the country’s transition left it vulnerable to foreign influence (Rossabi 
2005:46).  Specifically, Mongolia’s weak economy, lack of diverse international 
partnerships, and general inexperience with a market economy all allowed for a higher 
than average dependency on external actors (Zweifel 2006:5).  While it is arguable that 
such interference does not constitute external involvement in domestic affairs because 
Mongolia accepted the institution’s conditions voluntarily, such perspective fails to take 
into account the country’s needs and the seeming lack of choice it had under the 
desperate circumstances engulfing the country.  
 
The remaining section will examine Mongolia’s political system in order to determine the 
degree of Westphalian sovereignty the state holds over its institutions of control.  While 
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the argument will not be made that international actors have direct control over any 
aspect of Mongolia’s modern institutions, the section will address the lasting effects 
external influence has on the Mongolian state’s capacity for autonomous action and the 
degree to which its legislative, administrative, and judicial institutions can be considered 
to be under its control (Borzle & Risse 2005:207).   
 
Legislative 
 
Changes to the legislative system were at first modest and internally driven.  In response 
to widespread student protests, the MPRP established a ‘two-tier’ assembly based on the 
USSR Congress of People’s Deputies elected in March 1989 with the Supreme Soviet as 
the executive body.  It then announced the first multiparty democratic election at which it 
succeeded in securing 357 of 430 seats in the Great Khural, and 33 of 53 in the Small 
Khural (Karatnycky, Motyl, & Graybow 1999:423).  This reform, while gradually 
moving towards a more representative system than socialism, allowed the country’s 
leadership to remain remarkably unchanged.  This, in turn, lent an air of stability and 
continuity to existing socialist programmes focused on social welfare.  In addition, the 
election also allowed for a move towards a multi-party system as the MPRP allowed the 
newly formed opposition parties—the Mongolian Democratic Party (MDP), the National 
Progress Party, and the Mongolian Green Party—to participate in the elections.  All of 
the new parties won seats in the newly elected Parliament (The International Institute for 
Democracy 1997:324).   
 
Despite this initial adaptation of the country’s political system, a large number of 
institutions dominated by the developed states, including the International Monetary 
Fund, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank, exerted pressure on the Mongolian 
government to ‘deepen’ reform in a show of solidarity with capitalist and democratic 
norms (Carothers 1999:187).  As the pressure to reform was conditional to continued aid 
and foreign expertise, the MPRP-led Mongolian government acquiesced and responded 
by drafting a new constitution in line with international democratic and capitalist norms 
rather than the more familiar ‘two-tier’ system (Rossabi 2005:55).  The result was that 
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radical political reform in Mongolia came more quickly than the MPRP had originally 
intended and that the break between the former system and that adopted was larger and 
more drastic than had been initially comfortable.   
 
Work from both Huntington and Brzezinski on the evolution of single party communist 
states further lends to the hypothesis that the MPRP’s jump from an internally 
conceptualised ‘two-tier’ legislative to a unicameral democracy constituted an ‘unnatural’ 
shift in the country’s political environment.  Huntington’s three-stage model of 
communist party transition includes ‘transformation’, ‘consolidation’, and ‘adaptation’, 
all which rely on continuity and change driven by growing social demands (Huntington 
1970:23-40). Brzezinski expands on this concept, noting four stages including 
‘communist totalitarianism’, ‘communist authoritarianism’, ‘post-communist 
authoritarianism’, and ‘post-communist pluralism’, all of which occur internally as the 
result of social pressure (Brzezinski 1989:255).  While both scholars put forward these 
paradigms to emphasise the natural progression communist states pass through on their 
way towards reform, they are useful in understanding how the MPRP and Mongolian 
political environment might have developed without external pressure to completely 
redefine the country’s political system.  As a more internal, gradualist political 
development path may have slowed the country’s democratic development, so, too, 
would it have allowed a greater continuity between the MPRP’s impressive 1980s 
political accomplishments and a post-transitional Mongolian political environment 
(Rossabi 2009:233).        
 
Instead, the MPRP underwent what Rossabi calls a ‘transmogrification’ in order to 
remain a competitive party within Mongolia’s newly established liberal democracy, 
undermining its previous accomplishments and contributing to a growth in corruption and 
nepotism and an increasing inability to deliver public goods (Rossabi 2009:243).  At the 
same time, the MDP received funding and directive from foreign NGOs aimed at 
undermining the MPRP’s ‘socialist’ policies, which it successfully did in the country’s 
2000 elections by forcing the MPRP from power (Rossabi 2009:238-239).  Yet despite 
translating this victory into political reform that contributed to the country’s post-
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transition development, the MDP adopted a pure market economic strategy that led to 
limited economic growth and a general deterioration of the country’s social welfare.  The 
party also became embroiled in corruption changes and lost power in 2004.   
 
Administrative6  
 
Much as the country’s transition led to fundamental legislative reform, so too did it lead 
to substantial changes in the existing administrative system.  During much of the 
twentieth century, Mongolian operated under a centralised Soviet inspired system.  
Through this system, the MPRP made all administrative decisions in Ulaanbaatar and 
then dispersed throughout the countryside to the provincial capitals, or aimag centres, to 
the local party organ called the People’s Deputy Khural (PDK).  The PDK then 
implemented the central government’s mandate by disbursing MPRP directed funds and 
organising local resources as appropriate.  While this system was not entirely efficient as 
needless bureaucracy weighed it down, through it the Mongolian government nonetheless 
succeeded in providing a relatively high level of unprecedented social services to the 
Mongolian countryside.     
 
Following the state’s transition, international agencies put pressure on the government to 
fundamentally restructure the country’s administrative system.  The most drastic reform 
came in 1992 as the result of the United Nation Development Programme’s (UNDP) 
Management Development Programme (MDP) which it formulated in conjunction with 
the MPRP (Nixon & Walters 1999:164).  The MDP aimed at instituting four major 
administrative reforms that marked a dramatic break from the country’s previous system.  
These were: ‘(1) Public administration and civil service reform; (2) Decentralisation and 
local administration strengthening; (3) Privatisation and local administrative 
                                                
6 ‘According to the Constitution, the state of Mongolia is now divided into the following administrative units of 
different levels: The first level is Mongolia itself.  On the second level Mongolia is divided into one city (the capital) 
and 21 aimgas (provinces).  On the third level, the aimags are divided into 336 sums (counties).  A sum is divided into 
approximately 5 bags (townships), each with an average of 200 families.  In total, the 336 sums have around 1,600 bags.  
Each level—this is Mongolia, aimag, sum and bag—has its own government.  The three cities of Darkhan, Erdenet and 
Gobisumber were given aimag status in 1994.  Ulaanbaatar itself consists of twelve districts, which are divided into 
119 horoos (neighbourhoods).  Thus the bag and horoo are the lowest administrative units of urban and rural areas 
respectively’ (Bruun & Odgaard 1996:168). 
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strengthening; (4) Private sector development’ (Nixson 2000:32).  In an attempt to 
implement the UNDP’s programme, the MPRP decentralised a wide range of tasks to 
local level governments including the privatisation of cattle, machinery, farms and small 
businesses as well as the administration of land, physical infrastructure, health, education, 
and poverty alleviation (Bruun & Odgaard 1996:171).  
 
This decision to decentralise was hastily made and implemented without due 
consideration to the consequences.  Indeed, no aspect of the UNDP’s reform addressed 
the potential effects it could have on social welfare, whether provincial governments had 
the expertise to implement administrative duties previously handled by the central 
government, or how these provincial officials would find revenue to implement 
programmes formerly state funded.  Both the UNDP and MPRP even failed to consider 
what would happen if, in the 1996 election, opposition parties came into power and 
disagreed with the administrative development path.  When the Democratic Union 
Coalition (DUC) came to power, therefore, no safeguards or multiparty consensus were 
in place to ensure continuity of the newly established programme.  As a result, the DUC 
immediately abandoned the efforts made to institute the MDP reforms to push forward its 
own administrative agenda.   
 
At the suggestions of the World Bank, ADB, and, oddly, the UNDP, the DUC launched a 
second round of administrative reform in 1996 (Laking 1999:221).  The DUC stated it 
would abandon the UNDP’s original, more modest programme and instead adopt reform 
based on the widely admired New Zealand administrative system.7   
 
From the very beginning the DUC’s plan was flawed.  While New Zealand’s 
administrative reform was a praiseworthy system, its government had modelled it on a 
                                                
7 The New Zealand administrative reform can be summarised as follows: ‘Virtually every element of reform has been 
designed to establish or strengthen contract-like relationships between the government and ministers as purchasers of 
goods and services and departments and other entities as suppliers. Hundreds of contracts are formally negotiated each 
year; the typical contract specifies the resources that one side will provide and the performance the other side will 
produce. Ministers are always on the resource-providing side of the relationship; chief executives can be on either side, 
depending on the role they are playing. A chief executive provides resources in negotiating employment contracts with 
managers but promises results in negotiating purchase agreements with ministers and performance agreements with the 
State Services Commissioner” (Schick 1998:124).  
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developed country with highly skilled, highly competent ‘manager’ administrators at the 
local administrative region as well as an established formal sector (Schick 1998).  In this 
regard, it was largely inappropriate for a developing country in transition from socialism 
to democracy.  Nevertheless, the DUC pushed ahead with the reform despite warnings 
from experts who believed Mongolia did not have the prerequisite personnel with the 
necessary training in place to support such a system (Nixson 2000:37).  Indeed, no 
serious attempt to study the effects of the transposition of the New Zealand 
administrative model to Mongolia’s post-Soviet modelled administrative system ever 
took place.   
 
The results, particularly in rural areas, were disastrous.  Between 1989 and 1999 
government expenditures declined from 50.2 % of GDP to 26.9 %, substantially 
outpacing the decline in GDP.  This sharp decrease reflects a widespread disinvestment in 
public goods in rural areas such as social services, health care, and education over the 
same period.  It further emphasises the government’s failure to support the 
decentralization of administrative reform with action other than ideologically driven 
words (Chuluundorj 2004:236).  
 
The consequences of the New Zealand reforms have never been adequately mitigated. 
Indeed, Mongolia’s administrative system remains greatly aligned with the DUC-led 
reform.  The result has been a steady fall in rural resident’s health, literacy, and overall 
standards of living as local governments lack necessary finance to maintain these 
essential social services (Asian Development Bank 2005).   
 
Judiciary 
 
Judicial reform and a move towards a rule of law began with the 1992 drafting of the 
state constitution.  The constitution in turn led to the establishment of a National Security 
Council, a Constitutional Court (called the Tsets), and the General Council of the Courts 
(Batbayar 2003:46).  These institutions, and the state-guaranteed rights expressed in the 
constitution, marked the first instance in the history of the Mongol state where the 
  83 
government expressed a willingness to limit its power while extending civil liberties such 
as freedom of speech, religious tolerance, and economic rights.  Moreover, while the 
constitution establish tangible institutions by which all members of society could be held 
accountable, the state was seen as simultaneously enabling the means to enforce such 
guarantees.  In this regard, civil society was greatly strengthened by the democratically 
aligned constitution as it broke with the communist era constitutions’ (1924, 1940, 1960) 
failure to protect individual citizen’s rights.      
 
Yet, according to Deborah Davis, Managing Director of Lehman, Lee & Xu, the oldest 
foreign law firm currently operating in Mongolia, the Mongolian government has failed 
to live up to its commitments and has thereby undermined most of the gains made in 
constitutionally guaranteeing judicial regularity (Interview 9).  Indeed, the Tsets, or 
Constitutional Court, is widely regarded as being politically aligned and unable to fulfil 
its expressed role in an impartial way (Ginsburg 2003:159).  The constant re-writing of 
election laws before a new election, as well as the failure of the Tsets to remain neutral in 
intra-party conflicts, has created a sense of anarchy around the way in which the judiciary 
is composed and fears the political elite are manipulating the rule of law system to remain 
in power (Freedom House 2007).  
 
Deborah Davis further notes that corruption in the judicial sector has become endemic.  
Indeed, a 2006 public opinion poll on corruption identified the judicial system as one of 
the country’s most corrupt institutions (Asia Foundation & Sant Maral 2006:8).  This, in 
turn, contributes to a sense among the Mongolian public that those who can afford to 
bribe judges or pay high ‘fines’ are essentially above the law.  Indeed, in a 2005 
Transparency International poll, 93 % of Mongolians surveyed stated that they believe 
rich and/or politically influential people can manipulate the judicial system while average 
citizens have little recourse to legitimate legal proceedings (Transparency International 
2007:229).  The survey continued by noting that many Mongolians believe justice is a 
matter of whether one can afford it as lawyers are widely regarded as little more than 
conduits for bribes (Transparency International 2007:230). Transparency International 
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also cited Mongolian federal judges’ low pay and living standards as threats to judicial 
independence and integrity (Transparency International 2007:230).   
 
The sense that Mongolia’s judicial system in fundamentally corrupt does not end 
domestically.  Indeed, Amnesty International published a report on Mongolia’s courts 
that included intense criticism for its failure to ensure transparent judicial hearings, its use 
of secret executions and torture, and its intimidation of the press (Amnesty International 
2007).  Amnesty did, however, note that severe occurrences of torture remain relatively 
rare.   
 
China’s Role in Mongolia’s Institutional Development  
 
China’s role in the development of Mongolia’s post-Cold War institutions of authority 
was nominal.  Indeed, the Mongolian government’s decision to move toward a liberal 
democratic system of government was motivated, in part, by the state’s desire to increase 
contact with the international community in order to balance China’s regional influence.  
Moreover, as China’s professed system of government is communism, the Mongolian 
government had little to gain from closer political interaction with the PRC in the 
development of its democratic legislative, administrative, and judicial systems   
 
Yet it is also important to note that China has played a significant role in the evolution of 
Mongolia’s state institutions.  According to L. Vanjildorj and J. Liang of the Asian 
Development Bank, Mongolia has worked with the PRC in regional cooperation activities 
such as government staff training, IT support, infrastructure development, and economic 
development (Interviews 14 and 17).  Moreover, according to Ts. Batbayar, Counsellor of 
Policy, Information, and Monitoring, Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mongolia 
has increasingly begun to look towards the IMAR for policy and institutional 
development direction as the two regions share geographic, demographic, and economic 
similarities (Interview 27). While it is too early to tell whether this will allow the PRC to 
have a significant impact on Mongolia’s institutional development, it provides an 
alternative model for the Mongolian state to consider.  
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3.4 Interdependence sovereignty 
 
The most significant aspect of sovereignty in terms of China’s influence over Mongolian 
domestic political environment is interdependence sovereignty which, according to 
Krasner, represents the degree to which a government has managed to secure the cross 
border flow of ideas, goods, and people (Krasner 1999:12).  In this sense, 
interdependence sovereignty’s particular significance in Sino-Mongolian relations comes 
from its focus on control rather than on the authority that defines international legal and 
Westphalian sovereignties.  While authority is important in that it gives the Mongolian 
government the legitimacy it needs to govern, the ability to control a country’s cross 
border movements is essential to the maintenance of its integrity and its ability to control 
the degree to which external ideas, peoples, and manufactured goods effect its domestic 
development.  As China is a significant force in Mongolia’s capacity to control its 
borders, Mongolia’s interdependence sovereignty is largely influenced by the PRC.    
 
Identity also becomes an issue when considering Mongolia’s interdependence 
sovereignty as individuals are ultimately responsible for instituting the state’s directives.  
In this sense, if the state sets rules regarding behaviour that the individual or collective 
unit does not agree with, the chances of these rules being enforced are few.  Social roles, 
in this sense, are based in social norms and accepted behavioural patterns set in social 
cognitive action.  If these roles do not adhere to the institutional regulations, the result 
will be chaos and a weakening of the overall state.     
 
The following examination of Mongolia’s interdependence sovereignty will focus on the 
physical flow of goods and people by evaluating Mongolia’s border control in relations to 
China, its rail line and other transportation issues, as well as smuggling and other illegal 
cross border activities.   
 
The Mongolian Border and Customs 
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By 1991, Mongolia had settled all serious border disputes with neighbouring Russia and 
China, albeit mostly to Mongolia’s geographic disadvantage.  In agreeing to permanent 
demarcations, the Mongolia government agreed to accept what it considered the loss of 
portions of Mongolia proper equalling more than 5,800 square kilometres.  Most of these 
lands, including large portions of China’s Xinjiang, Heilongjiang, and Inner Mongolian 
provinces, while never a part of the modern Mongolian state, were widely believed to 
constitute the traditional Mongolian ‘motherland’ and considered ‘Mongolian’ in so far 
as they were geographically, environmentally, and cultural similar to Mongolia’s defining 
Gobi desert and eastern steppes (Hodder, Lloyd, & McLachlan 1998:150).  That the 
Mongolian government agreed to legally and formally accept the permanent loss of such 
lands is a testimonial to both the country’s weakness vis-à-vis China and Russia, its 
inability to mediate the country’s identity with geopolitical needs, and its desire to secure 
its borders regardless of the cost. 
 
Image 3.1: Mongolia’s Primary Border Crossings 
 
Source: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations, January, 2004. 
 
Altanbulag 
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Despite Mongolia’s strengthening of its border control through regional treaties and 
agreements, the early 1990s saw a significant increase in illegal cross border activities 
between the Russian/Mongolian and Chinese/Mongolian borders. For example, illegal 
activities between Russia and Mongolia increased 60% in 1991 alone while growing 30% 
between China and Mongolia in the same year (Hodder, Lloyd, & McLachlan 1998:150).  
While the state has successfully reined in a good percentage of this initial cross border 
illegal activity by improving the quality of its border patrols, its regional partnerships, 
and its customs facilities, the sizable increase during Mongolia’s transition years is worth 
mentioning in that it indicates the degree to which continued interaction with Russia was 
initially more important than newly formed relations with the Chinese.   
 
It is also useful in understanding how this balance has shifted over time to favour Sino-
Mongolian border activity at the expense of Russo-Mongolian relations.  Indeed, while 
the Altanbulag border crossing between Russia and Mongolia is the country’s oldest and 
for much of the twentieth century Mongolia’s most important link with the outside world, 
it has diminished significantly in recent years as both trade between Russia and Mongolia 
has lessened (image 3.1).  This is due to both increased Russian restrictions on cross 
border traffic from Mongolia in order to limit the number of Chinese goods entering 
Russia through the country and to growing Mongolian-Sino trade (Business Times 2007).  
Moreover, in comparison with Zamin Uud, the primary border crossing between China 
and Mongolia, Altanbulag remains vastly underdeveloped and unprofessionally guarded 
(image 3.1). 
 
According to G. Baigalmaa, Second Secretary at the Embassy of Mongolia, Beijing, 
China and Mongolia have nine border crossings between them: five in Inner Mongolia, 
four in Xinjiang (Interview 10).  While the largest, and most utilised, is the 
Erliang/Zamin Uud crossing on the Beijing-Ulaanbaatar rail line, the other eight are 
equally important for small-scale trade and business.  More relevant to any discussion on 
Mongolian interdependency sovereignty, the eight smaller border crossings are also more 
susceptible to corruption, smuggling, and illegal crossings.   
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Indeed, respective Chinese and Mongolian policy toward visa issuances may indirectly 
contribute to illegal crossings and corruption at the two countries’ smaller border posts.  
Despite there being four crossings between Xinjiang and western Mongolia, there is not a 
consulate in Xinjiang to issue visas to Chinese who want to travel to Mongolia for 
business. Nor is there a consulate in western Mongolia able to issue Chinese visas to 
Mongolians.  The logic behind this restrictive visa policy is, according to J. Liang of the 
ADB, due to China’s hesitancy to allow foreign activity in and around Xinjiang out of 
concern such foreign influence might have a negative effect on the region’s security 
environment.    
 
Thus, in theory at least, anyone wanting to do business between Xinjiang and Mongolia 
would have to first travel several days by car to apply for a visa, only to turn around and 
repeat the same trip back home all in order to cross several kilometres over the border 
into Mongolia to conduct business.  In reality, of course, it is far cheaper and more 
practical to simply bribe a customs’ official, whose average monthly salary is around 
USD200 a month, than to operate through the more formal channels (Business Times 
2007).  As corruption among Mongolian border guards and officials is widespread, 
unchecked, and in many ways socially accepted, these smaller, under regulated crossings 
are a source of weakness in Mongolian interdependence sovereignty (News Today 
2007a). 
 
The Mongolian government has, however, deflected larger criticism of these ineffectual 
border crossings by actively working with the World Customs Organisation (WCO) as 
well as the Chinese government under the auspices of the Asian Development Banks’ 
Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) initiative. The programme seeks 
to increase the quality of Sino-Mongolian main border patrols, to facilitate information 
exchange and capacity building programmes between the two countries, and to deal with 
corruption.  In July 2007, WCO General Secretary Michel Danet visited Mongolia and 
inspected the Zamin Uud crossing and commended Mongolia on its professionalism and 
adherence to international customs’ standards.  He also pledged further assistance 
towards training for Mongolian customs agents and expressed his opinion that corruption 
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could be overcome if the country remained committed to routing it out of society as a 
whole.  While his opinion of the Zamin Uud crossing was welcome by the government, 
his seeming lack of interest in the small, more porous and corrupt border crossings makes 
questionable his, as well as the Mongolian government’s, real commitment to securing 
the Mongolian-Chinese border (M.Bolorma 2007).   
 
Moreover, while the CAREC project is increasing the quality of Mongolia’s border 
guards at the Zamin Uud crossing, it is primarily focused on streamlining trade and not 
necessarily to tackling the larger issue of corruption.  Indeed, to date Sino-Mongolian 
customs cooperation under CAREC has consisted mainly of a move towards joint 
customs control.  The two countries hope to accomplish this by agreeing upon a standard 
operation procedure that would allow them to streamline customs, which took five hours 
on average in 2008, thereby requiring only one inspection rather than two.  According to 
Jeffrey Liang, head of the ABD’s PRC Resident Mission’s Programmes and Regional 
Cooperation Unit, the Chinese government has agreed to allow Mongolian customs 
agents to train at the Shanghai-based customs training centre while also agreeing to 
financed the training (Interview 14). 
 
Rail line and Transportation       
 
At present, Mongolia is connected to Russia and China by a single rail line that divides 
the country from north to south.  Over 1800 kilometres long, the rail line was first 
constructed in 1949 and is part of Mongolia’s Soviet legacy.  Indeed, Russian Railways 
still own 50% of the line, thereby giving them direct control over its operation and 
maintenance.  This has led to a situation in which the country’s track, trains, and signals 
are all in disrepair because the respective Mongolian and Russian owners cannot agree on 
how to finance repair.  As Russian Railways primary concern, at least according to 
Mongolian perceptions, is to maintain control over the railway so as to have more 
leverage over Mongolia’s mineral exports, achieving consensus between the two national 
railways has proven difficult at best (D.Behee 2007).   
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The Mongolia government has, however, been working with the United States 
government to renovate the old line while beginning construction of a more modern, 
larger capacity rail line directly parallel to the existing line.  Indeed, in July 2007, the 
Mongolian parliament passed legislation outlining a privatisation plan for the country’s 
rail line related industry while maintaining the actual line would remain state controlled.  
The legislation’s purpose is to increase competitiveness within the industry with the hope 
a raise in efficiency will follow suit (D.Behee 2007).  While as of the beginning of 2009 
no work towards renovation or a new railway was underway, the Mongolian government 
hopes to begin both projects in the very near future. 
 
At present, Mongolia is reliant on Chinese goodwill not only for the use of its rail 
services inside China but also for use of its Tianjin port facilities (Mongolian Railway 
website 2008).  Such cooperation is, however, technically difficult.  As Chinese and 
Mongolian track widths do not match, all Mongolian trains entering China must adjust 
their wheel width from 1524 millimetre to accommodate China’s narrower track width of 
1435 millimetres.  Until 1998, the Mongolian government lacked the equipment 
necessary to facilitate the change and were exclusively reliant on Chinese good will.   
 
In recent years, the Chinese government has further offered to help Mongolian 
transportation development in ways that would link the two countries even more.  Firstly, 
the PRC has offered to fund a direct rail line from Mongolia’s Oyun Tolgoi and Tavung 
Tolgoi gold and copper mines to the Inner Mongolian autonomous region for the sake of 
expediting resource-based imports (Railway Authority 2008).  Secondly, the Chinese 
government, along with the ADB, has proposed the possibility of funding a rail line 
between Xinganmeng in Inner Mongolia and Sukhbatar city in eastern Mongolia.  The 
Mongolia government, anxious to create transportation infrastructure in the poorer 
eastern and western regions, have embraced the proposal while submitting their own 
desired joint construction project to the Chinese government and Asian Development 
Bank for a road connection China’s Xinjiang to Mongolia’s Khovd province.   
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These increases in transportation linkage between the two countries, while good for 
Mongolia’s economic development, would also increase the Mongolian government’s 
dependency on the Chinese government for access to regional and international markets 
as well as cross border traffic that could negatively affect Mongolian interdependence 
sovereignty.  Indeed, while the Mongolian government is seemingly willing to forgo any 
concern of greater Chinese control over the transportation of Mongolian goods and 
peoples for the boon of a more developed infrastructure, the effect on the country’s 
interdependence sovereignty could be significant.  Indeed, increased Mongolian 
dependency on Chinese maintained transportation lines could translate into Chinese 
leverage over the country’s trade.  This, in turn, would enable the PRC to use the 
country’s dependency on the rail lines to influence Mongolia’s domestic affairs.   
 
The PRC’s response to the Dalai Lama’s visit to Mongolia in 2002 made clear that the 
Chinese government was willing to use control of Mongolia’s access to its rail lines and 
ports to effectively punish the Mongolian government. Chinese government officials 
stopped all train traffic, and by proxy access to its port in Tianjin, to Mongolia for the 
duration of the Dalai Lama’s visit, essentially cutting off Mongolia’s economic lifeline to 
the rest of the world. In response, Mongolian government officials refused to meet with 
the Dalai Lama in a show of solidarity with Beijing, despite what the country’s religious 
leaders and public alike believed was one of the most important events to take place in 
the modern Mongolian state (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2003:32).    
 
Smuggling 
 
Corruption among border guards, an 8000 kilometres long border, a fledgling recreational 
drug scene in the capital city, as well as newly introduced windfall taxes on minerals and 
exported cashmere, have all contributed to a growing industry of smuggling between 
China and Mongolia.  In response, the Mongolian government has turned to China and 
the international community for support.  At present, the Mongolian government is 
working closely with the Chinese customs agency and the Asian Development Bank to 
improve the standards of its customs operation.  It has also entered into cooperation with 
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the United States’ government to increase technology at its border crossings aimed at 
dealing with nuclear weapons and materials smuggling (United States Department of 
Energy Office of Public Affairs 2007).  While these efforts do show that the state is 
determined to develop a sustainable approach to improving border security, thus far such 
attempts have fallen short of stemming illegal smuggling in practice.  
 
Of immediate concern to the Mongolian economy is the growth in recent years of raw 
cashmere smuggling from Mongolia into China’s IMAR.  Such an increase in smuggling 
is the direct result high export taxes on cashmere and Mongolia’s own lack of domestic 
production facilities.  By smuggling their skins directly to China, herders are able to 
avoid paying tariffs as well as the initial costs of having to comb the cashmere 
domestically.  Herders accomplished this by placing cashmere skins between sheep and 
cow skins, both of which are not heavily taxed, and smuggling them across the border.  
While this method is not difficult for customs officials to detect, it is time consuming and 
often simply infeasible to adequately monitor.  Indeed, according to one account, corrupt 
customs officials were actively involved in allowing the goat skins through the border in 
exchange for a small percentage of the profits (News Today 2007b).   
 
As a result, overall government revenues from cashmere plunged from on average 20 
billion tugrik annually to a mere 96 million in 2007.  Yet perhaps even more detrimental 
to the Mongolian cashmere industry is that the end products produced in Inner Mongolia 
are of lower quality.  As these products are marketed internationally as ‘Mongolian’ 
cashmere, they have negatively affected Mongolian cashmere’s international reputation.  
As cashmere ranks second on Mongolia’s strategic product index, following only mining, 
any fundamental threat to the industry such as questionable quality could have long term, 
negative effects on the overall Mongolian economy (News Today 2007b). 
 
Another important issue related to smuggling is the growing drug trade in Ulaanbaatar.  
While those who can afford designer drugs such as marijuana and cocaine are still 
relatively few, some younger generation Mongolians do have disposable incomes and 
choose to spend them on drugs.  This growth of drugs and drug users among Mongolians 
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is an extremely recent phenomenon as in early 2000 knowledge about drugs and drug use 
was exclusively relegated to the foreign community.  Indeed, Mongolians lacked even the 
vocabulary to speak about drugs as all illegal drugs, from hashish to heroin, were 
commonly referred to as har tamax, or ‘black tobacco’.  By 2008, however, the situation 
in the capital city had changed enormously as it was not at all uncommon to find drug 
dealers in most bars and all the capital city’s popular discos. 
 
Mongolians in the capital city attribute the increase in drug flows in Ulaanbaatar to the 
Chinese both in the sense that they harvest it domestically (marijuana grows wild along 
the rail line north of Ulaanbaatar) and smuggle it illegally from China.  Indeed, according 
to popular newspaper reports, the Chinese mafia is solely responsible for the drug 
network in Mongolia (G.Delger 2007).  Whether or not this is true, the perception that 
illegal drugs smuggled into Mongolia all come from China is damaging to the Mongolian 
government’s interdependency sovereignty as it creates the image of aggressive Chinese 
criminals engaged in illegal activities in Mongolia despite society’s and the government’s 
best efforts to protect the Mongolian people (G.Delger 2007).   
 
Lastly, the issue of human trafficking between China and Mongolia was discussed widely 
in newspapers in late 2007-2008 as a Mongolian woman was returned to Ulaanbaatar 
after having endured a yearlong period of forced prostitution in Macau.  According to one 
newspaper report, the number of Mongolian women tricked into sex slavery by being 
offered modelling contracts in cities like Singapore, Hong Kong, Tokyo, and Berlin, has 
grown substantially in recent years.  This is due to the increased attractiveness of a 
modelling career among young, attractive Mongolian women and foreign sex traffickers 
who prey on their inexperience and desire to leave Mongolian for a more international 
life.  Indeed, in early 2008, both Mongolia’s top modelling agencies and the government 
issued warnings in local newspapers for women interested in modelling careers to be 
vigilant when offered work abroad (G.Yalgun 2007).     
 
Moreover, a 2006 Asia Foundation study on human trafficking in Mongolia found that 
the Zamin Uud border crossing between China and Mongolia is the primary corridor 
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through which Mongolian women are trafficked into China for sex work.  An estimated 
200-300 women work as prostitutes in China’s Erliang, the Chinese border town adjacent 
to Zamin Uud, while hundreds more work in Beijing, Shanghai, and other larger cities.  
While some are prostitutes by choice, others, particularly students, are lured into the trade 
through promises of scholarships to study abroad.  That it is becoming more profitable 
for Mongolian prostitutes to work in China than in Mongolia is an indication that human 
trafficking will become more of a problem in the future (Desai 2006).   
 
3.5 Domestic sovereignty 
 
Domestic sovereignty differs from Westphalian sovereignty as it is largely unconcerned 
with the international influences on domestic affairs and institutions but rather with the 
effectiveness of the government to exercise authority.  While some distinction must be 
made as to who is the sovereign—whether a nationalist dictator, a foreign controlled 
government, or the citizens in a democracy—such variations do not necessarily have any 
influence on a country’s International Legal or Westphalian sovereignties (Krasner 
1999:11).  Domestic sovereignty is, therefore, more closely aligned with political 
legitimacy in that it focuses on effective government rather than the nature of the power 
that composes it. 
 
In this regard, the two primary variables that constitute a challenge to Mongolian 
domestic sovereignty are the increased infighting and nepotism that have kept the 
Mongolian parliament from addressing some of the country’s most pressing foreign and 
domestic policy needs as well as systemic corruption throughout the government. Indeed, 
the 2008 Ulaanbaatar riots against the government indicate deep-seated frustration at the 
government’s inability to augment the failures caused by the disastrous shock therapy, 
frustration at what is considered persistent and unaddressed corruption, as well as the 
widening gap between the urban rich and rural poor.  Moreover, increased media 
accounts of nepotism that leads to inefficient management or inexperienced appointees to 
government posts also contributes to a public sense of an ineffectual government 
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operated by politicians more concerned with maximising their foreign and domestic 
contacts for financial gain than in delivering public goods (Ch.Sumiyabazar 2007). 
 
Parliament 
 
Within the last ten years, a growing number of Mongolians have expressed a loss of 
confidence in the country’s parliament (table 3.4).  At the centre of such growing 
disillusionment is the perception that infighting and nepotism often force ruling parties to 
focus their energies on maintaining factional alliances for the sake of remaining in power 
rather than delivering public goods. While such occurrences are, of course, often present 
in all governments, that they occur as frequently as they do in Mongolia is cause for 
frustration and concern among many Mongolian citizens (Ch.Sumiyabazar 2007).   
 
While the MPRP bears the burden of criticism related to policy and legislation, the 
parliament in general has come under increased pressure due to the widespread belief that 
the majority of MPs are not acting professionally and that the institution that serves as the 
cornerstone of Mongolian democracy has become little more than a ‘men’s club’ of the 
rich and corrupt.  For example, in 2008 the Mongolian media began attacking members 
of the Mongolian parliament with poor records of attendance.  This increase in media 
coverage highlighted parliamentary ‘abuses of power’ and came about as the result of a 
widely criticised law on Parliamentary Procedure passed in October 2007 
(Ts.Monkhtsetseg 2007).  The Parliamentary Procedure law exempted MPs from 
disciplinary action for non-attendance, unethical behaviour, and shortened the number of 
hours that Parliament must hold plenary sessions from 75 annually to 50 
(Ts.Monkhtsetseg 2007).   
 
As most sessions of parliament are broadcast live on television throughout the day that 
many days are poorly attended is common knowledge. Moreover, according to one 
journalist, those MPs who do attend often sign in for absent colleagues using their 
electronic attendance cards.  Even more common is the practice of MPs who sign in and 
immediately leave.  This lack of commitment is seen as stemming from MPs greater 
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concern for their private business, or the business they are able to generate in their 
powerful positions, than the state of the Mongolian government (C.Uul 2007). 
 
Lastly, and perhaps most representative of the Mongolian social perception of MPs and 
Parliament as a whole, is the widely reported upon perception that a great many MPs are 
drunkards with connections to organised crime (Ch.Davardorj 2007).  In one widely read 
account in a major Mongolian newspaper, a journalist reported witnessing a drunken 
scene of pandemonium at a session of congress at which MPs were deciding on council 
membership.  In his account of the incident, rather than respectfully participating in what 
he believe a very serious matter of the country’s future, many MPs were seen staggering, 
slurring, and acting aggressively with blood shot eyes.  The journalist called the incident 
a ‘tragedy’ for Mongolia and wrote that ‘from drunken minds comes drunken policy’ 
(Ch.Davardorj 2007).     
 
Such instances of aggression and belligerence are all too common in parliament.  MPs 
have been known to engage in physical altercations, challenge one another to go outside 
to fight, or shout obscenities at one another while on national television.  It is not 
uncommon for more established, older MPs to threaten younger members with 
imprisonment or even death.  Indeed, in one extreme instance a well-known MP was 
overheard by the media commenting that he would engage a contract killer to assassinate 
one of his unfortunate colleagues.  In a political environment where unsolved killing of 
those in opposition power has occurred, such threats only serve to add to the general 
sense of anarchy and lack of professionalism ruling the Mongolian political process 
(Ch.Davardorj 2007).     
 
More important than public perceptions of MPs behaviour is the degree to which such 
behaviour has affected overall public governance and the Mongolian Parliament’s ability 
to respond to social demands at both a domestic and foreign level.  Without a doubt, the 
greatest failure in this regard came in the aftermath of the 2008 Parliamentary election 
that led to riots throughout Ulaanbaatar during which five people were killed.  Not only 
did the MDP instigate the riots by claiming election fraud, but it also effectively crippled 
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the government afterward by refusing to take less than an equal share of the contested 
Parliamentary seats.  For more than 100 days, Mongolia was effectively without a 
government while both the MPRP and MDP squabbled for power (Tuul 2008b).  During 
that time the country’s domestic and foreign political agendas were in a state of arrested 
development while Mongolian media carried reports of both old and new MPs leaving 
the country in the midst of the government ‘crisis’ to attend the Beijing Olympics at the 
Chinese government’s invitation (Emulgeen 2008).   
 
Numerous Mongolian media articles also reported steep price increases in both petrol and 
food products, claiming the Russia and China government were both ‘taking advantage’ 
of the political chaos for financial gain (Tuul 2008a).  While official statistics to 
corroborate these claims were not available at the time of writing, interviews with 
Mongolian residents in Ulaanbaatar at the time did indeed confirm that prices increased 
in various daily-use goods in the riot’s immediate aftermath.   
 
Finally, one Mongolian reporter wrote that crime in Ulaanbaatar more than doubled 
during the 100 days the MPRP and MDP fought over the Parliamentary results (Enhtor 
2008).  In an article loosely translated, ‘While the Government is In Crisis…’, this same 
reporter also chastises the Mongolian Parliament for failing to manage the country 
despite the average Mongolia’s increased suffering.     
 
Corruption 
 
According to Agni Baljinnyam, United Nation’s National Project Manager, Independent 
Authority Against Corruption, corruption remains a widespread and tacitly accepted part 
of Mongolian life (Interview 1).  It is pervasive throughout society and in many ways 
recognised as a political and social norm.  Indeed, corruption is evident throughout 
Mongolian society in instances varying from workers having to pay as much as a year’s 
salary in order to secure a new job, residents having to pay bribes to receive a public 
service to which they are legally entitled, and government official’s teenage children 
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driving Mercedes Benz jeeps through a city where the monthly salary for MPs is around 
USD400 (Asia Foundation & Sant Maral 2006).     
 
While a survey of corruption conducted by the Asian Foundation found that more than 
two-thirds of Mongolians believe corruption is unacceptable, two-thirds also accepted 
that it was a prevalent trend throughout politics and believe that the situation had actually 
gotten worse over the previous three years (Asia Foundation & Sant Maral 2006).  The 
same survey showed widespread belief that government officials, far from acting to 
secure the people against corruption, were more likely to use their positions of power to 
enrich themselves at the cost of society as a whole.  As corruption is directly influential 
on the state’s ability to function properly, it is an essential component of any discussion 
of Mongolia’s domestic sovereignty.         
 
A 2005 USAID report on corruption notes that by far the most problematic characteristic 
of Mongolia’s corruption is that which takes place at an elite level and involves a conflict 
of interests between the state and private sectors (U.S.Agency for International 
Development 2005:3).  According to the report, this high-level corruption is the result of 
a lack of transparency around government work, ineffective government oversight 
committees, and a ‘spoils system’ that has become a widely ‘accepted’ source of 
additional income for civil servants and politicians alike.  As the report also indicates that 
the impetus for change among politicians and other government officials is weak, that 
persistent, pervasive corruption has become what Mongolians believe is the country’s 
third most pressing concern (following poverty and unemployment) is unsurprising.   
 
Among government agencies, the Mongolian public reportedly consider customs to be 
the most corrupt and unregulated.  Indeed, the level of corruption in Mongolia’s customs 
forced Ts. Tsergelen, Brigadier-General of the Border Patrol, to openly admit that 
corruption within the agency was widespread and all but uncontrollable (News Today 
2007a).  Indeed, corruption within the customs agency has resulted in at least one highly 
publicised case where one border guard shot and killed two others while the three were 
involved in smuggling on the Russian border.   
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Moreover, nepotism is rife in the appointing of customs officials.  This is clearly 
demonstrated in the case of Ganbatar, the head officer of the Zamin Uud border crossing.  
While under investigation for illegally allowing more than USD190,000 worth of 
medicine across the Altanbulag border with Russia while head officer of that border post, 
the Custom’s Office simply transferred Ganbatar the more prestigious and profitable 
southern border crossing rather charge him with misconduct.  His fortune in essentially 
receiving a promotion away from his troubled post is attributed to the fact that his uncle, 
Kh. Batar, is director of Customs General Office (News Today 2007b).  The Mongolian 
media and other customs officers in Zamin Uud vocally criticised his reappointment, 
albeit to no effect. 
 
Corruption among Mongolian customs is not just confined to the small-scale.  Media 
reports note that the custom’s agency is currently pushing for new legislation that would 
turn the Zamin Uud border crossing into a free trade zone over which it would have total 
authority (C.Tuul 2007).  Plans for transferring the fifteen thousand-person village of 
Zamin Uud range from the absurd (building an international airport) to the exploitative 
(an unregulated casino).  These same reports note that if the legislation passes, Zamin 
Uud will in effect become a private source of personal wealth for customs officials and 
their political sponsors (C.Tuul 2007).   
 
The abuse of power for profit is also evident in instances between the government and 
private sector.  Two incidents stand out as exemplary in this regard and are worth noting 
in brief.  The first involved the sale of Mongolia’s Savings Bank; the last of Mongolia’s 
state controlled banks.  In 2006, the bank was sold for 23.4 billion tugriks, of which 14.2 
billion subsequently disappeared unaccounted for.  Investigators later proved that Ts. 
Chimedtseren, the banks senior accountant, embezzled the funds in order to take them 
abroad to gamble.  Upon his return to Mongolia and subsequent arrest, Ts. Chimedtseren 
accused prominent members of the MPRP and the MPRP’s affiliate organization, the 
Mongolian Democratic Socialist Youth Association, of accompanying him on his 
gambling debacle and aiding him in embezzlement.  While the MPs accused of 
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participation were suspended from their positions pending an outcome, as of 2009, the 
case was still under investigation and no charges had been brought against any party 
involved (Ts.Davandorj, D.Zayabat, & D.Bexbayar 2007).   
 
Second, and perhaps more damaging to Mongolia’s international reputation as well as its 
relations with one of its most important trading partners, is the incident between one of 
Mongolia’s key corporations, Buyan Company, and the Japanese firm, Marubeni.  B. 
Jargalsaikhan, one of Mongolia’s most prominent businessmen and an MP, acting in his 
capacity as director of Buyan Company, bought USD18.9 million worth of equipment 
from Marubeni on credit.  In order to secure the deal, he arranged for the Mongolian 
Ministry of Finance to act as a guarantor and provided official documentation to the 
Japanese as proof the Mongolian government stood beside his business endeavour.  
When, in early 2000, Buyan Company defaulted on the loan, Marubeni undertook legal 
proceedings against the Mongolian government for repayment.  While the Ministry of 
Finance eventually managed to prove it had never legally acted as a guarantor on Buyan’s 
behalf and that B. Jargalsaikhan had illegally offered the Ministry as a co-signer for the 
corporation’s loans, the state legal fees amounted to USD1.7 million, financed by the 
Mongolian tax payer.  B. Jargalsaikhan’s Buyan company was ordered to repay the legal 
costs, but as of 2009, no attempt has been made by the government to reclaim the 
expenses (Ts.Davandorj, D.Zayabat, & D.Bexbayar 2007).   
 
While the Mongolian government has taken visible steps to deal with corruption through 
the formation in 2006 of the Independent Authority Against Corruption (IAAC), the 
organisation has proved weak-willed in battling any but the lowest level corruption.  
Indeed, the Mongolian public has increasingly come to view the IAAC itself as a corrupt 
agency (Today 2007a).  Moreover, the agency’s heavy-handed approach towards 
investigation has earned it a horrible reputation of only pursuing corruption cases against 
low-level, private and government sector employees as well as a comparison to the 
MPR’s security apparatus in the 1930s.  In many ways the comparison is accurate as, 
according to A. Baljinnyam who has worked with the agency since inception as a 
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representative from the UN, the IAAC is fully staffed with ex-secret police from 
Mongolia’s disbanded Public Security Bureau.   
 
Mongolian media has reported a large number of cases where the IAAC has detained 
low-level government workers without cause while physical abusing them.  Moreover, 
media reports also offer accounts when the IAAC has harassed those accused of 
‘corruption’ by illegally tapping their home and office telephones (Today 2007a).  In this 
regard, the Mongolian public largely views the IAAC as an agency with a government 
signed carte blanche to harass and detain individuals at will.  Indeed, as the IAAC was 
established by a parliamentary mandate and all high ranked officials appointed, it is 
difficult to understand how it is envisioned to pursue high-level corruption.   
 
Corruption in the IAAC extends beyond the agency’s abuse of power to its use of 
government funding.  According to A. Baljinnyam, in 2009 the IAAC did not have 
finances necessary to conduct investigations despite the Mongolian government’s general 
budget having supplied the centre with a substantial allotment of funds.  A. Baljinnyam 
explained this disparity by noting the IAAC spent the entirety of its operational funding 
on new cars and salaries for a staff of ninety ex-police with no training in corruption 
investigation as well as an extension on an already sizable new office.  As of 2009, no 
high-level officials had been seriously investigated by the agency  
             
Moreover, in one instance when parliament sanctioned a high-level official (non-IAAC) 
to investigate corruption in the credit and savings scandals of 2006 in which it suspected 
many members of the MPRP had taken part, the investigating officer, D. Badraa, Chief of 
the Ministry of Finance’s Office of Financial Control, was stabbed to death in front of his 
offices in broad daylight.  Investigators identified the perpetrator as a director of a 
prominent Savings and Loan Co-op with links to numerous government officials.  While 
arrested and detained for several months, as of 2009 the state had not filed formal charges 
against him (Today 2007b). 
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As with Mongolia’s Westphalian sovereignty, Chinese effects on Mongolia’s domestic 
sovereignty are incidental.  While cross border corruption does, of course, include 
Chinese participation, the inability to staunch domestic corruption is entirely the fault of 
the Mongolian government.  Moreover, the current state of the Mongolian parliament is 
exclusively a domestic affair in which the Chinese have no part to play. 
 
This is not to say that that such weakness in domestic sovereignty is not beneficial to the 
Chinese government and, even more so, Chinese entrepreneurs.  Indeed, a parliament 
preoccupied with internal power struggles and corruption is neither focused nor united 
enough to maintain an easily enforceable policy of excluding foreign actors in the state’s 
internal affairs.  Moreover, as Chinese economic influence in Mongolia grows, it is more 
than likely that so, too, will Chinese influence over Mongolian domestic sovereignty in 
so much that Chinese special interests groups will have funds and influence necessary to 
lobby a corrupt and power hungry government.  This will, of course, ultimately lead to a 
situation where the Mongolian government’s hold on domestic authority weakens.  
 
Conclusion 
 
While Mongolia remains an uncontested, independent state in the international system, it 
nevertheless faces considerable threats and challenges to its overall sovereignty.  
Specifically, the inability of the country’s two largest parties to bolster various 
dimensions of state control, particularly in regard to the state’s interdependence and 
domestic sovereignties, is proof that Mongolia’s leadership is uncommitted and/or unable 
to create legitimate governmental institutions that outlast their tenure in office.  
According to Midgal, this myopic approach to government building is a fundamental 
component of state weakness (Midgal 2001:136).   
 
Moreover, Mongolia’s most stalwart aspects of sovereignty are those relating to 
legitimacy, not control, and have largely been imposed and strengthened by external 
actors.  In this sense, Mongolia’s overall sovereignty is what Weng calls ‘negative’ 
sovereignty in that it relies on the international community for legal recognition while 
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having allowed external influence to play too large a role in the shaping of its institutions 
of authority (Weng 2000:94).   
 
Mongolia’s legal sovereignty, while established and supported by the international 
community, does not convey on the state what Jackson refers to as the prospect of long-
term control and internal legitimacy (Jackson 1990:22).  While legal sovereignty does 
offer the government legitimacy in that it is seen as the head of an internationally 
recognised state, an ineffective democratic government, particularly one seen as corrupt, 
can easily lose the support of its populace and weaken the state’s institutions (Krasner 
1999:17).  As the previous analysis of Mongolia’s domestic sovereignty clearly shows 
that the Mongolian parliament has largely become an ineffective, corrupt institution while 
maintaining international and domestic legitimacy as the state’s legal sovereign, the 
potential for future political instability is apparent.   
 
Mongolia’s Westphalian sovereignty, the foundation upon which the bureaucracy of the 
modern state functions, is also weak as foreign institutions and countries constructed it 
externally and applied it to the country’s post-transition environment without taking 
identity concerns into account.  The results of this transplantation are legislative, 
administrative, and judicial systems that were largely inappropriate for Mongolia’s post-
Cold War political environment and that continue to undermine the state’s ability to 
function today.  Growing corruption compounds Mongolia’s institutional inefficiency.        
 
Additionally, the Mongolian government’s inability to secure it borders and to root out 
corruption from among its customs officials will have long-term negative effects on the 
state’s sovereignty.  Cross-border trade in illegal goods threatens the state’s economic 
and environmental sectors while issues such as human trafficking undermine the state’s 
ability to provide essential public goods, such as security.  This, in turn, creates problems 
of interdependency in that the state cannot control the flow of foreign goods and ideas 
into the country.  Nor can it frankly claim to have secured the country’s physical borders 
from foreign influence.   
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Lastly is the issue of Mongolia’s domestic sovereignty.  Central to this is the chapter’s 
position that systemic corruption has fundamentally affected the state’s ability to act in 
the public’s best interest.  In many ways, this is an entirely post-Cold War phenomenon 
as a driving force behind this corruption is the growing link between the state and private 
sector.  This, in turn, weakens the state’s long-term ability to maintain sovereign control 
as foreign as well as domestic companies and governments can gain influence over the 
country’s domestic affairs through political ‘contributions’ or bribes.        
 
Taken together, Mongolia’s international legal, Westphalian, interdependence, and 
domestic sovereignties all indicate that the modern state has limited control over the 
country’s institutions of authority and is consequentially acting against the publics’ best 
interest in a myriad of ways.  This creates a gap in the country’s socio-political cohesion 
that undermines what Buzan calls ‘stateness’ and leads to weakness (Buzan 2003:22).  
Consequently, Mongolia is left more open to external and internal threats that can further 
undermine the government’s sovereignty in an almost cyclical manner.  This allows 
foreign actors to gain influence across the country’s sectors that could potentially 
contribute to dependency. 
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Chapter Four: Mongolia’s Growing Economic Dependency on China 
 
 
The following chapter will employ dependency theory and regionalism in examining 
Mongolian-Sino economic relations since Mongolia’s transition to a capitalist market 
economy.  It will start by examining Mongolian-Sino trade and investment in mining as it 
is this chapter’s position that this aspect of the two countries’ economic relations is the 
catalyst for subsequent penetration by small and medium sized Chinese firms into 
Mongolia’s domestic economy while also the driving factor behind foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and Chinese aid.  The chapter will demonstrate how increased 
dependency on Chinese investment and technical expertise has undermined the 
Mongolian government’s ability to direct the country’s economic development.  In doing 
so, the chapter will establish a framework for subsequent chapters’ use of Mongolia’s 
economic dependency to explain the lack of security in the country’s other sectors.   
 
The chapter’s use of dependency theory will focus on the position that trade is not 
beneficial for all states and that states with greater economic and political power can use 
that power for enrichment at the weaker state’s expense (Barbieri 2005:28).  It will also 
assume that such asymmetrical economic relationships contribute to an unequal exchange 
between states.  Such exchange allows powerful countries to exploit weaker countries’ 
resources, thereby undermining the weaker state’s ability to accumulate surplus capital so 
that it might industrialise and develop (Reid 2007:35). 
 
It will also draw on basic concepts from dependency theory such as what Preston refers 
to as the developed (‘core’ or ‘central’) state and the underdeveloped (‘peripheral’) state, 
as this dualism is particularly relevant for any discussion of Mongolian-Sino economic 
relations (Preston 1996:198).  So, too, will the chapter draw on Furtado’s concept of a 
regional industrial nucleus in order to emphasise the important role regionalism plays in 
the two countries’ economic relations and Mongolia’s subsequent dependency (Furtado 
1964:135-138).   
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From a liberalist perspective, Mongolia’s proximity to China is full of economic 
opportunities.  China’s seemingly inexhaustible need for raw materials very much 
complements Mongolia’s agricultural and mineral based economy while the Chinese 
government and Chinese businesses are providing needed investment to the country’s 
growing mining and energy sectors.  Indeed, Mongolia’s impressive economic growth 
since 2000 has in many ways been driven by Chinese demand (figure 4.1).  According to 
Bill Bikales, Chief Economist for the UNDP in China, the two countries’ geographic 
proximity and mutually beneficial economic systems together constitute a framework for 
potential economic exchange that could turn Mongolia into a ‘Canada’ in relation to 
China’s ‘United States’ (Interview 3).   
 
On closer examination of the two countries’ economic relations, however, there is little 
reason to view Mongolia’s position on China’s periphery with such optimism.  While 
Mongolia’s GDP has benefited from increased Chinese-based economic cooperation, the 
pattern of such cooperation has in many ways retarded the country’s own domestic 
growth.  In regards to trade, the majority of Mongolian exports to China are in the form 
of raw materials that China then processes and re-sells back to Mongolia as a higher 
priced import, creating an what Farmer calls an ‘unequal exchange’ between the two 
states (Farmer 1999:12).  This, in turn, has widespread negative impacts on aspects of 
Mongolia’s domestic economy such as manufacturing as China’s ability to provide cheap 
alternatives undermines the incentive for domestic development.  Moreover, China’s 
dominant position in relation to Mongolia, best viewed as a core to periphery 
asymmetrical relationship, has resulted in what Krugman notes is a ‘relaxation of 
financial restrictions’ on the outflow and inflow of funds, thereby increasing the 
country’s financial dependence on Chinese investment and aid (Krugman 2000:1-2).   
 
The result of the two countries’ asymmetrical trade relationship is the increased 
dependency of Mongolia on China and China’s subsequent growth in influence over 
Mongolian economic structures.  While this chapter will not argue that China has sought 
out this dominant position intentionally, it nevertheless holds that the PRC has developed 
what Strange calls an ‘unconscious power’ or the ability to exercise power ‘by “being 
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there” without intending the creation of exploitation of privilege or the transfer of costs or 
risks from oneself to others’ (Strange 1996:26).  China’s ‘unconscious power’ is most 
evident in Mongolian policy makers’ seeming inability to enact protective legislation that 
could insulate Mongolia’s domestic economy from over-dependence on China or to enact 
a trade agreement that would benefit not only those domestic sectors, such as mining, in 
which China has a vested interest, but Mongolia’s domestic economy in general. 
 
This increased dependency is driven in large part by regionalism. Whereas world trade 
during the decade following Mongolia’s transition to democracy and a liberal market 
economy (1991-2001) increased 177%, intra-regional trade in East Asia grew 304% 
during the same period, indicating most new trade in East Asia was between East Asian 
states (Ohashi 2006:72).  In 2008, the World Trade Organization (WTO) noted that trade 
between Asian states for 2007 accounted for 50% of total trade, placing it, as a region, on 
par with North America and the EU as one of the three regions worldwide with the 
highest level of intra-regional trade (WTO 2008b:9).  These instances of expanded 
regional integration and cooperation indicate that East Asia is now increasingly driving 
its own economic growth. This shift in trade patterns away from extra-regional 
multilateralism is best understood through the concept of regionalism in so much as the 
term refers to informal networks of economic overlapping and integration (Liu & Regnier 
2003:7).  
 
Indeed, key to East Asian regionalism is that such increases in regional trade did not 
occur due to formal trade agreements or institutionalism but rather through an 
autonomous process driven by market forces (Munakata 2006:133).  In this sense, East 
Asian regionalism is not a simple reproduction of trading blocks represented by the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in North America or the European Union but 
rather is based on non-institutionalisation and non-discrimination in international and 
trade economic policy, or what Columbus calls a ‘soft-open’ regionalism.  East Asian 
regionalism exists because East Asian countries’ economies are complementary ‘in terms 
of production factor endowments and economic structures’ while having geographic 
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proximity to one another and often sharing a common cultural and ethnic history 
(Columbus 2006:107). 
 
For China, inter-regional trade has become increasingly important as within the last 
fifteen years the percentage of China’s overall foreign trade that is inter-regional has 
steadily grown (figure 4.2);(Moore 2003:101).  Moreover, while it is still much smaller in 
economic terms than Japan, China is arguably East Asia’s regional hub in terms of 
manufacturing, population, culture, and geographic location.  This increasing regional 
economic dynamic in which China forms the core has massive implications for 
Mongolia’s domestic economy, particularly as the overall percentage of Mongolia’s trade 
with China has grown exponentially since 2000 (figure 4.3).  
 
 
Source: Statistical data derived from National Statistical Office of Mongolia, 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 2001-2007. 
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Source: Data derived from National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical 
Yearbook 1993-2008, 2009. 
 
 
Source: Data derived from National Bureau of Statistics, China Statistical 
Yearbook 1993-2008, 2009. 
 
4.1 China’s Economic Foreign Policy Toward Mongolia 
 
According to Jeffrey Liang of the Asian Development Bank, China’s foremost economic 
interest in regard to Mongolia is in securing a dominant position in the country’s newly 
emerging mining sector so as to strengthen its regional supply chains of minerals such as 
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copper, gold, and coal (Interview 14).  In order to pursue these policy ends, the Chinese 
government has employed what Alden, in his work on Sino-African relations, describes 
as a ‘traditional strategy of linking investment to tie-in projects and providing lower 
labour costs in the form of less costly managerial staff and introducing their own contract 
workers’ (Alden 2007:13).  Such Chinese investment tends to focus on infrastructure 
building as related to trade and development of mining-related infrastructure.     
 
This strategy, in turn, has helped small and medium sized Chinese firms, as well as 
Chinese products, penetrate the domestic Mongolian economy.  Clear examples of this, 
examined in further detail below, are the growing presence of Chinese companies and 
workers involved in infrastructure development in relation to mining and transportation 
and the numerous shops in Ulaanbaatar and the Mongolian countryside that are stocked 
with low-cost Chinese imports.  As, according to Huang, many of these ‘private’ firms 
may retain direct or close relations with China’s larger state owned enterprises (SOEs), 
this growth of Chinese-based companies in Mongolia translates into increasing 
‘unconscious power’ for the PRC (Huang 2008:13).   
 
In this sense, while professing a foreign policy of ‘no political strings’, China’s 
involvement in Mongolia’s domestic economy may be part of a larger strategy that has as 
its ultimate goal the occupation of a dominant position in the Mongolian market as well 
as the establishment of the PRC as the engine for the country’s domestic growth.  
Conversely, China’s increasing leverage in Mongolia’s economy may simply be the 
natural consequence of the size of its presence.  Regardless of the initial motivation 
behind Chinese decisions to use infrastructure development to assure access to 
Mongolia’s minerals, that the situation has led to increased Mongolian dependency is 
clear.  The remainder of the chapter will examine the ways in which this dominance has 
limited the Mongolian government’s ability to institute protective legislation to ensure 
Mongolia’s economic autonomy.  
 
4.2 Mongolia’s External Trade 
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Mongolia’s mineral wealth, China’s demand for such resources, and the Mongolian 
Customs Law of 1996 that severely limits the government’s ability to regulate trade have 
all contributed to the PRC becoming Mongolia’s largest export partner, absorbing 74% of 
all Mongolia’s exports in 2007 (figure 4.13). At the same time, a lack of development in 
the country’s manufacturing industry and the inflow of cheap Chinese goods have helped 
raise China to Mongolia’s second most important import trade partner (Ministry of 
Industry and Trade 1996:1); (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific 2006:9).  While increased trade with China has contributed to substantial 
growth in overall trade (figures 4.2 and 4.4), so, too, has it led to economic dependency 
that has the potential to undermine the benefits associated with growing trade.  This is 
most evident in that Mongolia exports all its resources unprocessed while importing 
goods for which it then does not development a domestic production capacity. 
 
 
Source: Statistical data derived from National Statistical Office of Mongolia, 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 2001-2007.  
 
Indeed, not content with its current access to the Mongolian import/export markets, the 
Chinese government has actively sought to further its trade relations with Mongolia by 
investing in trade-related infrastructure and pushing forward trade agreements.  In 2006, 
the Chinese and Mongolian government, under the auspices of the Asian Development 
Bank and CAREC, signed a USD5 million Trade Facilitation Project meant to foster 
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bilateral trade by improving custom’s cooperation, infrastructure, and transportation 
(Asian Development Bank 2007).  In November 2007, officials from Mongolia’s 
Ministry of Industry and Trade met with their Chinese counterparts in Beijing for a joint 
task force meeting to discuss ways to further the project.  
 
The Chinese government also uses the IMAR’s geographic proximity to Mongolia to 
increase trade between the two countries.  In 2005, the Mongolian government and 
IMAR’s regional trade representatives signed bilateral road transit and transportation 
agreements to facilitate cross-border trade in addition to those pursued at the government-
to-government level between China and Mongolia (Asian Development Bank 2006:3).  
These agreements include dry ports development (border crossings), building refrigerated 
capacity, and promoting intermodalism (use of a single container and a single source of 
transport) at border crossings.  Moreover, in line with the ADB and PRC government’s 
plans for Sino-Mongolian trade development, plans to develop a road from the IMAR’s 
Xinganmeng to Mongolia’s Sukhbaatar city are underway.  In 2006, the two governments 
also met to discuss the possibility of attaching the Mongolian state owned Central Region 
Electric Transmission Company’s power cable, which currently extends to the Mongolian 
border town of Zamin Uud, to the Chinese power grid in Inner Mongolia.   
 
Imports 
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Source: Statistical data derived from National Statistical Office of Mongolia, 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 2001-2007.   
 
 
Source: Statistical data derived from National Statistical Office of Mongolia, 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 2001-2007.  
 
 
Mongolia’s primary imports in 2008 consist of manufactured goods (23.8%), foods 
(6.5%), machinery equipments (13.5%), and energy resources (25.6%), all of which are 
either cheaper to import than produce or for which Mongolia lacks domestic production 
ability on a substantial scale (Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency (FIFTA) 
  114 
2007).  As opposed to exports, for which the bulk goes to China, the sources of 
Mongolia’s imports are more diverse with the Russian Federation remaining the most 
important import relationship in Mongolia’s trade portfolio.  This is, however, changing 
as the percentage of imports originating from China is growing substantially year by year 
and now threatens to overtake Russia’s dominance (figure 4.5) (European Commission 
2007:4).  While Mongolia also receives imports from other countries, including Japan, 
Korea, and the European Union, such trade is inconsequential in that collectively all 
imports from those three countries amount to less than 25% of total imports while both 
Russia and China account for more than 30% each (World Trade Organisation 2007).   
 
Oil 
 
Although overall trade relations with Russia are decreasing, Mongolia is almost entirely 
dependent on Russian oil.  In 2007, Mongolia imported 769.6 thousand tons of oil 
products, 95% of its total oil consumption, from Russia’s OAO Rosneft Oil Company, at 
a total cost of USD533.5 million (World Bank 2008:3).  The remaining 5% of 
Mongolia’s domestically consumed oil is supplied by Kazakhstan while a nominal 
amount comes from China in the form of Mongolian oil exported in crude form, 
processed in Inner Mongolia, and re-imported.  This import dependency, the only one of 
Mongolia’s major imports not originating from China, is likely to continue into the near 
future as supplies are, according to J. Doljinsuren of the UNDP, both established and 
cheap (Interview 12).  Any reduction of oil imports from Russia, therefore, will only 
come when and if Mongolia is able to develop its own untapped oil reserves to meet 
domestic demand, which figure 4.7 shows is increasing, or in response to a shift in 
economic and political relations with Russia. 
 
  115 
 
Source: Statistical data derived from National Statistical Office of Mongolia, 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 2001-2007.  
 
Manufactured Goods 
 
From 2003 to 2007, China’s share of Mongolia’s overall import market grew from 27% 
to 32% while Russia’s simultaneously fell from 45% to 35% (Ministry of Industry and 
Trade 2007a).  Most of China’s increasing imports to Mongolia can be attributed to an 
increase in the demand of manufactured goods and consumer products (Foreign 
Investment and Foreign Trade Agency (FIFTA) 2007) (figure 4.6). Making up around 
27% of total imports, manufactured goods from China include electric and mechanical 
equipments (13.6%), transport vehicles and their spare parts (8.5%), construction 
equipment (2.1%), textiles and textile related products (1.5%), electric appliances (0.8%), 
wood products (0.6%), and foot and headwear (0.1%) (Ministry of Industry and Trade 
2008a).  As Chinese articles are often cheaper and of higher quality than those produced 
in Mongolia, domestic production in Mongolia has slowed or disappeared altogether.  
 
Foods 
 
More than any other import, Mongolia is linked to the Chinese market for its food 
imports.  While a small amount of cereals and breads come from Russia, more than 90% 
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of all non-meat foods in Mongolia originate from China.  These include poultry and fish, 
vegetables, fruits, tea, rice, wheat flour, sugar, soft drinks, and beer—all items difficult or 
impossible to produce in Mongolia itself (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2008).  Indeed, 
one need look no further than the local markets for evidence that Chinese foods dominate 
Mongolia’s food imports as more labels are written in Chinese than in Mongolian. 
 
While such dependency on imported foods, according to Patrick Evans of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), is not uncommon for small countries such as Mongolia 
in which extreme climate and proximity to a agricultural production centre, such as China, 
make domestic production of fruits and vegetables untenably expensive, rising food costs 
in China have contributed to an estimated 5 percentage points to Mongolia’s 2007 15.1% 
inflation (Interview 25);(World Bank 2008:3).  
 
Exports 
 
 
Source: Statistical data derived from National Statistical Office of Mongolia, 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 2001-2007.  
 
Important in regard to Mongolia’s recent economic growth (over 6% annually for the 
four year period between 2002-2006) is the country’s sizable mining sector, particularly 
such minerals as copper and gold (figures 4.1 and 4.4); (Gooptu 2007:5).  Indeed, 
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estimates for the percentage mining accounts of overall GDP are around 30% of total 
value while constituting almost 68% of total export earnings (Environmental and Social 
Development Department 2007:1).  The state-owned Erdenet Copper Mine alone, the 
largest active mine in the country with a capacity of producing 24 million tonnes of high 
grade ore a year, generates almost 25% of Mongolia’s foreign reserves, accounts for 45% 
of all exports, and provides the Mongolian government with about one-quarter of total 
government spending (Environmental and Social Development Department 2007:17).   
 
Of lesser importance to Mongolia’s exports, while its secondary industry, are Mongolia’s 
animal products.  Constituting just 5.9% of overall exports in 2007, down from 6.9% in 
2006, animal products, primarily cashmere, while still considerable in that they constitute 
a large percentage of Mongolia’s non-mineral related production, are receiving less and 
less domestic attention as the country turns its resources towards developing the 
country’s mining sector (figure 4.9).    
 
 
Source:  Data derived from Ministry of Finance, Foreign Investment and Foreign 
Trade Agency (FIFTA), FDI 1990-2007, 2008. 
 
Minerals  
 
  118 
Nearly 70% of Mongolia’s mineral exports go to China; a number likely to increase as 
China’s industrialisation continues over the next several decades and China secures a 
even more dominant position in Mongolia’s mining industry (Asian Development Bank 
2007a:150).  An indication of the growing importance of the Chinese market for 
Mongolian mineral products is the growth of exports between 2005 and 2006 from 56.6% 
to 67%, respectively (The Economist Intelligence Unit 2006:17). 
 
Copper 
 
The most important Mongolian export to China is copper.  In 2006, Mongolia exported 
nearly 600,000 tons to China, making it by far the most important mineral resource in the 
country’s export portfolio (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2008a).  Moreover, the 
closeness of Mongolia’s copper extraction and Chinese demand is likely to increase as, at 
present, China’s need for copper seems almost insatiable.  The PRC is now the world’s 
largest consumer of copper, consuming more than 20% of global copper supplies in 2003, 
and increasing its imports of the mineral 250% from 2000 to 2003 alone (Commodity 
Research Bureau 2005:291).  As Mongolia’s undeveloped Oyu Tolgoi copper and gold 
deposit, estimated to be one of the largest in the world with a capacity of producing more 
than 1 billion tonnes of copper and 330,000 ounces of gold annually for at least thirty-
five years, is in the south Gobi desert near the Mongolian-Chinese border, all 
prerequisites for a long-term linked trade relationship seem to be in place (Asian 
Development Bank 2007a:151).   
 
Gold 
 
In 2006, Mongolia exported 15,378 kilos of gold almost exclusively to China, down 
significantly from the previous year’s 23,811 kilos (Ministry of Industry and Trade 
2008a).  Yet this is not an accurate indication of the overall level of gold trade between 
the two countries because it does not take into account the significant black market 
economy (xar zax zeel in Mongolian).  According to Luke Distelhorst of Ivanhoe Mines, 
the level of legal gold traded between China and Mongolia has, in recent years, 
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plummeted as small and medium sized mining companies, particularly Chinese invested 
firms, have taken to smuggling gold out of Mongolia for sale in the Chinese market in 
order to avoid the Mongolian government’s significant windfall tax.  As much of 
Mongolia’s gold is mined illegally to begin with, that a large percentage of it enters the 
Chinese market circumspectly is quite natural (World Bank 2008:2). 
 
Animal Products 
 
While for most of the 1990s, animal related textile products, such as cashmere, drove 
Mongolia’s export economy, in the past decade a major shift towards the mining industry, 
severe winters, and animal disease have all contributed to large-scale decreases in 
production and investment in animal husbandry.  Indeed, from 2001 to 2005, Mongolia’s 
total output of woollen products dropped from 43.1 thousand metric tons to 33.5 
thousand metric tons while other animal related products, such as leather, experienced 
even more drastic declines (16.7 thousand to 3 thousand tons from 2001 to 2005) 
(International Monetary Fund 2007:55).  In total, animal and agricultural products made 
up less than 5.9% of Mongolia’s total exports in 2007, plummeting from 27% in 2003 
(Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency (FIFTA) 2007); (World Trade 
Organization 2007).   
 
Of this percentage, exports to China are increasing while exports to the other countries 
are in decline (Asian Development Bank 2007a:150).  In relation to meat products, 
Mongolia has been unable to raise its production and storage facilities to meet with more 
industrialised nation’s food safety standards and, as such, has seen its share of the foreign 
market slip in recent years (World Bank 2008:20).  As food safety issues do not, 
according to Patrick Evans of the FAO, hinder exports to China to the same degree as to 
Japan or Korea, Mongolian herders look more and more to the Chinese market for sale of 
their goods. 
 
As for cashmere, a growing trade of legal and illegal skins between Mongolia and 
China’s IMAR, where much of the production takes place, has not only intricately tied 
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the two industries together, but also weakened Mongolia’s domestic ability to process 
cashmere at a competitive price.  This, in turn, has lead to further dependency on the 
Chinese market. 
 
 
Source: Statistical data derived from National Statistical Office of Mongolia, 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 2001-2007.  
 
 
Source:  Data derived from Ministry of Finance, Foreign Investment and Foreign 
Trade Agency (FIFTA), FDI 1990-2007, 2008. 
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4.3 Foreign Direct Investment  
 
 
Source:  Data derived from Ministry of Finance, Foreign Investment and Foreign 
Trade Agency (FIFTA), FDI in Mongolia, 2008. 
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Mongolia has averaged 5.2% of overall GDP for the 
ten year period between 1996 and 2006, while increasing, on average, around 80% each 
year between 2000 and 2007 (figure 4.12) (United Nations Staff 2005:59).  This 
impressive inflow of foreign funds is well above the average for East Asia and three 
times the amount of the low-income country group to which it belongs (Gooptu 2007:11).  
While most FDI occurs between larger, wealthier countries, Mongolia’s mineral deposits 
make it a particularly attractive investment destination for both regional and international 
funds.  Indeed, since 1990, Mongolia’s mining sector has been the largest recipient of 
FDI at 52.5% with trade and consumer food products ranking a distant second with 
18.7% of total FDI received (figure 4.13) (Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency 
2008).  As the country’s main mineral resources have yet to be tapped, and as, according 
to L. Vanjildorj of the ADB, mining industry experts consider the country to be a ‘next’ 
generation energy provider, it is very likely Mongolia will continue to receive high-levels 
of FDI in its minerals sector in the near future (Interview 17).   
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The question then remains whether the Mongolian government will enact domestic 
legislation to encourage FDI or choose instead to protect the country’s resources from 
foreign dependence and possible dominance.  Moreover, of particular significance for 
any discussion of China’s role in Mongolian FDI, whether such legislation has the 
potential to increase Mongolian’s dependency on the PRC.   
 
 
Source:  Data derived from Ministry of Finance, Foreign Investment and Foreign 
Trade Agency (FIFTA), FDI 1990-2007, 2008. 
 
There is no question that the Mongolian government increasingly views FDI as the means 
to develop its private sector beyond the level of domestic investment at present.  This is 
most evident in the Mongolian Foreign Investment Law that allows for a range of choices 
for foreign investors.  At present, and excepting resources that are deemed ‘nationally 
strategic’, a foreign company or investor has the right to own one hundred percent of a 
Mongolian-based company.  Foreign owned companies are not restricted as to what 
industries or geographic areas in which they might invest (with the exception of 
nationally protected areas) (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2008b).  Types of foreign 
investment include wholly owned foreign firms, partially invested firms with a 
Mongolian partner, direct investment in stocks, shares and other securities in Mongolian 
business entities, and purchasing shares in any business (foreign or national) operating in 
Mongolia.  Moreover, the Foreign Investment Law guarantees foreign investors the same 
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rights and opportunities as Mongolian investors (Ministry of Industry and Trade 2008b).  
This legislation has led to a trend in which the number of Mongolian-based companies 
that are fully foreign owned accounts for one-third of all Mongolia’s companies 
(Permanent Mission of Mongolia to the United Nations 2007).   
 
While the Mongolian government does impose limitations on land ownership, petroleum 
extraction, and strategic minerals deposits, these limitations are far from protectionist.  
Indeed, they have proven rather easy for smaller investors to circumvent, as detailed in 
the following case study on Chinese investment in Mongolia’s mining sector.  In relation 
to land ownership, foreign companies can own building structures while leasing the land 
for a term of up to ninety years or simply buy the land outright through a Mongolian 
intermediary.  While determining what exactly constitutes a strategic mineral deposit is at 
the government’s discretion, a greater challenge is site development and extraction 
without foreign investment or mining technology (International Trade Administration 
2007:1).  Indeed, while the Mongolian government has debated at length the need to keep 
mining projects such as Oyu Tolgoi under state control, the reality, according to Luke 
Distlehorst of Ivanhoe Mines, is that without foreign investment, expertise, and good 
mining practices, Mongolia’s mining sector will not develop beyond exploration of 
mineral deposits, be they ‘strategic’ or not.  
 
That this investment environment has been particularly beneficial for the Chinese 
government and Chinese businesses is evident in the increase in the overall percentage of 
Mongolia’s FDI represented by Chinese-originating funds (figure 4.14).  Throughout the 
1990s, Chinese originating FDI to Mongolia accounted for around a 24% annual average.  
This number increased in the early 2000s to 47% with the clear majority going toward the 
mining industry (Gooptu 2007:48).  In 2008, the PRC was responsible for 50% of total 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in Mongolia, 90% of which went to small and medium 
sized mining projects while the remaining 10% focused in consumer food products 
(Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency 2008).  Yet, according to L. Nyamtseren 
of the Mongolian Ministry of Finance, the actual amount of Chinese FDI may, in fact, be 
far greater than the actual registered statistics (Interview 15).  Indeed, during an interview, 
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L. Vanjildorj of the ADB in Ulaanbaatar stated most Chinese prefer to use Mongolian 
intermediaries for investment so as not to risk Mongolian nationalist backlash to their 
investments. 
 
 
Source: The Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia, Foreign Direct 
Investment in Mongolia 2003, 2009. 
 
 
Source: Statistical data derived from National Statistical Office of Mongolia, 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 2001-2007.  
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With 3769 registered companies in the country, Chinese invested businesses occupied 
49% of Mongolia’s total foreign invested companies, leading second ranked Republic of 
Korea, with 19%, by a substantial margin (Foreign Investment and Foreign Trade Agency 
2008).  Of this sizable number, a small amount are in the mining sector (while receiving 
by far the most investment) while the majority, according to J. Doljinsuren of the 
UNDP’s Mongolian mission, are engaged in food and textile trade and construction 
(interview 12).  Indeed, according to J. Doljinsurn, whereas throughout the 1990s small 
merchants involved in trade were common in Mongolia, since the early 2000s, Chinese 
invested firms have pushed out the Mongolian middleman by establishing Mongolian-
based importing companies that bring foods and textiles from China into Mongolia.  
Many of these investors, according to Ts. Batbayar of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MOFA), are Inner Mongolians and speak both Chinese and Mongolian and, as such, 
have considerable advantage.  
 
The following case study will examine more closely China’s role in Mongolia’s mining 
industry.  It will do so to demonstrate the degree to which Chinese businesses have 
penetrated Mongolia’s principal domestic sector. 
 
4.4 Mongolia’s Mining Industry: Chinese Investment  
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Source: Taken from Economist Intelligence Unit, Mongolia: Country Report 
2008.  
 
 
Source: Statistical data derived from National Statistical Office of Mongolia, 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 2001-2007.  
 
Mongolia’s mining sector, consisting of close to 80 minerals including coal, copper, gold, 
iron, silver, and fluorspar, is the country’s economic foundation (Tse 2007:1).  It is the 
largest industry in terms of gross industrial output (GIO) as well as the lead recipient of 
FDI despite the relative underdevelopment of its largest reserves (figure 4.16 and 4.13).  
On the surface, it is also an industry in which the Mongolian government has succeeded 
in securing a broad array of foreign actors so as to maintain plurality while implementing 
legislation so that the country can maintain a forceful, often dominant position in any 
mine considered of ‘national importance’.  Yet on closer examination it becomes evident 
that state-backed Chinese mining giants such as Shenhua Group Corp., Aluminium Corp. 
of China (Chinalco), and Qinghua are positioning themselves so as to dominate 
Mongolia’s largest deposits while small and medium sized private and/or public Chinese 
firms have already penetrated the country’s small scale and artisan mining industry to a 
significant degree.  While the Mongolian government has in recent years attempted to 
realign the country’s mineral laws so as to maintain either public or private ‘Mongolian’ 
control over the industry, in many ways the laws thus far enacted have allowed for 
greater dependence on Chinese-based firms.  While it is unlikely that such was the 
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Mongolian government’s intention, that no attempts have been taken to rectify what is 
becoming more and more a publicly acknowledged dependence on Chinese investment 
and firms is indicative of a failure to protect the country’s economic security from over-
dependence on China.     
 
For the Chinese government, Mongolia’s nascent mining industry is an opportunity for 
the PRC to ensure access to regional deposits of coal and copper that are secure in terms 
of supply lines without having to compete from the disadvantaged position of entering 
the market as a late comer (Downs 2004:23).  To this end, Chinese state-managed mining 
companies have actively sought permission to develop Mongolia’s key deposits, most of 
which remain un-mined, or partnerships with those companies that have already secured 
licenses to extract minerals from the country’s most promising deposits.  Indeed, Chinese 
firms have taken and are taking concrete steps to secure as dominant a position as 
possible in all of Mongolia’s most important, undeveloped large-scale mines.     
 
Mongolia’s two most promising mines are the Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold deposit and the 
Tavang Tolgoi coalmine.  Both are located in the Southern Gobi desert within 100 
kilometres of the Chinese border and both are considered among the largest known 
deposits in the world.  While Canadian mining giant Ivanhoe Mining Ltd. has explored 
and begun development at Oyu Tolgoi, the Mongolian government has not yet issued 
Tavang Tolgoi’s mining license.  The Chinese government has taken active steps to be 
involved in both projects. 
 
In February 2008, the Chinese government-run Chinalco purchased a 9 % stake in the 
Anglo-Australian mining firm Rio Tinto and in February 2009 sought unsuccessfully to 
increase this percentage to 18 % in what would have been the largest Chinese investment 
in a foreign firm to date (Rio Tinto 2009).  Among the advantages of such an acquisition 
for the Chinese state would have been access to Mongolia’s Oyu Tolgoi mine through a 
profit sharing agreement already in place between Ivanhoe Mines Ltd. and Rio Tinto.  
According to the two companies’ agreement, Rio Tinto has the right to acquire up to 46 
% in the Oyu Tolgoi mine, giving Chinalco a substantial window into the project (Tse 
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2007:2).  Despite its failure to secure a larger share in Rio Tinto, the Chinese 
government’s 9% still allows it substantial involvement with the development of Oyu 
Tolgoi.  Moreover, it gives the Chinese government direct access to the world’s largest 
copper mine and the ability to import the majority share of the projected 1 billion pounds 
of copper the site is capable of producing annually for 30 years.  Indeed, at the time of 
writing, the Mongolian government had committed to building a toll road directly from 
the mine to the Chinese border. 
 
In a more direct fashion, in February 2009 China’s Shenhua Group Corp made a bid for 
49% development rights for the Tavang Tolgoi coalmine, located just 33 kilometres from 
the Chinese border (Hantulga 2009).  Industry estimates believe the site to be the world’s 
largest undeveloped coalmine, containing more than 6 billion tonnes of coking and 
thermal coal (SouthGobi Energy Resources 2009).  In support of its bid, the Shenhua 
Group Corp, a Chinese SOE, has committed to building a USD687 million dollar railway 
capable of transporting 60 million tons of coal and copper annually from Tavang Tolgoi 
to Baotou City in Inner Mongolia (Chinamining.org 2009).  It has also promised to build 
three coal-powered energy plants in Tavang Tolgoi’s vicinity with direct lines to Inner 
Mongolia.            
  
While not on the same scale as Oyu Tolgoi and Tavang Tolgoi, Inner Mongolia’s 
Qinghua Group has partnered with Mongolia’s largest state-owned mining company, 
Mongolyn Alt, to develop a number of smaller, albeit substantial, mines in the Southern 
Gobi.  Most important in regard to the two companies’ joint development is the Nariin 
Sukhait coalmine thought to have 125.5 million tons of coal located on the Mongolian-
Chinese border (Adorno & Wyller 2009).    
 
While Chinese SOEs are moving into prominent positions in Mongolia’s mining industry, 
such as those described above, the real penetration of Chinese firms into the country’s 
mineral sector is arguably taking place in small and medium sized mining operations 
throughout the country.  Government officials such as Ts. Batbayar, Counsellor for 
Mongolia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and L. Nyamtseren, counsellor to the 
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Mongolian Ministry of Finance (MOF), both agree that Chinese firms and foreign direct 
investment now dominate Mongolia’s active small and medium sized mining industry. 
While no measurement of how heavily Chinese firms are invested in Mongolia’s small 
scale mining is available (over 6000 licenses to mine are currently ‘active’), Sh. 
Altantsetseg, in-resident economist for the World Bank based in Mongolia, stated during 
an interview that the number of ‘Mongolian’ small and medium size firms either partly or 
totally Chinese financed most likely make up the majority of active Mongolian mining 
companies.  
 
The difficulty in determining the number of Chinese firms operating in Mongolia’s small 
and medium size mines comes from lack of transparency in the smaller firms; a situation 
the Mongolian government has largely ignored.  According to a 2006 report on 
transparency in Mongolia’s small and medium sized firms conducted by the Dutch 
Technical Bureau for Mining Engineering and Minerals Economics (TBB), more than 
76% of the firms surveyed were either completely closed or ‘inadequately’ transparent, 
while an additional 12% were only ‘half’ transparent (Enkhjavhlan 2007).  These firms, 
according to the report, routinely hide their management structure, funding activities, and 
often do not disclose their operational base.  Those transparent enough to determine 
ownership were reportedly all either wholly Chinese owned, as in the case of the Xin Bai 
mining company, or Chinese partially-financed, such as the Monjap, Tomortei Huder, 
and Hustai Eroo companies (Enkhjavhlan 2007).  
 
Protective Measures 
 
According to L. Nyamtseren, the Mongolian government has, since 2006, passed a 
number of ‘good’ laws aimed at curbing the state’s overdependence on Chinese firms for 
development of the country’s minerals’ industry and instituting more government control 
over the industry and profits derived from minerals.  For L. Nyamtseren the three most 
significant are the government’s revision of the 1997 mineral licensing law, the Mineral 
Windfall Tax, and the implementation of the Citizen’s Input Law. Each is worth 
examining in brief in order to determine whether the Mongolian government has 
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successfully redirected the economy so as to increase government control and decrease 
dependency on China. 
 
In 2006, the Mongolian government revised the existing 1997 Law on Mineral Resources, 
which allowed firms regardless of nationality to mine and extract all minerals for which 
they obtained a license, so that only a Mongolian citizen could obtain a license for 
mineral extraction.  Yet L. Nyamtseren noted during an interview that this policy, 
conceived to restrict Chinese involvement in Mongolian mining, has largely failed.  
According to L. Nyamtseren, Chinese businessmen have simply skirted the restriction by 
using Mongolian front men for licensing purposes while retaining full control over the 
mines (Environmental and Social Development Department 2007:35).  In this sense, the 
legislation, far from regulating Chinese investment in the country’s mineral sector, has 
succeeded only in creating skewed statistics that make it impossible for the Mongolian 
government to collect reliable information on Chinese investment in Mongolian-based 
mining companies.  This, in turn, limits the state’s ability to mitigate a growing over-
dependency on Chinese companies for development of the mining sector and effectively 
undermines the legislation’s original purpose. 
 
Also in 2006, the government introduced a windfall tax of 68% on all copper and gold 
mined in Mongolia once the value exceeds USD6500 a ton for copper and USD500 an 
ounce for gold (Asian Development Bank 2007a:151). While the longer-term 
implementation and effects of the tax are still uncertain, Luke Distelhorst, Ivanhoe’s 
Corporate Communications Assistant for Mongolia, claims that the short-term effect has 
been an increase in cross border smuggling in order to avoid the tax and an overall 
lessening of investment by non-Chinese foreign firms that believe the Mongolian 
government is moving to nationalise the nation’s most important mines (Interview 16).  
As Luke Distelhorst believes small and medium sized Chinese firms carry out most of the 
smuggling as they are largely able to avoid oversight due to their size while also 
maintaining connections inside China for the product once it is successfully outside 
Mongolian borders, it seems as if the windfall tax has also empowered Chinese-based 
firms where its original intention was to mitigate such an effect.   
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Lastly, and specifically designed with small and medium sized companies in mind, is the 
‘Citizen’s Input’ clause the Mongolian government inserted in the 2006 Law on Mineral 
Resources.  The legislation was designed so that local Citizens Representative 
Committees (CRCs) would have the right to review, with the option to reject, any mining 
application made for use of their regional lands.  According to the legislation, the local 
community has 30 days to organise, conduct a review of the application, and submit its 
majority decision back to the Minerals Resources and Petroleum Authority (MRPAM) 
before the license is automatically issued.  The measure’s purpose was to give the 
Mongolian people more say over the development of their lands while empowering them 
with more oversight into what type of firms could operate in their regions (Finch 2008).   
 
The ‘Citizen’s Input’ measure, too, has fallen short of its stated goals.  Whereas rural 
communities are theoretically given say over how their local lands are developed and 
whether a mining company can operate in or around the collective lands, the reality of 
such practice has proven elusive as oftentimes the residents are either informed too close 
to the end of their thirty day period to successfully organise or are simply not informed at 
all.  During a tense ‘Citizens Lecture on Mining’ seminar at the Mongolian National 
University in May 2008, informed Mongolian residents attacked ministers from the 
MRPAM and Mongolian mining company representatives, accusing them of withholding 
information about potential mine developments so that communities were effectively cut 
off from the process.  Pressed to establish a website listing all proposed mining licensing 
so that Mongolia’s civil society could inform local communities, a government 
spokesman for the MRPAM responded that such measures were too complicated and 
unlikely to develop.  The inability, or seemingly unwillingness, of the Mongolian 
government to provide local communities with real tools to regulate regional mining at a 
grassroots level, assuming Chinese firms have a large share in Mongolia’s small scale 
mining as described above, has further allowed increased Chinese penetration into the 
domestic industry despite potential social objections against their presence. 
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While such Chinese investment is contributing to Mongolia’s overall growth, the 
Mongolian government could counterbalance its dominant presence throughout 
Mongolia’s minerals industry by focusing on relations with ‘third neighbours’.  Indeed, 
Canada, British, United States, and Australia firms are all active to a lesser degree in 
Mongolia’s mining sector and could potentially replace Chinese demand and investment 
with alternative funding.  Nevertheless, the Mongolian government has been unable to 
cultivate these alternative actors so as to maintain any real diversity and, as such, risks 
developing an overdependence on Chinese investment that could translate into what 
Handel calls a ‘patron-client relationship’ (Handel 1990:132).  Such an asymmetrical 
economic relationship has the potential to lead to a dependency relationship in which 
Mongolia’s mineral sector, as well as other aspects of its economy, is, according to 
Santos, ‘conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy to which [it] 
is subjected’ rather than in such a way as to maintain economic security for Mongolian in 
general (Santos 1970:231).  
 
The failure of the above three pieces of legislation aimed at curbing over-dependence on 
any one nation is, in this sense, indicative that the Mongolian government has perhaps 
already lost its ability, or willingness, to act autonomously in regard to the country’s 
mining sector.    
 
4.5 Overseas Development Aid (ODA) 
 
Since 1991, Mongolia has received around USD2.4 billion in overseas development aid 
(ODA) at an average of USD300 million annually (figure 4.18).  Constituting more than 
15% of Mongolia’s total GDP, it is one of the highest recipients of foreign aid per capita 
in the world (United States Aid and Development Agency (USAID) 2007); (Asian 
Development Bank 2007b).  Until the present, Mongolia’s primary bilateral ODA sources 
were Japan, the United States, and Germany while ODA funding was primarily used in 
line with the donor agencies social development agendas (Swedish International 
Development Agency (SIDA) 2006).  Yet in recent years, due in part to Mongolia’s 
economic growth and its three-year consecutive budget surplus, ODA from traditional 
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donors has been declining (World Bank 2008:4).  Moreover, non-traditional sources of 
ODA have becoming increasingly active in Mongolia’s development sector, either 
through direct ODA or concessional loans.  This is particularly true in relation to China. 
 
 
Source: Data Derived from Economic Cooperation, Management and 
Coordination Department and Treasury Department, MOFE 2002, 2009. 
 
 
Source: Data Derived from Economic Cooperation, Management and 
Coordination Department and Treasury Department, MOFE 2002, 2009. 
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According to J. Doljinsuren, Economist for the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) in Mongolia, the Mongolian government is now in the process of redefining the 
country’s use of ODA by shifting the focus of funding from ‘donations’ to ‘technical 
support’.  While ODA in Mongolia has traditionally gone to address more immediate 
social and financial issues such as balance of payments, education, transport, and health 
development, in 2007, the Mongolian government announced its intention to redirect 
ODA towards developing the country’s private sector rather than simply addressing what 
it claimed were short-term social problems (World Bank 2008:12).  Indeed, during an 
interview, L. Nyamtseren of the Mongolian MOF stressed the need to readjust 
Mongolia’s ODA implementation policy away from ‘stop gap’ programmes designed to 
‘put out fires’, towards future development issues. 
 
While the new government focus towards developing the private sector is, according to J. 
Doljinsuren, in line with some of the its major donors agenda (USAID, JICA, and GTZ 
all have economic development projects as part of their overall country plans), the lack of 
clear development priorities, the absence of a legal framework to regulate ODA to the 
private sector, and the decision to disregard other aspects of its donor organisation’s 
agendas has led to a reduction in overall aid and a new found tension in Mongolia’s NGO 
and INGO donor community.  These newfound challenges to ODA implementation have 
also been noted within Mongolian civil society by Mongolian-based NGOs such as the 
Mongolian Development Research Centre (MDRC) and the Mongolian Development 
Institute (MDI) (Nyamtseren 2007:193).  Whereas all donors agree with the Mongolian 
government’s decision to focus on long-term, economic growth, the Mongolian 
government’s insistence that the private sector should receive the majority of ODA, 
coupled with the government’s well-known tendency towards corruption, is creating a 
division between the Mongolian government’s and the international donor organisation’s 
future development plans for Mongolia.  
 
According to J. Liang of the ADB, the Chinese government has steadily increased the 
amount of monetary assistance in the form of aid and loans it provides to Mongolia while 
also further developing its technical assistance to the country in the form of the United 
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Nation sponsored Technical Cooperation Among Developing Countries (TCDC) 
programme.  While direct aid from China, according to B. Gaadulam, Department of 
Policy and Coordination for Loans and Aid, Mongolian Ministry of Finance (MOF), is 
nominal compared to that Mongolian receives from Japan, it is increasing and much more 
in line with current Mongolian governmental development objectives and is considered 
important because of its regularity and reliability (Interview 5).   
 
B. Gaandulam, the government official responsible for arranging for Chinese aid, noted 
that the Chinese and Mongolian governments have an ‘unwritten’ rule in relation to aid 
that includes one or two high-level political visits each year where the Chinese 
government will pledge somewhere between RMB50-100 million for projects usually 
related to mining infrastructure or construction.  B. Gaadulam noted that the Chinese 
government is notorious for strictly dictating where and how such aid will be used and 
the Mongolian government particularly accommodating at accepting direction, 
particularly as the Chinese-side does not attach any other concessions to the aid.   This 
trend is particularly noteworthy as it seems to go against China’s doctrine of non-
conditionality and non-interference when providing foreign aid.  
 
Up until the present time, China has provided aid almost exclusively for housing and 
transportation, assisting with the private development of Ulaanbaatar’s infrastructure.  
Notable examples of Chinese direct financing are the ‘Elderly and State Employees 
Apartment Districts, 2002-03’ project for which the Chinese government provided the 
Mongolian Ministry of Construction and Urban Development (MCUD) a USD5.1 million 
grant and the ‘Renovation of UB’s Roads and Increase of Road’s Capacity, 2005-2007’ 
programme for which it provided the MCUD USD2.5 million.  While the ‘Renovation of 
UB’s Roads’ project has not been renewed, the “Elderly and State Employees Apartment 
Districts’ project has been extended to 2007-2010 with a new Chinese financial 
commitment of US7.5 million (Ministry of Construction and Urban Development 2008).       
 
Recent trends in direct aid from China are both increasing and focusing more on 
industrial infrastructure development, particularly related to the mining sector.  
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According to J. Doljinsuren of the UNDP, as of 2008, the Chinese and Mongolian 
governments were in discussion about a USD20 million grant for infrastructure related to 
developing transportation in and around Oyu Tolgoi and Tavang Tolgoi mines in 
Mongolia’s southern Gobi Desert.  While J. Doljinsuren pointedly mentioned that such 
investment is hardly direct aid as it is so politically laden and not addressing any direct 
need of Mongolia’s greater social and economic development (most especially as such 
development is far more needed in other parts of the country), that the Mongolian 
government is increasingly finding this sort of aid is attractive is evident (Interview 12).  
Indeed, the state’s desire to develop areas of private sector importance ahead of social 
priorities is an indication that Chinese ‘type’ aid will become more desirable as the 
Mongolian government seeks to develop in line with its own priorities.  Indeed, B. 
Gaadulam of the MOF noted that while all Chinese aid is usually highly political in that it 
goes towards industries and sectors in which the Chinese have a heavy influence such as 
mining or energy, the Mongolian government does not consider the Chinese-side’s 
political or economic agenda.  This is due to the increasing tendency among government 
officials to view Chinese interests as compatible with their own drive to develop the 
country’s private industry and refreshingly free of social conditions usually present in 
other state or INGO development agendas.   
   
This is particularly true in the case of the USD300 million loan (USD240 million at 
2.76% annual interest; USD60 million at 1.75%) the Mongolian government took in 2006 
from the Chinese government for development of mining and mining related projects, 
infrastructure, and trade capacity between the two nations.  While the MOF publicly 
insisted to the media the loan was concessional in nature, for the Mongolian Law on 
Coordination for Loans and Aid does not allow the government to take commercial loans, 
B. Gaadulam of the MOF admits that the loan is, in fact, commercial and is likely the first 
of many from China.  While the Mongolian government now has the funds, according to 
World Bank Economist, A. Shiilegmaa, it has not yet determined how to spend them 
(Interview 2).  As such, the state is now sitting on a large amount of money that other 
donor agencies believe largely makes their smaller amounts less effective and less 
welcome.  Indeed, A. Shiilegmaa stated that in taking the loan, the Mongolian 
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government alienated many of its traditional donor partners and saw aid in general lessen 
in 2007 and 2008. 
 
It is possible to view 2007, then, as a turning point from the types of aid Mongolia has 
traditionally received to those it is likely to receive from China in the future.  For at the 
same time the Mongolian government took the loan from China—a ‘no strings attached’ 
loan for which the Mongolian government could develop the private sector—it was also 
engaged with the United States government, through its Millennium Challenge 
Corporation (MCC), to receive a USD285 million grant for poverty relief and railway 
development (Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) 2007).  According to Bill 
Bikales of China’s UNDP, the negotiations were extremely prolonged and frustrating for 
the Mongolian government as so many conditions were attached to the funding 
(Interview 3).  Moreover, as of early 2009, the American government still had not 
dispersed the funds to the Mongolian government as it had not fulfilled parts of its 
requirements, such as establishing an anti-corruption mechanism for internal dispersal of 
MCC funds, and threatened to wholly withhold the grant if the Mongolian government 
did not immediately comply with the agreed upon terms.  As the Mongolian government 
has reached a new stage of economic confidence with 9% growth in 2007, a rising mining 
sector and rising international energy costs, and a closer relationship with China, the 
same pressures to accept foreign intervention in its domestic development strategy are not 
as great as they once were.  While the government is certain to eventually alter its 
behaviour to fulfil the requirements to receive the MCC grant, that it has waited as long 
as it has to do so is a keen indication that the country’s attitudes towards ODA is 
changing.   
 
Conclusion 
 
Mongolia’s periphery position in relation to China, its mineral wealth, its immature 
economy, and China’s energy strategy of developing regional supplies of minerals to 
increase the security of its own economic development all contribute to the country’s 
economic dependency on the PRC.  So, too, has the Mongolian government’s decision to 
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focus on immediate high-levels of GDP and private sector growth rather than on what 
Strange calls ‘enlightened, long-term national interests’ such as protecting the country’s 
weak domestic industries from Chinese competition, allowed for the Chinese state and 
Chinese businesses to entrenched themselves in the country’s key industries (Strange 
1996:17).  While such an economic policy has, as earlier shown, led to rapid growth, so, 
too, has it led to a furthering of a Mongolian-Sino asymmetrical relationship that has 
extended to almost every sector of Mongolia’s domestic economy.       
 
Through larger scale investment into Mongolia’s Oyu Tolgoi and Tavang Tolgoi, as well 
as penetration into the small and medium sized mining sector by Chinese companies, 
many of which may be state funded, the Chinese government has succeeded in securing 
either full or partial control over the industry’s financing, production, knowledge, and 
security. This, in turn, translates into the Chinese government having increased structural 
power over Mongolia’s most important non-renewable domestic economic sector.  As, 
according to Strange, those countries with structural power are in a position to ‘change 
the range of choices open to others, without apparently putting pressure directly on them 
to take one decision or to make one choice rather than others’, the PRC, as the core state, 
has gained, and continues to gain, an increased position of dominance in its already 
asymmetrical relationship with Mongolia (Strange 1998:39).  This asymmetrical 
relationship will in turn lead to strengthened dependency for Mongolia as the increased 
costs and risks of acting against the Chinese government’s directive will make it ‘less 
easy to make some choices’ than if the Mongolian state or businesses controlled the 
industry’s structural power (Strange 1998:39).  As, according to L. Nyamtseren, mining 
is the county’s economic ‘life blood’, loss over the ability to determine how the industry 
develops is truly a loss of economic autonomy. 
 
China’s increased investment in Mongolia’s minerals sector has also translated into 
greater trade between the two countries as shown in the correlation between the growth in 
mineral production in Mongolia and trade volume between the two countries (figures 4.2 
and 4.4).  This trade relationship is asymmetrical in so much as China is by far 
Mongolia’s most important trade partner while the amount of imports China receives 
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from Mongolia, and the value of exports it sends to the country, are nominal in terms of 
China’s larger trade portfolio (figure 4.2).  Furthermore, as the majority of Mongolia’s 
exports to China are raw, unprocessed minerals, the two countries’ trade relationship is 
clearly, according to Farmer, an unequal exchange more beneficial for China as it has the 
means to process Mongolia’s resources, thereby making value-added items which 
Mongolia often re-imports (Farmer 1999:12).  This unequal exchange inhibits the 
development of Mongolia’s domestic economy as the country’s manufacturing sector 
suffers tangentially with the mining industry’s further growth (figure 4.5).  In this sense, 
the Mongolian state is losing control over its productive resources while becoming 
increasingly dependent on the Chinese government and businesses for basic stable 
imports such as food, manufactured goods, and machinery (Santos 1970:231).  This 
dependency, in turn, translates into increased Chinese structural power and what Strange 
calls an increased ability to ‘shape and determine the structures’ within which Mongolia 
must operate (Strange 1998:24-25).  
 
So, too, does the growth of Chinese FDI in Mongolia have the potential to stymie 
development in the country’s domestic economy as it shifts the Mongolian government’s 
development priority towards the mining sector, thereby undermining support for other 
industries, such as manufacturing, while also repatriating profits earned to China that are 
often greater than the Chinese companies’ initial investments (Haber 1997:10).  Chinese-
based FDI is also allowing for small and medium sized Chinese companies to enter and 
potentially dominate non-mining related sectors as, given Mongolia’s increased 
dependency on Chinese trade, Chinese merchants have both financial and logistical 
advantages that make it easier for them to import Chinese goods to Mongolia.     
 
The change in ODA trends in Mongolia also fits clearly with this chapter’s argument that 
the country is becoming more and more dependent on China in so much as, according to 
Moon, ‘foreign aid becomes [one more] transaction which serve to create an 
asymmetrical integration of economic, social, political, and cultural systems, and, 
consequently, produces a distortion in the foreign policy behaviour of the weaker 
dependent state’ (Moon 1983:321).  A clear example of this occurred in January 2009 
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when the Mongolian government announced its plans to request a USD3 billion dollar 
loan from the Chinese government in order to provide liquidity to the state’s struggling 
banking sector as well as develop future trade ties to the PRC (Sonin 2009).  The 
government’s decision was unexpected in that it exemplified a remarkable departure from 
the state’s professed ‘third neighbour’ policy, by which it uses its relations with countries 
such as the United States, Japan, and those in the European Union, to balance 
dependency on Russia and China.  It was also perplexing in what appears to be a total 
disregard for Mongolian identity concerns.  Indeed, shortly after the announcement was 
publicised, the Mongolian media responded ferociously to the idea, accusing both the 
MPRP and Democratic Party of driving the country into poverty with their policies and 
then selling the Mongolian people to the Chinese out of greed (Sonin 2009).  
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Chapter Five: China’s Effect On Mongolia’s Environmental Security  
 
 
The following chapter will draw on concepts from both weak state and dependency 
theories in order to analyse Mongolia’s post-Cold War environmental security in relation 
to China.  It will do so by focusing on the domestic factors that have contributed to 
environmental insecurity while also examining the state’s foreign policy response where 
applicable.  From a domestic perspective, the chapter will rely on weak state theory to 
examine the state’s institutional development and environmental management since its 
transition away from a socialist government.  From a systems-level perspective, it will 
pay close attention to its ability to maximise on its weakness through cooperation within 
the international system while closely examining the role economic dependence plays in 
the government’s foreign policy.  The chapter will approach Mongolia’s environmental 
security in line with Buzan’s classification of its different components into disruption of 
ecosystems, energy problems, population problems, food problems, and economic 
problems (Buzan, de Wilde, & Wæver 1998:74).     
 
Domestically, Mongolia’s weak interdependence sovereignty (discussed in chapter 3) and 
its decision to give priority to development over environmental protection have both 
contributed to domestic environmental degradation.  Such institutional weakness and lack 
of state control are in line with the two main variables Harbeson and Rothchild identify in 
their study on weak states in Africa and resulting environmental deterioration (Harbeson 
& Rothchild 2000:12).  This, in turn, contributes to a decrease in the state’s 
environmental security as it is neither able to control such issues as cross border illegal 
wildlife and natural resource trade nor willing to slow down pollutant-causing economic 
activity.  
 
At a state-level, the Mongolian government has adopted a foreign policy aimed at 
mitigating its rapidly deteriorating environment much in line with that Schreurs and 
Economy outline as a weak state strategy of using domestic environmental concerns to 
extract concessions from international organisations and states (Schreurs & Economy 
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1997:17).  Indeed, the Mongolian government has sought to benefit from the country’s 
increased economic insecurity by courting development assistance in the form of grants, 
loans, and technology transfers.  Through the adoption of this foreign policy approach, 
the Mongolian state has been able to maximise on its domestic environmental 
degradation through regional and international treaties.  In this regard, the Mongolian 
government has at times successfully translated the country’s institutional weakness into 
a foreign policy advantage.  While the cost-benefit of such a post-transition trend is 
debatable, understanding this aspect of Mongolian foreign policy from a weak state 
perspective is vital.     
 
Dependency theory also provides insight into Mongolian foreign policy as it highlights 
the country’s economic relationship with China as a major factor in its ability to protect 
the environment.  Through a dependency theory approach, it is possible to draw a 
correlation between economic dependence and resources exploitation visible throughout 
Mongolia’s domestic environmental sector. It also allows for consideration of the 
country’s asymmetrical trade relationship with the Chinese government and Chinese 
business which is very similar to that which Alden describes as taking place in Africa as 
the Chinese government attempts to ‘lock in through formal and informal means a steady 
supply of key resources’ (Alden 2007:12).  
 
The following chapter will, therefore, examine the degree to which Mongolia’s weakness 
has contributed to the country’s current environmental problems while also considering 
how the Mongolian government has maximised on this weakness in the international 
community.  It will simultaneously consider how the state’s economic dependency with 
China has influenced its ability to regulate the country’s environmental security, used 
here in line with Buzan’s definition that such security includes resource availability and 
ecosystem health, while facing growing demand from the region’s economic core (Buzan, 
de Wilde, & Wæver 1998:74). 
 
5.1 Chinese Domestic Environmental Policy   
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In 2009, China was the world’s leading consumer of natural resources ranging from coal 
to timber (Energy Information Administration 2009).  While a necessary condition for its 
impressive economic growth, so, too, has the country’s use of resources contributed to 
widespread environmental degradation with increasingly severe social and economic 
costs. The CCP thus faces the challenge of mitigating its resource consumption with 
policy aimed at environmentally sustainable growth (Economy 2007:211).  
 
Moreover, as China’s position in Asia and the rest of the international community has 
become increasingly prominent in accordance with its impressive economic growth, so 
has external pressure to regulate its environment increased.  While the CCP has been 
adamant in its insistence that developed countries such as the US and those in the EU are 
responsible for the current global environmental crisis and that it has a right to pollute 
while developing economically, it nevertheless understands the importance of 
international environmental cooperation (MacFarquhar 2009).    
 
To meet these new domestic and international pressures and environmental challenges, 
the CCP has begun to include protection of the environment in its political development 
agenda.  In both China’s tenth and eleventh Five-year Plans (2001-2005 and 2006-2010, 
respectively) the Chinese government raised protection of the environment to the level of 
a ‘national priority’, while casting it as an essential component for China’s ‘harmonious 
society’ (hexie shehui) (Hua Wang & Changhua Wu 2005:273).  While decentralisation 
of environmental regulation has allowed some provincial or township-level officials to 
continue ignoring the environment and resource protection for the sake of economic 
growth, the CCP has also taken measures to provide a centralised means of enforcing 
environmental protection laws.  One prominent example of such development was the 
CCP’s 2008 decision to replace the former State Environmental Protection Agency’s 
(SEPA) with the Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People's Republic of China 
(MEP).  The CCP has also issued New Environmental Protection Laws (EPLs) that set 
national standards while developing national monitoring criteria managed centrally by the 
MEP (Zimmerman 2005:758).  
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In this regard, China’s future trend of economic development will steadily include more 
and more regulations as to resource use in order to keep pollution related issues from 
exacerbating domestic social tensions.  Yet the Chinese government is unlikely to 
voluntarily slow its overall rate of economic growth for the sake of resource management.  
What is more likely, and, indeed, already increasingly evident, is that rather than 
decimate its own natural resources, China will look to increase its resource imports from 
its poorer, neighbouring countries with whom it has large trade surpluses (Yusuf & 
Nabeshima 2006:31).   
 
As many of China’s poorer neighbours such as Myanmar, Cambodia, Nepal, and 
Mongolia are likely to match an increased Chinese demand with increased production of 
natural resources, this medium-term development strategy is likely to work.  Indeed, as 
many weak states prefer to use international firms to develop their natural resources 
rather than let the resources remain fallow, that Chinese businesses will also likely 
benefit from foreign investment in China’s neighbouring resource markets is also highly 
likely (Hartman 2008:55). 
 
5.2 Disruption of Ecosystems 
 
Illegal Wildlife Trade 
 
Within the last twenty years, Mongolia has seen a large number of its species become 
extinct or driven to the verge of extinction because of illegal hunting and animal trade.  In 
2005, the Wildlife Conservation Society and World Bank estimated that illegal trade in 
rare and very rare animal products, primarily furs and animal parts used to make Chinese 
traditional medicines such as musk glands and horns, had reached USD100 million 
annually (The World Bank 2006b:2).  According to the report, while Korea serves as a 
distant second destination for such goods, the overwhelming majority end up in Chinese 
markets. 
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The resulting effect on Mongolia’s biodiversity has been catastrophic.  For example, the 
Siberian marmot population, a species targeted for its fur, has decreased 75% in the last 
12 years.  In 2006, within Mongolian markets alone, the Mongolian Ministry of 
Environment reported uncovering more than 585,000 pelts while only 60,000 permits had 
been issued in last three years (World Wildlife Fund 2008b).  According to B. 
Munkjargal of the Mongolian based Coping with Desertification Project (CODEP), the 
marmot fur trade is dominated by the Chinese who process the fur in Inner Mongolia 
only to resell it in the Russian market as mink.  As there is little domestic demand for 
marmot fur in Mongolia, it is possible to directly attribute this dramatic decrease in 
marmot population to Chinese demand.           
 
Some of the other Mongolian animals species adversely affected by illegal trade are Red 
Deer (population decline of 92% in 18 years), the Saiga antelope (declined 85% from 
5,000 to 800), the argali (75% in 18 years), and the Saker falcon (30% in five years) (The 
World Bank 2006b:1).  All of these animal species, except for the falcon, which has 
declined largely due to exports to Kuwait, are hunted and traded for Chinese medicinal 
purposes.  Moreover, the grey wolf, brown bear, Siberian ibex, Mongolian gazelle, wild 
boar, and Yakut moose are all in danger of becoming extinct due to the increase in prices 
offered in the Chinese market for game meat.      
 
According to Giovanna Dore, East Asian Environmental Specialist for the World Bank, 
illegal traffic of wildlife and wildlife trade are among the greatest threats to Mongolian 
biodiversity, as well as one of the most profitable enterprises for some Mongolian hunters 
(Interview 11).  During an interview, G. Dore stressed that while Mongolian hunters and 
local governmental officials ultimately bear total responsibility, China’s smugglers and 
wildlife traders were the principle cause of demand.  Indeed, G. Dore pointedly 
mentioned that the World Bank had found that volume of illegal trade moving out of 
Mongolia was directly affected by Sino-Mongolian political relations at the time.  When 
relations are good, illegal trade activities were high.  When relations were strained, the 
WB found that illegal trade lessened. 
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Giovanna Dore also specified that such illegal trade is not Sino-Mongolian specific, but 
rather a larger, China-centred phenomenon that stretches across East and Southeast Asia, 
especially among those countries along the Mekong River.  Indeed, in its comprehensive 
look at illegal wildlife trade in Mongolia, the World Bank notes that such trade is 
particularly acute in Asia as China’s growing economy and the traditional custom of 
Chinese medicine to rely on animal products for ailments ranging from infertility to 
insomnia makes supplying the growing demand increasingly profitable (The World Bank 
2006b:x).  As many of China’s periphery countries, Mongolia included, still have large 
percentages of their populations living in poverty, that illegal hunting and trade is 
increasing is line with Chinese demand in logical.             
 
Yet despite the growing evidence that Mongolia’s illegal trade is flourishing because of 
Chinese demand, the Mongolian government has done little to staunch the flow of illegal 
goods across the borders.  Indeed, while Mongolian law clearly spells out the need to 
protect natural plants, the same comprehensive legal protection does not exist for animals 
(B.Tserendavva 2008).  While the Mongolian government does impose restrictions on the 
number of animals that can be legally hunted, enforcing these restrictions is next to 
impossible as single hunters do most poaching and all killing of animals is justified under 
Mongolian law so long as the hunter claims the animal was endangering his herd (The 
World Bank 2006b:3).  And while there are legal safeguards against cross border trade on 
animal goods, Mongolia’s excessive shared border with China, as well as the inability of 
the Mongolian government to control its border points, all mean that the illegal wildlife 
trade will continue well into the future.      
 
Desertification 
 
Desertification in Mongolia is, according to B. Munkjargal of CODEP, essentially a 
question of ‘to exist, or not to exist’ (Interview 4).  While in part hyperbole, B. 
Munkjargal’s and the CODEP’s position on desertification nonetheless places it as the 
key environmental challenge that the country faces in the twenty-first century.  
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While desertification in Mongolia is a component of almost every INGO, NGO, and 
several Mongolian ministries’ agenda, there is no general consensus as to what 
constitutes ecological desertification.  This lack of a common concept as to the extent of 
the problem and confusion as to how to best address it has caused rifts to form in inter-
agency cooperation.  For example, according to M. Munkjaragal, the CODEP, using the 
UN Convention to Combat Desertification’s (UN-CCD) definition to include ‘arid, semi-
arid, and dry-sub humid areas’, estimates that about 44% of Mongolia is affected by 
desertification.  Conversely, the Mongolian Geology Institute of Academy of Sciences, 
using a more liberal measurement to determine how far desertification has spread into 
Mongolia’s ‘khungai’, or lush regions, estimates that desertification now affects more 
than 90% of the country’s territory (Arnalds & Archer 2000:10).  While both institutions 
are committed to working to mitigate the affects of desertification, this fundamental gap 
between the two organisations’ working definitions makes it difficult to coordinate a 
national effort against the phenomena.   
 
What is held in general agreement among the different agencies, both governmental and 
nongovernmental, is that desertification is primarily a man made problem that is 
exacerbated by economic activity within the country.  While both mining and illegal 
logging contribute to desertification, the primary cause in Mongolia is pastureland 
degradation due to the overgrazing of goats.  Goats, in contrast to less damaging sheep, 
have both sharp hooves and snouts and that break up Mongolia’s thin layer of top soil 
(also contributing to sandstorms).  They also tear plants and grasses out by the roots 
rather than, like sheep, merely eating the above ground vegetation.   
 
The massive increase of goats as a percentage of overall herds, accounting for over half 
of all Mongolian livestock in 2008, is the combined result of Mongolian government’s 
policy failure to regulate the animal husbandry sector and the Chinese government’s 
decision to impose limits on the size of its goatherds in Inner Mongolia while providing 
herders with low interest, preferential loans to supplement production (Poverty Reduction 
and Economic Management Unit 2003:10); (Ch.Sumiyabazar 2006).  Indeed, the Chinese 
government’s attempt to address land degradation in Inner Mongolia, including 
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decentralisation of lands, fencing, and mandatory reduction of sheep and goats as 
percentage of overall herds, has led to a decrease in locally produced cashmere than has 
contributed to the rise of cashmere imports (Zimmerer 2006:300); (Humphrey & Sneath 
1999:46).   
 
While Chinese demand has undoubtedly contributed to the Mongolian herder’s decision 
to raise more goats despite the effect such unhealthy practices have on the country’s 
ecosystem, the inability of the Mongolian government to implement land use regulations 
or to impose quotas on specific animals rather than measuring herds simply by their size 
in total animals has also contributed to ecosystem degradation.  Indeed, much as laws 
regulating animal trade, a legal framework for pastureland use or herd composition is 
conspicuously absent from Mongolia’s laws related to environmental protection and 
natural resources (B.Tserendavva 2008).  Moreover, the Mongolian government’s 
National Plan of Action to Combat Desertification in Mongolia (NPACD), established by 
government mandate in 1996 to coordinate the government’s response to desertification, 
is, according to B. Munkjargal, a ‘complete failure’.  B. Munkjargal explains the plan’s 
shortcomings as stemming from a lack of direct government funding, the absence of 
single department oversight, and internal ministerial competition.          
 
The Mongolian government has sought to address its domestic challenges of mitigating 
desertification through regional and international partnerships and requests for 
development aid.  It is an active participant in a variety of established programmes 
including the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, the ADB’s 
‘Prevention and Control of Dust and Sandstorms in Northeast Asia’, and the Swiss 
Agency for Development and Cooperation’s ‘Coping with Desertification Project in 
Mongolia’ (Asian Development Bank 2005).  Representatives from the Mongolian 
government are also regular attendees to regional conferences such as the Northeast 
Asian Conference on Environmental Cooperation (NEAC).  The Mongolian government 
also receives generous aid from the ADB, Japan, China, and Korea aimed at addressing 
Northeast Asian sandstorms (Asian Development Bank 2005). 
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Notably, however, Mongolia has not been asked to participate in the region’s most 
concerted effort to address desertification and sand storms, mainly the Tripartite 
Environmental Ministers Meeting (TEMM).  While the group, consisting of China, Japan, 
and South Korea, has consulted with the Mongolian government regarding the drafting of 
its ‘Regional Master Plan for the Prevention and Control of dust and Sandstorms in 
Northeast Asia’, it is otherwise quite exclusionary in terms of cooperating with the 
Mongolian government (Tripartite Environmental Ministers Meeting 2009).  This is 
likely due to the Mongolian government’s inability to contribute resources or expertise to 
TEMM’s efforts.   
5.3 Energy Problems 
 
Illegal Logging  
 
The World Bank estimates as much as 80% of rural Mongolians live in or near forested 
or semi-forested areas upon which they depend for fuel to cook and heat their homes, 
offices, and schools.  In many cases, wood fuels are used in winter to supplement a lack 
of electricity from ill-supplied coal while used almost exclusively in the summer for all 
energy needs.  Statistics vary between organisations as to how much wood rural residents 
consume for fuel (UNDP estimates 1.3-1.5 million m³ used annually; the World Bank 
0.6-2.3 million m³).  Still, all agree that such domestic use of timber sources constitutes 
the largest percentage of Mongolia’s legally consumed wood annually (The World Bank 
2006c:20).   
 
More harmful than the degree of fuel wood collection to forest ecosystem health is the 
usual practice of single-consumer harvesting in which the youngest trees and brush are 
selected and removed, roots and all.  This method of collection is incredibly destructive 
as it removes the possibility that the trees or underbrush might eventually rejuvenate.  
Such practices have also contributed to land degradation and Mongolia’s overall 
desertification phenomena. 
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Yet, despite the obvious adverse effects the use of fuel woods has on the environment, 
the legal collection and use of fuel woods is largely the product of necessity.  Moreover, 
while consumption of wood as fuel has increased dramatically since privatisation, mostly 
due to local industries using it for production, the traditional practice of using wood as 
fuel in the Mongolian countryside was sustainable well into the twentieth century.  
Indeed, under the Soviet inspired system, the distribution of energy resources was more 
even throughout the country, with schools and offices supplied with coal centrally rather 
than having to compete for it on an open market with Ulaanbaatar.  This allowed 
consumption of wood as fuel to remain around 400,000 m³ annually during the period of 
Soviet patronage—far below what is now considered the maximum annual sustainable 
consumption level (The World Bank 2006c:1).  
 
Of greater threat to nation’s forests is the larger scale illegal timber production that 
remains unchecked and thriving in most of Mongolia’s forested areas.  While it is 
impossible to measure the degree of illegal logging, the estimates are staggering.  The 
government’s National Statistics Office (NSO) estimates the average consumption, 
including legal and illegal timber production, to be around 5.51 million m³, or about five 
times the estimated sustainable annual harvest volume (The World Bank 2006c:26).  To 
put this amount into perspective to average national predicted consumption, the Mongolia 
government has restricted annual legal harvest limits at 617,200 m³; one-tenth the actual 
estimated amount used. 
 
According to Giovanna Dore of the World Bank, a large percentage of the illegal timber 
is sold into the Chinese markets (Interview 11). As China is now the largest importer of 
wood in the world, with an annual deficit of 75 million m3 of wood need for economic 
growth, that such demand leads to increased illegal logging in Mongolia is logical (WWF 
2009a). 
 
Indeed, this trend is fitting with Chinese international lumber imports as domestic 
restrictions regarding logging in the PRC have forced Chinese businesses to look to less 
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than developed countries in Asia and Africa for both legally and illegally harvested wood 
(Plafker 2006); (Alden 2007:87).  
 
While in 2005 the Mongolian government passed legislation eliminating tariffs on 
imported lumber while doubling the cost of domestically produced wood products in the 
hope to discourage wood related product exports, the massive demand for wood in the 
PRC has made the illegal wood trade hugely profitable and, consequently, attractive to 
those who might have trouble selling their illegal wood in a domestic market.  This is 
evident in that in 2005 the Mongolian government placed a two year moratorium on the 
legal harvesting of the Mongolian birch because illegal overproduction, due to Chinese 
demand for the wood to make chopsticks, had greatly reduced domestic numbers 
(Ministry of Environment 2008a).    
 
Such domestic policies have, however, had limited success as the Mongolian government 
lacks the internal capacity to enforce the regulation it has put into place.  Indeed illegal 
logging, despite the Mongolian government’s expansive laws against it, takes place not 
only in those areas designated for production, but also in Mongolia’s most sacred and 
protected areas, such as around the nation’s beloved Khosgol lake in the northern 
Mongolian boreal taiga forest (Ts.Tsevenkherlen 2007b).  While the government has 
taken very specific, and often quite draconian, legislative measures to protect the forests 
from illegal logging, constant change in the forestry sector has led to a breakdown in the 
institutional base from which no single ministry has emerged as key regulator.  Moreover, 
cross ministerial competition for resources has left it so that no single institution has the 
ability to enforce the government’s widespread protective laws (N.Batsukh 2008:3).    
 
The Mongolian government has made attempts to deal with illegal logging through its 
foreign policy by participating in multilateral programmes such as the German-led 
Europe and North Asia Forest Law Enforcement and Governance (ENA FLEG) and 
through bilateral cooperation with the Chinese State Forestry Administration (Illegal-
logging 2009).  While such cooperation provides the Mongolian government with 
additional resources and technology to direct against illegal logging, this has not yet been 
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sufficient to mitigate the state’s underlying weakness coupled with demand from the 
Chinese market.      
 
Hydroelectricity 
           
Although Mongolia derives less than three percent of its overall energy from five mini-
hydroelectric plants, the Ministry of Fuel and Energy has announced an ambitious project 
to dam as many as 20 of Mongolia’s smaller rivers in the near future.  Part of ‘national 
renewable energy program’, the damming is aimed at providing remote areas with a 
steady supply of energy not dependent on coal (Ministry of Fuel and Energy 2008a); 
(Kurikawa 2007:54).  While 17 of the projected sites for damming are still in the initial 
funding phases, three sites-- Durgun, Taishir, and Orkhon—are under construction in 
western and central Mongolia. 
 
While looking to hydroelectricity to solve its regional energy shortages began in the 
1950s with Soviet assistance in constructing five mini-dams using water diversion 
channels, the Mongolian government’s current and professed future plans are a large 
break with the past in their scope and ambition.  While current hydroelectric energy from 
the five stations collectively produce 3.1 (MW) of energy, the Durgon dam is projected to 
produce 12 (MW) and Taishir 11 (MW).  The Orkhon, in contrast, seeks to solely 
generate enough energy to supply the Oyun Tolgoi and Tavang Tolgoi copper and gold 
mines in Mongolia’s western Gobi (World Wildlife Fund 2008a).     
 
Despite the government’s commitment to hydroelectric development as one approach to 
solve the state’s chronic electricity shortages and to lessen energy dependency on Russia 
and China, the cost-benefit of constructing such large-scale dams is, at best, questionable.  
Up to the present, Mongolia’s hydroelectric energy sector has remained underdeveloped 
because past attempts to use hydroelectricity have proven extremely unproductive.  This 
is in large part because Mongolia’s rivers remain frozen for the majority of the year.  
Indeed, the only viable months Mongolia has been able to use hydroelectricity are from 
May to October.  Moreover, Mongolia’s numerous rivers and streams are not substantial 
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in size or flow capacity and, even more problematic for the government’s grand scheme, 
are drying up in large number due to water demands from Ulaanbaatar, global warming, 
desertification, and deforestation (World Wildlife Fund 2007:2).   
 
Moreover, while Mongolia has extensive laws in place regarding the fees for water and 
mineral water use, including provisions for taxing income derived from hydroelectric 
production, no current legislation exists regulating who can construct a dam and under 
what circumstances a dam can be constructed (B.Tserendavva 2008:129-130).  This stark 
omission of government regulation and oversight has allowed projects to go forward 
without an environmental impact assessment (EIA).  
 
The cost of damming Mongolia’s rivers has been great, especially among the poor and 
rural communities.  A prime example of the environmental and social cost these projects 
have is in the widely publicised case of Ogii Lake soum.  This small village of around 
3,000 residents, situated on the UNESCO and Ramsar registered Olgii lake, is now 
threatened with the prospect of having to move because of water pollution and shortages 
caused by an upstream dam.  The dam, one from the Soviet era sold by the government 
during the transition, is now privately owned.  The owners of the dam, however, claim 
they lack the funds to maintain the dam and operate in an environmentally conscious way.  
Indeed, when threatened by the local government to regulate the flow of the river so as to 
provide Ogii Lake with enough water to maintain its ecosystem, the private company 
threatened to start charging Ogii suom for water.  The response by many of the residents 
of Ogii was to move as they saw little sense in fighting for a dying lake when the had no 
control over the source (Ts.Tsevenkherlen 2007a).         
 
Nevertheless, the Mongolian government has largely ignored the high social and 
environmental cost of damming its rivers as, according to U. Tungalag, Environment 
Practice Manager of Mongolia’s UNDP, its sees such development as an opportunity to 
modernise its energy sector.  Moreover, as Chinese FDI is financing two of the three 
major damming projects mentioned earlier, the Mongolian government has little to gain 
in the short-term by stalling their development. 
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The Durgon dam, financed by the Chinese firm the China Water-Conservancy Investment 
Company (a subsidiary of China Shanghai (Group) Corporation For Foreign Economic & 
Technological Cooperation (SFECO)), is a case in point of the haphazard way in which 
the Mongolian government is allowing the dam building industry to move forward (China 
Shanghai Corporation For Foreign Economic & Technological Cooperation 2008).  The 
government-approved project, implemented without an EIA, has generated huge 
opposition from local residents and civil society.  Indeed, a World Wildlife Fund 
conducted EIA on the dam’s construction found that the position of the dam will directly 
affect Khar-Us Nur Lake—the largest freshwater lake in western Mongolia—by causing 
severe fluctuations in the lake’s water level.  WWF noted that these fluctuations will in 
turn affect the freshwater habitat of aquatic flora and fauna such as birds, fish, and 
surrounding herds that rely on the lake’s plants and water to survive (World Wildlife 
Fund 2003:1).  The same EIA also reported that the entire western region could be 
supplied more efficiently and cheaply with supplies from Russia if the local power grid 
were improved to include the suoms and bogs.  Considering the adverse affects of the 
dam coupled with the nominal output, which nevertheless will require extensions in the 
existing power grid, the overall project is questionable in motive and effectiveness. 
 
The Orkhon dam, also partially Chinese financed, is another questionable hydroelectric 
project.  Indeed, according to U. Tungalag, NGOs and international organisations in 
Mongolian widely regard the dam as a Chinese pet project with no real benefits for 
Mongolia other than supplying power to the copper mines in Mongolia’s south.  This 
perception comes from the fact Rio Tinto, of which the Aluminium Corporation of China 
(Chinalco) owns 9%, is involved in the mining and also in the process of negotiating a 
direct rail line from the mines to Inner Mongolia so as to expedite exporting extracted 
minerals directly to China.  In this sense, Chinese demand for Mongolia’s minerals would 
be the key consideration behind the Orkhon dam rather than the overall benefit to 
Mongolia’s domestic development.  This perception would increase even further were the 
dam to lead to environmental pollution (Dyer 2008). 
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Notable is how Chinese businesses, often government run, have undertaken similar dam 
building projects throughout Africa for economic purposes with little or no regard for 
social or environmental consequences (Alden 2007:88); (Manji & Marks 2007:66-68).  
Examples of this are evident in Chinese dam construction in Mozambique, Sudan, and 
Zambia (Manji & Marks 2007:66-68).  All three projects reportedly involve 
environmental degradation, forced migration, or human rights abuse.  In this sense, it 
might be supposed that various Chinese businesses have opted to use their dominant 
economic position in relation to weaker states to push forward such projects despite the 
social cost to the country within which they are constructed.         
 
5.4 Population Problems 
 
Dependency theory explains population problems in developing countries by examining 
the role such variables as industrialisation of the periphery’s core, overreliance on foreign 
capital, and economic stagnation in more remote areas play in mass in-migration and 
urbanisation (Smith 1996:14).  It assumes an urban bias in foreign investment that results 
in an increased accumulation of capital in large cities and a resulting rural ‘brain drain’ as 
labour forces leave the countryside.  The consequences of this type of population 
movement are decreased economic activity in the country’s more impoverished, isolated 
areas and an overburdening of city facilities and resources.         
 
Further, dependency theory notes that as more and more of a country’s population moves 
towards urban areas in search of economic opportunity, populations within the cities 
experience high levels of unemployment, decreased quality of services, material 
inequality, and increase instances of ‘marginalisation’ (Mclean & Kromkowski 
1991:118).  Rather than contributing to the development of cities, in-migration resulting 
from economic dependency causes the deterioration of infrastructure conditions and 
social services such as healthcare, education, and sanitation.  Dependency theory explains 
this by noting much of the country’s wealth is exported to core states, further 
undermining the weak state’s government’s ability to provide social goods. 
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In this regard, dependency theory is particularly relevant to understanding Mongolia’s 
post transition population problems, particularly in-migration and urbanisation, as the 
socio-economic consequences have largely been negative.  Indeed, as the World Bank 
notes that in-migration and urbanisation in Mongolia since 1991 has been the direct result 
of the country’s transition to capitalism and increased economic opportunity in the capital, 
assuming an economic motivation behind the phenomenon is entirely appropriate.  Such 
a perception would further imply that foreign direct investment and foreign trade have 
been the primary drivers behind the country’s demographic shift (World Bank 2009). 
 
While it is not possible to attribute Mongolia’s in-migration directly to its economic 
dependency on China, the two countries’ relations do play an important enough role in 
Mongolia’s domestic economic system that it is without a doubt a variable necessary to 
consider.   Of course, the ultimate responsibility for the worsening environmental 
conditions in Ulaanbaatar caused by population strain rests with the Mongolian 
government.  But as a weak state, it is limited as to what it can do to mitigate such 
deteriorating conditions.      
 
Uncontrollable Migration 
 
An estimated one-half of Mongolia’s entire population lives in or around Ulaanbaatar, 
with more residents leaving the countryside each year for the state’s capital.  
Proportionally, the resulting population concentration, according to G. Dore of the World 
Bank, is only matched in Asia by Thailand’s Bangkok where one-quarter of the nation’s 
population live.  Moreover, according to N. Sureen, Assistant Representative of 
Mongolia’s United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), an average of around 25,000 new 
residents arrive in Ulaanbaatar annually with the numbers increasing each year. In a 
speech presented to the 2005 National Summit of Migration, the Chairman of the 
Parliament Standing Committee on Social Policy, Professor S. Lamdaa, likened the 
current situation to a direct threat to national security (Parliament Standing Committee on 
Social Policy Ministry of Social Welfare and Labour 2006:20).     
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Key challenges of this in-migration for Ulaanbaatar are increased pressures on already 
existing urban infrastructure and the transfer of rural to urban poverty.  Indeed, as many 
migrants to Mongolia’s capital are former herders who have lost their livestock due to 
harsh winters or economic concerns, they often lack the skills to make the transition from 
animal husbandry to Ulaanbaatar’s service sector (Asian Development Bank 2007).  In 
this regard, uncontrolled migration from Mongolia’s countryside to Ulaanbaatar is a two 
fold social and development challenge for the Mongolia government in that both the city 
and rural areas suffer economically, environmentally, and socially as a result.   
 
Mongolian legislation is laissez-faire in addressing the issue of in-migration.  According 
to the 1992 Constitution, Mongolian citizens have the freedom to move and live where 
they wish, without constraint or regulation.  The Mongolian government is, therefore, 
limited to what it can do and what it seems willing to do.  Thus far, the government has 
attempted to record, not control, migration with a series of laws related to registration.  
The key piece of legislation in this regard is the 2004 ‘Rules of Registration of People 
Moving in Mongolia’ which requires any new resident to register with the local 
municipal authorities after 180 days in a new location (National Statistical Office of 
Mongolia 2007:27). 
 
Another indirect method the Mongolian government has of attempting to address the 
migration issue is by encouraging regional development through its 2003 rural 
development strategy (RDS).  More specifically, through its 2003 ‘Law on Regionalized 
Management and Coordination’, the Mongolia government has specified eight ‘Pillar 
Cities’ throughout the country which could serve as economic alternatives for migrants 
who seek a better life than that they are able to find in the countryside.  While allocating 
500 million tugriks (USD500,000) for the project in 2003, none of the eight pillar cities 
has shown a net increase in migration while many continue to show increasing loss of 
population.  Moreover, according to the World Bank and ADB, the ‘Pillar Cities’ 
programme was conceptualised without economic analysis or an environmental impact 
assessment as to each city’s carrying capacity or current environmental state (Asian 
Development Bank 2007); (Nagpal & Dore 2006:14).  G. Dore of the World Bank went 
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further to declare the ‘Pillar Cities’ programme a good theoretical idea, but one with no 
economic basic and, therefore, no real chance of addressing the key migration related 
issues. 
 
Urbanisation  
 
Mongolia’s uncontrolled migration has resulted in unplanned, unsustainable urbanisation.  
The rapid influx of rural Mongolians to Ulaanbaatar, a city initially conceptualised to 
accommodate 500,000 residents but now home to close to 1.5 million, is straining every 
aspect of the city’s infrastructure.  From waste management and water to accommodation 
and health services, Mongolia’s capital’s resources cannot meet the increase in demand.   
 
In response, in 2001, the Mongolia national government, as well as Ulaanbaatar’s top 
officials, agreed on a long-term development plan for the capital appropriately called 
‘The Ulaanbaatar City Development Strategy’ (CDS).  While theoretically a step forward, 
the CDS has proven nothing more than a collection of 26 visions statements without any 
clear budget allotments, implementation plans, or clear ministerial or departmental 
ownership.  Moreover, the plan did not address key issues such as education, health, 
water and sanitation, or land tilling with any concrete plans nor did it conduct an EIA to 
consider the affects it might have on already existing or potential environmental issues.  
Since 2001, according to G. Dore, the CDS has effectively died. 
 
The lack of a comprehensive, much needed approach to urban planning has left the city 
essentially fending for itself as new residents arrive each year with little or no realisation 
of the effects their actions have on Ulaanbaatar or the surrounding environment.  The 
result, in addition to increased traffic, air, water, and noise pollution, is a huge growth in 
the city’s ger districts, or shantytowns.  These ger districts, home to more than 80% of 
new arrivals to Ulaanbaatar, are by far the greatest challenge growing from urbanisation 
as they lack infrastructure for solid waste collection, water access, sewage, and sanitation 
(T.Tsevegmis 2007).   
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Of key importance when considering the effects the ger districts have on Ulaanbaatar’s 
environmental health is the issue of air pollution (B.Aruna 2007b).  While industry and 
construction in the city limits, as well as the continued use of leaded petrol for cars, 
contribute to the poor air quality, the burning of high pollutant fuels in the ger districts is 
the real source of high particle matter in the city’s air (Ministry of Environment 2008b).  
While investigating the source of air pollution in the ger districts, the Ministry of 
Environment found that rather than using more coal for heating and cooking, a large 
number of impoverished families had taken to burning rubbish and rubber tires 
(E.Enkhma 2008b).  The noxious chemicals released from such fuels has contributed to 
levels of air pollution in the ger districts five times those found in areas where coal is the 
primary fuel.  
 
The ger districts’ growth has also contributed to a lack of access to clean water 
throughout Ulaanbaatar.  As Ulaanbaatar is flanked on its north and south sides by 
mountains while open to the east and west, the logical progression of urbanisation would 
be to spread outward.  Yet the opposite has proven true, as the ger districts have spread 
up and into the mountains. The environmental effect of this urban spread is that water 
pollutants from the ger districts are focused downward into the city’s central ground 
water supplies.  
 
These polluted conditions have also led to increased health related issues that are specific 
to ger district residents, according to Paul Wilson, senior medical advisor for the 
American Embassy, Mongolia. Indeed, the Mongolian World Health Organisation (WHO) 
reports that non-communicable diseases such cancers, cardiovascular disease, injuries, 
and poisoning, are now higher in the ger districts than before and likely to increase 
(World Health Organisation 2008).  
 
Housing 
 
The concentration of new arrivals to Ulaanbaatar in the ger district is the result of a lack 
of affordable housing in Ulaanbaatar.  Indeed as between 2007 and 2008 the average cost 
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per square meter for a flat in Ulaanbaatar almost doubled from USD350 to USD650, 
housing prices in the city’s limited housing market are becoming even more out of reach 
for the average Mongolian (E.Enkhma 2008c). 
 
According to B. Batsukh, Director General of the Urban Development’s National Centre 
for Construction, Urban Development, and Public Utilities, Mongolian Ministry of 
Construction, Ulaanbaatar’s housing problems are the result of the rising cost of building 
materials such as steel and wood in Mongolia due to Chinese regional demand and 
Mongolian companies’ inability to produce materials such as bricks and cement, both of 
which are imported from China, at competitive cost (Interview 7);(E.Enkhma 2008c).  
Indeed, increased costs of materials from China contributed to the difficulty the 
Mongolian government had in launching its ’40,000 New Flats’ programme aimed at 
centrally housing more than 100,000 residents now living in the ger districts (E.Enkhma 
2008a).   
 
While perhaps never a viable development strategy, the Mongolian Ministry of 
Construction’s ’40,000 New Flats’ it is worth examining in that it is generally accepted 
by the press as a prototypical example of the ways in which Mongolia’s own urban 
development is entirely dependent on conditions outside its own control.  According to 
media reports at the time, the moment ex-PM M. Enkhbold and other government 
officials announced the programme aimed at providing low-cost housing to 100,000 
residents in the ger district, prices for supplies from China such as bricks leapt from 75 to 
200 tugriks each while bags of cement doubled.  This immediate increase in building 
material costs forced the government to indefinitely suspend the programme.  
 
While such evidence is not, of course, enough to prove Chinese regional demand caused 
the project to fail, it is an example of how the country’s economic dependency can 
undermine domestic development initiatives.  Moreover, that the Mongolian 
government’s initiatives fail in the face of rising market costs the result of China’s own 
development and demand is worth focusing on in so much as lack of housing is 
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contributing greatly to the overall poor quality of Ulaanbaatar’s environment (E.Enkhma 
2008a). 
 
5.5 Food Problems 
 
Desertification, urbanisation, and Mongolia’s economic dependence on China have also 
contributed to food problems in the country including food scarcity, lack of domestic 
production, and food safety issues.  So, too, has the Mongolian government’s inability to 
regulate such practices as herding and farming led to a worsening of domestic conditions 
and environmental deterioration (FAO/UNICEF/UNDP 2007).    
 
The Dzud 
 
Central to discussions regarding food scarcity is the complex socio-economic issue of the 
Mongolian dzud.  Between 1999 and 2002, severe weather winter conditions and 
subsequent lack of vegetation, known in Mongolian as dzuds, caused the country to lose 
more than 6 million of its 22 million head of livestock while directly affecting the food 
security and safety for more than 40% of the country’s overall population (Centre for 
Disease Control 2002).  While a reoccurring environmental phenomenon, it is possible to 
attribute the increased severity in dzuds to the same economic variables that have 
contributed to Mongolia’s deforestation and desertification. 
 
During an interview, U. Tungalag of the UNDP noted that the main economic factor 
related to increased dzuds is Mongolia’s disproportionate amount of goats.  Raised almost 
entirely to meet Chinese demand for cashmere, these goats destroy grasses by pulling 
them out by their roots while loosing topsoil with their sharp hooves.  As the increase in 
goats is, like the country’s intensifying dzuds, an entirely post-transition phenomenon, 
their correlation with recent environmental change is evident.  
 
U. Tungalag also stressed the government’s inability to undertake policy to address the 
dzuds’ causes as a main variable in their continuation.  In this regard, she cited the 
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government’s unwillingness to implement even modest pastureland management as a 
fundamental government failure.  To emphasise the role smart policy could play in 
alleviating Mongolia’s dzuds, U. Tungalag offered the example of the IMAR’s Chinese 
government.   
 
Despite operating in a region with an almost identical geographic makeup to Mongolia, 
the IMAR’s government has successfully avoided dzuds by implementing simple 
pastureland management such as fencing, providing winter shelter and fodder for animals, 
and regulating the number of goats per herd.  Not only has the IMAR’s government 
avoided widespread animal die-off, its simple policies have actually led to a tenfold 
increase in the number of livestock in the region within the last fifty years (Runnström 
2000:470).  U. Tungalag stressed the need for the Mongolian government to learn from 
Chinese practices and to set aside cultural concerns for the sake of the country’s 
economic growth and rural development.  Yet she also noted that the likelihood of 
Mongolian herders adopting a Chinese-style initiative towards pastureland management 
is extremely unlikely as it would not only mean admitting Mongolian practices obsolete, 
but also admitting their inferiority to Chinese models. 
 
Rather, the Mongolian government has looked to the international community for dzud 
relief.  Yet evidence suggests that once generous aid is slowing as government agencies 
and NGOs have begun to question the lack of fundamental reform aimed at curbing dzuds.  
While following the 2000 dzud, the international community, particularly Japan, pledged 
close to USD27 million in monetary relief, the American Embassy in Ulaanbaatar 
suspended all dzud relief in 2002 after then American Ambassador John Dinger 
conducted a fact finding mission to the Mongolian countryside (Mongolian Red Cross 
2004).  When questioned why the American embassy suspended aid, Ambassador Dinger 
noted the he would not continue to provide funding to supplement the country’s failed 
agricultural policies.     
   
Food Safety 
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Also of central concern for food safety in Mongolia is the lack of control measures in 
place for food related imports, most of which come from China.  As most bulk food 
imports are brought to Mongolia from China in un-refrigerated freight containers not 
designed for transport of perishable items, more than 50% end up arriving in Ulaanbaatar 
either failing to meet frozen conditions, expired, or improperly packaged (Food and 
Agriculture Organisation & World Health Organisation 2002).  Moreover, as an 
increasing amount of food imported to Mongolia comes not in bulk shipments, but by 
individual traders, it is impossible for Mongolian border officials to inspect all incoming 
food supplies.  According to J. Enkhbayar, vice-director of Mongolia’s Food and Drug 
Administration, only 10% of all food imports from China are checked (X.Bolormaa 
2008b). 
 
These issues are of particular concern for rural food safety as many goods that end up in 
the Mongolian countryside must first pass through Ulaanbaatar.  As a result, urban 
merchants usually unload their sub-quality goods on countryside merchants who are able 
to sell them to less aware consumers either by freezing them (the case with expired meats) 
or polishing them with vegetable oil to hide the telltale dullness of rotting fruits and 
vegetables (X.Bolormaa 2008a).  Moreover, the Mongolian government lacks any 
standardised shipping requirements for internal movements of food.  This creates 
additional opportunities for food to become contaminated as urban-rural transport 
primarily consists of personal cars.    
 
In relation to domestically produced foods, the Mongolian Food and Drug Administration 
found that more than 60% of countryside production facilities lacked any means of 
ensuring food safety.  As these facilities are generally owned by more affluent 
Mongolians with connections with local and national government officials (many who 
own the factories themselves), they are able to avoid improving their production methods 
through bribes or by foreknowledge of and preparation for inspection (X.Bolormaa 
2008a).         
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In 2006, the Mongolian Delegation to a World Trade Organisation (WTO) ‘Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures’ conference circulated a memorandum highlighting the measures 
the government and parliament have taken since inception into the organisation to 
improve food safety.  Key legislation mentioned included the 1999 ‘Food Safety’ law that 
clearly defined the rights and responsibilities of domestic food producers and product 
standards and the establishment of the State Specialized Inspection Agency in 2000 
(Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 2006).   
 
Yet, according to a joint FAO-WHO report on Mongolia’s food safety published in 2002, 
three years after the ‘Food Safety’ law and two years after the establishment of the 
Inspection committee, enforcement of such laws were incomplete.  The study noted that 
Inspection committees had failed to take into account the various stages of food 
production, instead focusing only on the end product (Food and Agriculture Organisation 
& World Health Organisation 2002).  
 
Domestic Production and Foreign Food Dependency 
 
Mongolia’s harsh weather and the country’s increased dependency on China for food 
imports (detailed in the previous chapter on Mongolian-Sino economic relations) has led 
to a dramatic decrease in domestic crop production.  As of 2008, Mongolia’s crop sector 
covered less than 200,000 hectares and was in decline both in production and total area 
covered.  Indeed, the Food and Agricultural Organisation’s (FAO) 2006 ‘Agricultural 
Sector Strategy Study’ described the future of Mongolia’s crop sector as bleak and noted 
that unless addressed at a national level its very existence was uncertain (Food and 
Agriculture Organisation 2006:105).  Most telling of the FAO’s lack of faith in 
Mongolia’s crop sector is the organisation’s decision to ignore the development of 
Mongolia’s crops entirely, while working with the Ministry of Food and Agriculture to 
increase Mongolia’s livestock. 
 
In Mongolia’s countryside, the lack of fresh produce is evident throughout the year and 
particularly so in the winter.  In the western province of Khovd, for example, residents 
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rely on jarred, pickled vegetables imported from Russia for any addition to their 
otherwise entirely meat and flour diet.  While it is possible to buy onions, garlic, and the 
occasional head of cabbage in winter, by the time they arrive in the distant provinces 
from Ulaanbaatar, they have been frozen, thawed, and refrozen so many times that they 
generally turn to a watery mush once defrosted.  During the summertime more vegetables 
are available, yet the prices rise exorbitantly and few can afford them.  Moreover, as fresh 
vegetables and the occasional fruit are such oddities in a countryside market, few people 
think to buy them even when they are available. 
 
The lack of secure food supplies to the countryside has led to persistent malnutrition, 
particularly among children and women.  While, according to the United Nation’s Child’s 
Fund’s (UNICEF) 2007 report on the ‘Situational Analysis of Women and Children in 
Mongolia’, malnutrition in the form of micronutrient deficiency is a continuing in rural 
communities as residents lack access to foods containing iron, vitamins A and D, and 
iodine (United Nations Children's Fund 2007:25).  
 
Much the opposite is true for the wealthier residents in Ulaanbaatar.  Even during the 
most extreme winter months at least three markets—the Mercury, Bars, and State 
Department Store—have an array of fruits such as mangos, pineapples, and grapes as 
well as vegetables ranging from aubergine to red peppers.  While remaining a luxury item 
only few can afford, the urban Mongolian appetite for vegetables, according to Patrick 
Evans, chief technical advisor for the FAO in Mongolia, is growing and China’s produce 
is meeting the demand.  
 
In this sense, the result of Mongolia’s dependency on China for its produce has led to an 
unequal distribution of food products between Ulaanbaatar and the rest of the country.  
This, in turns, has contributed to a growing number of rural residents who are 
increasingly suffering from malnutrition due to the failure of national crop production to 
provide them with domestic produce.  According to Victoria Sekitoleko, FAO 
Representative for Mongolia based in Beijing, this in turn affects Mongolia’s food 
security, especially in the countryside.   
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According to Patrick Evans of the Mongolian FAO office, the Mongolian government 
has not taken policy action aimed at increasing domestic crop production.  In fact, Patrick 
Evans noted all trends in food production and imports indicate that Mongolia will 
become increasingly dependent on Chinese imports to meet even basic food needs at a 
national level. The support for Mongolian-based crop production is equally weak among 
Mongolia’s civil society, save for one notable project sponsored by the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (SDC).  Yet the SDC’s ‘Revitalisation of Mongolian 
Potato Sector Programme’ seems an unlikely contributor to ending Mongolia’s 
dependency on China for food (Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation 2008).        
 
5.6 Economic Problems 
 
As chapter 4 examines Mongolian-Sino economic relations in detail, the following 
section will avoid repetition by assuming a level of interdependence between the two 
countries.  In this regard, the section will focus on such interdependence from an 
environmental perspective by examining two of Mongolia’s most important industries—
tourism and mining—so as to determine whether it contributes to land and resource 
degradation.  It will also examine the role Mongolian domestic policy has played in order 
to determine whether the government has been able to successfully protect the 
environment from economic activity related pollution. 
  
Tourism  
 
Tourism in Mongolian ranks as one of the country’s most important and fast growing 
industries.  According to the Ministry of Road, Transport, and Tourism, tourism increases 
15-20% per annum and accounts for about 10% of total GDP.  Yet, strangely, no part of 
the Ministry’s 2000 Tourist Law of Mongolia addresses the need to implement regulation 
aimed at curbing polluting activities or to conduct environmental assessments before the 
development of new tourist related industries (Ministry of Road 2008b).  Instead, the 
2000 Tourist Law focuses on the need to develop tourism related infrastructure, to train 
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local residents to act as guides, and to increase the amount of FDI for further tourist site 
development.  While economically rational, that no attention is paid to protecting the 
very resources upon which tourism depends is representative of government and industry 
shortsightedness and the unwillingness of those involved to decrease immediate profits in 
order to spare the environment. 
 
The Mongolian government has, however, passed legislation aimed at preserving 
protected areas with the ‘Law of Mongolia on Special Protected Areas’ (LoSPA).  Indeed, 
the LoSPA is an extensive piece of legislation aimed at protecting natural park, natural 
reserve, and natural monument while stipulating land usage rights within and around the 
specially protected areas (B.Tserendavva 2008:293).  As much of Mongolia’s tourism 
takes place in and around protected areas, the government may have intended the LoSPA 
to regulate tourist related development.    
 
Yet the 1994 LoSPA also contains provisions that allow for limited intrusion into 
protected areas and unlimited economic development related to tourism in border areas.  
These provisions, under Article 4 of the LoSPA’s ‘General Provisions’, state that the 
government can develop protected area’s buffer zones, or areas immediately around 
protected parks, at its discretion.  Moreover, under Article 33 of the ‘Land Utilization, 
Research and Studies in Protected Areas’ the government specifically gives business 
entities, organisations, and citizens the right to operate within protected areas on a limited 
scale.  These two clauses effectively undermine the LoSPA in its entirety as anyone with 
any relation to local or state officials is given free range to exploit the protected areas for 
profit.  That such practices regularly occur was made clear in the case of the Bogdkhan 
Mountain Special Protected Area. 
 
According to an audit conducted by Mongolia’s most widely read newspaper, ‘Today’ 
(Өнөөдөр) in 2006, 157 entities ranging from individuals to small, privately owned 
foreign and domestic companies, had permits to operate in or around Bogdkhan while an 
additional 32 were found to be operating without permission or license.  Moreover, 
according to the report, those engaged in registered use of the land had completely 
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avoided paying taxes, collectively estimated at 300 million tugriks (USD300,000), while 
engaged in government sanctioned use of the land (Ts.Tsevenkherlen 2008).          
 
More important in regard to environmental effects was the fact that the unplanned, small-
scale collectivisation of these 157 entities had spread into the protected area rendering the 
nearby environment ‘unrecognisable’.  The government, in response to the initial report’s 
findings, issued a statement saying it would nullify all 157 licenses and investigate those 
responsible for their issuance.  The reporter, however, concluded his article by stating the 
government routinely makes such promises only to not follow through with action 
(Ts.Tsevenkherlen 2008).   
 
Other protected areas such as Khovsgol Lake, Olgii Lake, the Orkhon River, the Altai 
Sayan Ecoregion which includes Dorgon, Uvs, Khar Us and Khar Lakes also report 
pollution problems due to tourism despite the fact that they are all UNESCO registered 
World Heritage Sites as well as Ramsar protected (Today 2007).  Reports such as illegal 
construction of tourist camps, illegal disposal of human waste and rubbish, and polluted 
water are becoming increasingly common from local residents (Ministry of Environment 
2008c).  Indeed, despite the Ministry of Roads, Transportation, and Tourism’s claims that 
tourism is an inclusive industry that benefits rural residents as much as the urban based 
travel and tourism companies, many countryside residents claim they no longer want 
tourism because of the damage it causes to the local environment (Ts.Tsevenkherlen 
2007a).   
 
While the Mongolian media focuses primarily on the effect tourist operators have on 
Mongolia’s environment, tourist operators, according to T. Tsogt, director of New 
Juulchin World Tours, the third largest in Mongolia, believe the real fault lies with 
tourists.  Indeed, T. Tsogt stressed that while the Japanese and western tourists that come 
to Mongolia are largely responsible tourists in that they work to leave as small an impact 
on Mongolia’s natural landscape as possible, the increase in Chinese and Korean tourists, 
both of which have horrible reputations in Mongolia as eco-tourists in that they create 
large amounts of rubbish for which they take no responsibility, are the main factor in 
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increase tourist related pollution.  As the Ministry of Road, Transportation, and Tourism 
reports that Chinese made up 46.7% of all foreign visitors to the country in 2007, this 
effect is likely to continue (Ministry of Road, Transportation, and Tourism 2008a).  
 
Mining 
 
While the potential for tourist related pollution is growing, Mongolia’s mining sector 
remains the main source of environmentally harmful economic activity in the country.  
More worrying even than the effect almost every aspect of the industry has had on the 
Mongolian ecosystem is over how short a period of time it has all occurred.  According to 
Giovanna Dore of the World Bank, large-scale mining in Mongolia has only taken place 
since the beginning of the twenty-first century, yet the environmental consequences have 
been so acute that whole rural areas have become essentially uninhabitable.  Water 
pollution, air pollution, mining in protected areas (some of which were declassified as 
protected when sizable mineral deposits were discovered), mercury poisoning, land 
degradation, loss of biodiversity, soil erosion, and landscape destruction are just some of 
the environmental problems associated with the industry (The World Bank 2006a:1).  
And far from successfully regulating the industry, the Mongolian government has 
unwittingly encouraged illegal, harmful mining activities through the introduction of high 
windfall taxes and the insistence that all gold mined in Mongolia must be sold to the 
Mongol Bank at a predetermined, fixed price.  In this sense, many companies, and 
certainly the illegal artisan miners, find it much cheaper and far more practical to operate 
completely outside the regulated mining industry. 
 
This is not to imply that the Mongolian government does not have a substantial legal 
framework in place for mining licensing and exploration.  Indeed, the laws regulating 
mineral exploration and extraction are extensive and seemingly quite focused on 
ecosystem protection.  Yet, as with tourism, there are several provisions included in 
legislation aimed at the mining industry that have allowed for a level of exploitation.  
These ‘loopholes’ have benefited both domestic and foreign (almost exclusively Chinese) 
firms equally.   
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In relation to exploration, while an individual is required to apply for a permit, anything 
related to ‘state’ exploration is permissible without a licence (B.Tserendavva 2008:234).  
As the responsibility to determine what constitutes a ‘state’ interest, as well as the 
ultimate responsibility to enforce all mining related laws, is decentralised and ultimately 
rests with regional officials who often have financial stakes in regional mining operations, 
corruption leading to environmental degradation commonly occurs (The World Bank 
2006a:11).  
 
Indeed, despite widespread concerns among the Mongolian citizens with an interest in the 
country’s domestic mining industry, the greatest threat to the country’s environment does 
not come from large-scale mining but rather small and medium sized mines.  While 
Mongolian media pays a great deal of attention to the larger mines like Oyu Tolgoi, the 
companies responsible for their development, such as Ivanhoe Mining and Rio Tinto, 
tend to follow international best practices, according to U. Jamba of the SDC (Interview 
30).  Such companies also bring with them the most sophisticated technologies, often 
developed to minimise the environmental effect, while the exact opposite it true for 
Mongolia’s smaller-scale mines.  
 
As discussed in the earlier chapter on the economics of Mongolia’s mining sector, some 
government officials believe that Chinese investors, acting through Mongolian citizens, 
control the majority of small and medium sized mines in the country.  While it is 
impossible to know that full extent of Chinese partial or full ownership of Mongolia’s 
small and medium sized mines, the more transparent Chinese firms surveyed have poor 
records of environmental protection.  Two prime examples of the poor mining practices 
of Chinese invested firms in Mongolia are the Da Chin firm in Dornod and the Ten Khun 
in Jargalant (B.Aruna 2007a).  Both companies have been accused of widespread 
environmental damage caused by illegal drainage of polluted water, illegal digging, and 
careless explosions which, in one case, left two Mongolian miners dead (B.Aruna 2008).  
When confronted, the Chinese staff denied any knowledge of Mongolian law, claiming 
they could neither read nor write Mongolian (B.Aruna 2007a).   
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Of even greater concern environmentally are Mongolia’s ‘ninja’ miners, or illegal placer 
gold miners, who destroy large swaths of Mongolia’s countryside by digging countless 
holes, poisoning water with mercury and sodium-cyanide (both chemicals used to 
winnow gold from small stones), and leaving behind unprocessed waste and makeshift 
shanty villages. While their activities are completely illegal, those actively involved in 
illegal mining number close to 100,000.  That they operate outside Mongolian society 
and Mongolian law, as well as outside the Mongolian economy (almost all collected gold 
and fluorspar, another mineral mined by the ‘ninjas’, goes directly to China), has left the 
Mongolian government unable to mitigate their actions or, consequentially, the 
detrimental effect their activities have on Mongolia’s ecosystem (The World Bank 
2006a:22).  
 
Conclusion 
 
As demonstrated throughout the chapter, lack of government regulation as well as the 
Mongolian government’s inability to enforce environmental protection laws already in 
place are the primarily enabling forces behind the country’s diminishing environmental 
health.  While the country’s weak institutions contribute to the overall problem in so 
much as they hobble the state’s ability to respond to pressing problems, so, too, does the 
country’s economic dependency on China play a role in the state’s failure to implement 
domestic reform to address pollutant-causing activities.  While ranging from the primary 
cause of environmental degradation through its mining activities to a contributing factor 
through its imports of foods and influence on Mongolian domestic construction, the 
Chinese government and Chinese businesses are clearly benefiting from Mongolia’s 
systemic weakness in regulating environmentally harmful activities.  Such benefits 
include higher profit margins, deeper penetration into the country’s domestic industries, 
and greater exploitation of Mongolia’s natural resources.  As with the two countries’ 
asymmetrical economic relations, Mongolia’s dependency on China as a market, supplier, 
and investor has translated into China’s enjoying what Strange calls ‘unconscious power’ 
in Mongolia’s environmental security in so much as it has both direct and indirect 
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influences on the direction of the country’s internal environmental development (Strange 
1996:26)  
 
This asymmetrical relationship and growth of Chinese ‘unconscious power’ is of key 
concern in Mongolia’s environmental security.  While many of Mongolia’s 
environmental challenges exist as a consequence of export driven, environmentally 
unsustainable practices meant to feed China’s resource needs, Mongolia’s total 
production of such resources meets only a fraction of China’s overall demand.  This 
imbalance creates a situation in which Mongolia has little leverage in demanding greater 
Chinese assistance in environmentally sustainable resource utilisation, but instead is 
faced with the what Buzan identifies as a weak state’s dilemma of whether economic 
growth is more important than resource protection (Buzan, de Wilde, & Wæver 1998:72).  
As up to the present the Mongolian government has not enforced the extensive legislation 
in place to protect the environment, legislation which in many ways makes finding a 
tangible solution more problematic as the government may claim it already possesses the 
necessary legal framework, it has clearly chosen to follow other underdeveloped Asian 
states in choosing to sacrifice environmental health for potential financial gain (Economy 
2004:239).   
 
Yet to attribute Mongolia’s poor environmental record to the country’s own lack of 
enforcement and priority placed on economic growth is to underestimate the influence 
China has not only through creating demand for natural resources, which in turn provides 
economic motivation for Mongolia to deplete its resources, but also in setting a regional 
example for overall environmental practices.  For, as with other regional cores, China has 
the potential to strengthen its neighbouring countries while encouraging trade just as it 
has the potential to encourage unsustainable resource exploitation.  A case in point of a 
regional centre of power encouraging better environmental practices as conditional to 
increased trade and social interaction with its neighbour countries is the European Union 
and the strict environmental standards it requires from member and would be member 
states.   
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This is particularly true in the case of Eastern European countries such as Poland, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic that, following the 
collapse of international communism in the early 1990s, were all left with extremely 
damaged environments.  Yet, rather than seek to exploit their transitional economics, the 
more affluent existing members of the EU demanded they adopt better environmental 
protection policies and improve the overall quality of their environments in order for the 
EU to consider their membership bids.  As a result, each respective country raised their 
environmental standards to match the EU requirement and were rewarded with 
membership into the larger economic community (Jordan 2005:281); (Lauber 2004:51).  
In this sense, it is possible to say that the EU has served as a regional core promoting 
sustainable European environmental policy through economic inducement. 
 
The exact opposite is true for China as has been shown throughout this chapter.  Rather 
than encouraging Mongolia, or for that matter other Asian states, to adopt 
environmentally sustainable practices, China has taken advantage of the country’s 
weakness.  It has done so to protect its natural resources and limit industry caused 
pollution as well as to supplement its own resource needs.  Chinese businesses have 
invested in Mongolia and operated outside Mongolian law when it has proven more 
profitable while Chinese border officials have not contributed to stop the cross-border 
flow of illegal goods ranging from animal parts to timber.  Far from using its central 
position in Asia to act as a model for eco-conscious development, China has instead 
exported bad environmental practices while consuming endless supplies of its 
neighbouring countries’ resources, whether acquired legally or illegally.          
 
For Mongolia, overcoming such a regional environment is critical.  The country’s natural 
health and beauty are not only part of the symbolism that helps maintain Mongolia’s 
modern identity, but also the crux upon which the economy is centred.  The sustainability 
of the country’s beloved nomadic lifestyle will most certainly prove impossible without 
greater care placed on land management and domestic animal production.  Moreover, the 
ability of Mongolia to regulate its economic dependency on China will be greatly limited 
by the country’s inability to provide at least the minimal requirement of food security for 
  174 
itself.  Without protecting the nation from illegal wood collection and animal poaching, 
the pristine beauty of the Mongolian countryside will simply disappear.   
 
Yet all environmental and economic development trends indicate that not enough is being 
done at a governmental level and that Mongolia’s civil society lacks the status to push 
forward real policy changing programmes.  The Mongolian government’s obsession with 
using the mining industry to push the country’s economy forward, while undoubtedly the 
country’s greatest and most valuable asset, does not include an equally powerful drive to 
protect the country’s ecosystem.  The result appears to be a growing dependency on 
China for products Mongolia could produce for itself and irreversible environmental 
damage that will undermine any financial gain made by the small minority of Mongolians 
responsible for the country’s ultimate ecological damage.      
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Chapter Six: Post-Cold War Mongolian-Sino Societal Relations  
 
 
Three main variables are useful when considering Mongolian-Sino societal relations 
since the end of the Cold War.  First is the effect the state’s weakness has on the 
Mongolian government’s ability to garner societal support for its foreign policy focused 
on cultural and societal exchange.  Second is the role identity plays between the Mongols 
and the Han Chinese and, separately, between the ethnic Mongols in Mongolia and the 
IMAR.  Third is Mongolian economic dependency on China and the influence it has on 
the two countries’ societal relations.  Together, these three factors provide a framework 
for understanding Mongolian-Sino post-transition societal relations.    
 
To begin, state weakness is evident throughout Mongolia’s foreign policy involving 
cultural and social exchange towards China as the government and public often have 
divergent views on the desirability of closer relations with the PRC. While the state has 
attempted to forge closer cultural and social relations with the PRC, Mongolian public 
opinion remains cool to closer partnership with China (table 6.1).  This divergence 
between policy goals highlights how state weakness can undermine the government’s 
ability to institute foreign policy while also drawing attention to a major source of 
potential intrastate conflict.  That such tension between the state and public regarding 
societal relations with China is growing is evident in the increased radicalisation of 
Mongolian nationalist sentiment.  
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Source: Sant Maral Foundation, Politibarometer, 2000-2008. 
 
Closely related to the state’s weakness is the issue of identity.  Mongolian identity plays a 
two-part role in relation to the state’s societal relations with China.  The first is that of an 
obstacle for closer Mongolian-Sino relations.  The second, ironically, is that of a catalyst 
for closer exchange.  In order to understand these seemingly contradictory positions, it is 
necessary to consider relations with the PRC and the IMAR separately.  
 
Public hesitancy for greater social exchange stems in part, according to Tsedendamba 
Batbayar, out of fear that accepting any aspect of Chinese culture may consequently lead 
to a loss of Mongolian identity (Batbayar 2002:325).  Indeed, more concerned with issues 
of ethnic purity and identity self-preservation, the Mongolian public has been hesitant to 
enter into social relations directly with China for fear that doing so could led to a sort of 
cultural ‘corruption’ (Kaplonski 2004:41).  As a result, Mongolia’s identity politics in 
relation to China tend to focus on what Hopf calls the ‘exclusionary practices, the 
discourse of danger, the representations of fear, and the enumeration of threats’ while 
‘downplay[ing] the role of affirmative discourses such as claims to shared ethnicity, 
nationality…or other commonalities’ (Hopf 2002:8); (Campbell 1998:70).  This, in large 
part, explains the Mongolian publics’ tendency to react coolly to state sponsored 
initiatives for societal exchange with China in general.   
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Conversely, a notable exception to Mongolian identity politics in relation to China is 
Mongolian public opinion regarding the ethnic Mongols in the IMAR.  While 
problematic in that the IMAR’s Mongols are part of the Chinese state and thereby contain 
an element of the Other that sometimes obscures ethnic affinity, Mongolian public 
support for cultural and social cooperation with the IMAR is relatively enthusiastic 
(Bayasakh 2000).  This indicates Mongolian society does not necessarily include the 
IMAR’s ethnic Mongols in the same conceptual idea of the Other in which it casts Han 
Chinese in general.  For this reason, Mongolia’s foreign relations with the IMAR tend to 
have more identity-based support and are, therefore, the focus from both the Chinese and 
Mongolian sides of a large portion of overall Mongolian-Sino social cooperation.  
 
Lastly, Mongolia’s economic dependency on China is playing an increasingly significant 
role in the two countries’ societal relations.  In this regard, the Mongolian public is 
divided as to whether closer ties based on economic linkages will have a positive or 
negative outcome on society.       
         
From a pessimistic perspective, elements within Mongolian society seem to believe the 
country’s economic dependency on China will negatively affect its societal integrity and 
identity security, particularly as the two countries’ relative cultures and ethnic identities 
are imbalanced in terms of demographic and geographic scope (Batbayar 2002:325).  
China’s increasing cultural appeal and projection, the range of its soft power, and its 
seeming ability to incorporate smaller social identities into its own, further aggravate this 
sense of threat (D. Bechee 2008); (Kurlantzick 2007).      
   
Dependency theory explains this process through what Harrell calls an ‘asymmetrical 
dialogue’ (Harrell 1995:7).  Just as economic dependency can extend into the country’s 
environmental sector, so too can it contribute to a subjugation of the periphery’s identity.  
That Chinese culture is more than capable of subsuming smaller identities into its own is 
evident in the PRC’s ongoing ‘civilizing projects’ aimed at assimilating the country’s 
minorities into a Han-centric Chinese nation (Borchigud 1995:278).  Indeed, Chinese 
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policy towards the IMAR’s Mongols is particularly worrying in regard to Mongolian 
identity.  
 
From an optimistic perspective, parts of Mongolian society seem to believe closer 
economic relations with China have the potential to translate into greater educational and 
career opportunities.  Indeed, evidence suggests that a number of young Mongolians, 
particularly students, see closer societal ties with the PRC as an increasingly desirable 
possibility.  This ‘warming’ to societal relations with may be the result of concerns 
among the younger generation that there are insufficient opportunities for good education 
and employment in Mongolia (tables 6.2 and 6.3).  While worry over the effect greater 
economic dependency will have on identity arguably still exist among those with a more 
optimistic view of the two countries’ relations, evidence suggests that opportunity based 
on economic ties may soon override such societal concerns.    
 
 
Source: Sant Maral Foundation, Politibarometer, 2000-2008. 
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Source: Sant Maral Foundation, Politibarometer, 2000-2008. 
 
Together state weakness, identity, and economic dependency largely shape Mongolia’s 
societal policy towards the PRC.  The following chapter will, therefore, draw on all three 
for analysis of the two countries’ societal relations.  It will do so by analysing discourse 
on identity obtained in Mongolian language media, public opinion polls, first hand 
interviews, and the limited number of scholarly accounts on Mongolian identity.   
 
6.1 Mongolian-Sino Social Relations 
 
Sources of Threat Perception 
 
Buzan’s paradigm for understanding societal security provides a useful framework for 
demonstrating how China’s geographic proximity and cultural ‘strength’, or soft power, 
can translate into a societal threat.  Indeed, Buzan’s division of threats into three parts 
including vertical competition, horizontal competition, and migration, is particularly 
relevant to the case of Mongolia and China (Buzan, de Wilde, & Wæver 1998:121).  
 
For many Mongolians with a fear of China’s growing cultural influence in the country, 
the most immediate threat that society faces is from vertical competition.  Used here to 
  180 
describe the threat towards identity from an integrating or ‘civilizing’ project, China’s 
actions in the IMAR provide all too applicable a precedent for the way in which Chinese 
political will and cultural prevalence has the potential to alter Mongolian identity.  As 
Harrell notes, the PRC has successfully incorporated the IMAR’s Mongolian ‘periphery’ 
into the Chinese state through a series of economic, education, and development reforms 
(Harrell 1995:22-27). In order to facilitate this assimilation, the Chinese government 
encouraged the IMAR’s Mongols to preserve elements of their culture such as dance, 
costumes, and other innocuous forms of cultural expression that ‘fosters ethnic pride, but 
does not impede progress’ (Harrell 1995:22-27).  Yet the PRC did so while maintaining 
Chinese culture as a heterogeneous umbrella under which such preservations were kept.  
In this sense, the Chinese state has already proven it is capable of absorbing Mongolian 
culture almost surreptitiously by allowing for the maintenance of a ‘minority’ ethnic 
consciousness while at the same time drawing the periphery in closer.     
    
In this sense vertical competition is closely related to horizontal competition in which a 
dominant state uses its linguistic and cultural advantage to force fundamental changes in 
a state or people’s culture (Collins 2007:170).  Evidence that China has used its language 
and culture to subjugate a region and people is also evident in the IMAR.  Indeed, Bulag 
writes extensively on how the PRC government forced Mongolian children to attend 
Chinese language schools, while essentially ostracising those who refused to learn 
Mandarin.  Bulag notes that these cultural ‘victims’, those who adopted the Chinese 
language and culture, in turn received higher position in a Han Chinese dominated 
society and often become more successful in wider society (Bulag 2003:754). Such 
cultural ‘advantage’ is often the result of dependency in that the core state occupies a 
dominant position in the weaker state’s society.   
 
In regard to migration, the perceived threat comes from the growing amount of Chinese 
workers and travellers in Mongolia and fear that their sheer numbers have the potential to 
fundamentally change the country’s demographic make-up as well as Mongolian society 
and identity (table 6.4).  This is particularly true as Mongolia is a large country with a 
small population making it more vulnerable to the negative effects of migration in 
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contrast to European or other western states (Guild & van Selm 2005:111).  While most 
legal Chinese migrants to Mongolia live in Ulaanbaatar, illegal workers are divided 
between the capital and various mining sites throughout the country (Batbayar 2006:221).  
This had led to a sense among the Mongolian public that Chinese have deeply penetrated 
Mongolian society at multiple levels (Batbayar 2001:150). 
 
Together, these three variables help explain the Mongolian public’s sense of a threatening 
Chinese Other.  They also provide a useful basis for discussion of the Mongolian public’s 
hesitancies to engage fully with the Chinese government and society in cultural exchange.   
 
 
Source: Statistical data derived from National Statistical Office of Mongolia, 
Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 2001-2007. 
 
Mongolian-Chinese Education Exchange 
 
In the early 1990s, the MPRP-led government sought to increase social and cultural 
cooperation with China, focusing in part on joint education.  The first state-level move 
towards closer social relations came with the signing of the 1994 Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation (Osmanczyk 2002:1468-1469).  In addition to guaranteeing ‘mutual 
respect for one another’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-mutual 
interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful co-
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existence’, the Treaty also proposed closer cooperation in education exchange and a 
commitment to developing cultural relations (Xinhua News Agency 1996). 
 
The 1994 Treaty was extremely vague as to specific educational projects and 
programmes, merely stating that such relations were desirable as part of a general 
bettering of relations (Severinghaus 1995:73-75).  Indeed, the Treaty’s main purpose 
seems to be entirely focused around China’s desire for Mongolia to remain militarily 
unaligned (Roy 1998:54-55).  Yet the symbolism behind the agreement indicated that 
both states believed tempering historical animosity through education exchange would 
lead to an improved environment in which to pursue more sustained economic and 
political relations.  For the Mongolian government, the agreement was a chance to lessen 
its dependency on Russia while also enabling a new generation of Mongolians to have 
more positive views towards China.  
 
Yet, despite the agreement in 1994 to further education exchange, neither country hurried 
to implement any specific programmes.  While Sino-Mongolian agreements for education 
exchange had existed nominally since the early 1950s, Mongolia’s constant siding with 
the former Soviet Union against China for the better part of the twentieth century had led 
to an effective moratorium on such exchange.  Indeed, it was not until 2000 that the 
Mongolian and Chinese governments agreed on the programme ‘Mutual Recognition of 
Academic Degrees and Credentials’ that would allow students to study in either of the 
respective countries knowing that their degrees would be transferable.   
 
Moreover, despite rhetoric encouraging bilateral educational exchanges, it also took the 
Mongolian and Chinese governments six years from first signing the 1994 Treaty to 
establish a fund for Mongolian students to study in China with the ‘Executive Programme 
on the Project for Helping the Mongolian Students Studying in China with Chinese Free 
Loan’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2007). 
 
These formal agreements between the two states did not, however, succeed in fostering 
further exchanges in education.  Since 2004, the Chinese government has provided 
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funding for only ten full scholarships for Mongolians to study in China (Brook 2004).  
Indeed, as of 2007 only 320 Mongolian students were registered as studying full-time in 
China, of which one hundred were studying in the IMAR (Embassy of Mongolia 2007).  
 
Yet, according to Munkhjin Bayanjargal, Officer in Charge of Education Exchange with 
the Mongolian Ministry of Education, Culture and Science in Mongolia, both the 
Mongolian government and Chinese embassy in Mongolia are working to increase the 
desirability and opportunity for Mongolian students to study in China (Interview 20).  In 
2004, the two countries’ Ministries of Education agreed to a five-year (2005-2010) 
student exchange programme that would increase the number of full scholarships from 
ten to twenty.  While, as of early 2009, the number of students had not yet been increased, 
that both countries have acknowledged the need to allocated additional student funding 
indicates that both sides are committed to further exchange.   
 
Despite the two government’s drive to increase education exchange between the two 
countries, M. Bayanjargal acknowledges that many students remain hesitant to the 
prospect of living and studying in China.  Indeed, M. Bayanjargal noted during an 
interview that China remains a secondary destination that appeals only to those who can 
neither afford nor qualify for study in Europe, the United States, Korea or Japan.   
 
One key to better understanding the continued hesitation Mongolian students have in 
studying in China is evident from an interview with a Mongolian student currently 
studying in Beijing.  Interviewee 22, a 25-year-old student at Beijing’s Foreign Studies 
University, has studied in China for three years (Interview 22).  She first focused entirely 
on Chinese language in Urumqi City, Xinjiang province, and later moved to Beijing to 
study international relations.  She believes a degree from a Chinese university will be 
more valuable in the long-term than one she could obtain in Mongolia and hopes it will 
enable her to find work after graduation as a customs official.  Her Chinese is fluent, she 
has a Chinese boyfriend, and she dresses, gestures, and acts in many ways ‘Chinese’. 
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While she clearly sees an advantage in studying in China, Interviewee 22 explained that 
Mongolian students who study in China are often stigmatised upon returning home to 
Mongolia.  She noted that while most Mongolians understand the utility in learning 
Chinese and are jealous of her time abroad, many Mongolians view her as having 
somehow been corrupted by her time in the PRC.  As a result, she has lost childhood 
friends who see her new clothes, her Chinese fluency, and her exposure to travel inside 
China as a sort of arrogance or an acceptance that Chinese culture is in some way 
superior to Mongolian.  In response, Interviewee 22 has stopped returning home for 
holidays, aside from Tsagan Sar (Mongolian New Year).  Indeed, during the interview 
she expressed a wish to find work in China so that she does not have to return home.  
Interviewee 22 noted that any Mongolian interested in studying in China would be fully 
aware of the backlash associated with embracing the culture and language.  
 
Yet, according to Professor Rossabi of Columbia University, such discrimination against 
Mongolian students studying in China may be lessening (Interview 21).  Professor 
Rossabi attributes this change in attitude to the growing number of elite Mongolians who 
send their children to study in the China.  Whereas before, poorer students mainly studied 
in the PRC, thereby contributing to the stigma of Mongolians studying in China, this 
trend is undergoing a fundamental transformation.  Indeed, Professor Rossabi believes 
that as the two countries’ economic ties grow closer, more and more affluent Mongolians 
will choose to study in China so as to cultivate potential business relations. As a result, 
study in China will become ever more socially acceptable (Interview 21). 
 
The spate of private Chinese language centres opening in Ulaanbaatar may also indicate a 
growing acceptance among the Mongolian public towards education exchange with 
China.  This is particularly true among the country’s elite as private centre tuition is 
expensive and foreign language study a luxury.  As of September 2009, Ulaanbaatar was 
home to more than 60 Chinese language centres, many run by Chinese nationals 
(People’s Daily 2009).  Most prominent of these schools is the Mongolian National 
University’s Confucius Centre.  Established in 2008, it is fully financed by the Chinese 
government and Shandong University with the stated aim of teaching Mongolians 
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Mandarin while providing information about Chinese culture (Mongolia-Web 2008). 
That China understands the role that language and culture plays in a country’s soft power 
is evident in the government’s plans to increase the number of Confucius Centre’s 
internationally from 314 in 2009 to 500 by 2010 (Sim 2009). 
 
This shift in societal perspectives based on the country’s elite’s activities is very much in 
line with dependency theory.  As two countries’ become tied economically, the stronger 
of the two can gain influence among the weaker country’s elite through education 
exchange (Moon 1985:298).  This in turn can contribute to what Crossley and Watson 
called education dependency, which can directly influence a country’s political, 
economic, and societal structures (Crossley & Watson 2003:28-29).   
 
While the number of Mongolian students interested in studying in China remains 
relatively small, ties between the two countries are indeed increasing.  Whether this will 
lead to greater future education exchange as Professor Rossabi suggests or whether such 
exchange will constitute a threat that fans Mongolian nationalism and anti-foreign 
sentiment remains to be seen.   
 
Mongolian-Chinese cultural exchange 
 
One important reason why cultural exchanges between Mongolia and the PRC are a 
sensitive issue is that both countries attach nationalistic importance to, and make cultural 
claims upon, the history of the Mongolian domination of China during the Yüan Dynasty.  
While there is a drive in China to ‘domesticate’ parts of Mongolian culture in the IMAR, 
the exact opposite is occurring in Mongolia as China often serves as the Other against 
which Mongolians define their identity and cultural history (Lam 2000:161-163).  Indeed, 
as China finds Mongolian culture appealing in its more primitive, idyllic aspects, there 
are those among the Mongolian public who fear Chinese culture as something threatening 
in the scope of its achievements and its ability to assimilate neighbouring histories into its 
own.  In this sense, attempts at cultural exchanges between Mongolia and China have 
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moved slowly and at times have even gone so far as to create distrust and resentment on 
the Mongolian side in regard to the country’s identity security.  
 
To show a commitment towards cultural cooperation, the Mongolian and Chinese 
government signed a series of agreements aimed at fostering better understanding of the 
two countries’ closely connected histories and customs (Embassy of the People's 
Republic of China in Mongolia 2004).  These include the 1994 ‘Cultural Cooperation 
Agreement’, the 1998-2000 ‘Executive Plan for Sino-Mongolian Cultural Exchanges’, 
the 2001-2003 ‘Executive Plan for Cultural Exchanges and Cooperation’ and, most 
recently, the 2008-2010 ‘Executive Plan for Cultural Exchange’.  Moreover, most 
meetings between Mongolian and Chinese state officials include a vague reiteration for 
cultural exchange when discussing closer trade cooperation (Xinhua News Agency 2005).   
 
It is important to note here that while both the Mongolian and Chinese governments 
profess a desire towards increasing mutual exchange, almost all proposed exchanges to 
date have been by the Chinese side for Chinese cultural activities in Mongolia. Ts. 
Jargalsaikhan, Officer for Cultural Exchange with the Mongolian Ministry of Education, 
Culture, and Science, explains this one-sided development in light of the Chinese 
tendency to use the IMAR as the source for Mongolian culture rather than looking to 
Mongolia for external cultural exchange (Interview 28).  This is best exemplified in the 
PRC’s decision to use Inner Mongolian musicians for the 2008 Olympic opening 
ceremony’s display of China’s Mongolian minorities without consulting the Mongolian 
Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science.  This asymmetrical dialogue, in which the 
Chinese government is seemingly eager to introduce aspects of Chinese culture while 
treating Mongolian culture as if it were already an element of Chinese culture fully 
understood and absorbed, has led to suspicion on the Mongolian side as to China’s real 
intent in relation to Mongolia’s societal security.  It has also led to backlashes against 
Chinese cultural events in Mongolia. 
 
This was clearly the case, according to Jargalsaikhan, during a 2004 exhibition of 
Chinese musical instruments in Mongolia that, while considered by the Ministry of 
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Education, Culture, and Science a success, led to a great deal of controversy.  On display 
at the exhibition were the huqin family of bowed stringed instruments that include the 
zhonghu; a two stringed bow closely resembling the Mongolian national instrument, the 
Morin khuur or ‘horse-head fiddle’.  Jargalsaikhan, while qualifying the interest 
Mongolian visitors had in regard to the Chinese instruments in general, reported that 
while the exhibition claimed the zhonghu as a traditional ‘Chinese’ instrument, 
Mongolian visitors, and later the media, took offence as many believe the instrument was 
a clear imitation of the Mongolian Morin khuur.  Ts. Jargalsaikhan noted that this offense 
turned to anger over what many saw as a Chinese attempt to undermine Mongolian 
cultural achievement. 
 
Other attempts at importing Chinese culture to Mongolia have also been received coldly.  
Chinese cultural day, for example, which since 2004 has been an annual event in 
Ulaanbaatar, is widely shunned and openly criticised as an affront on Mongolian cultural 
preservation.  Moreover, in some cases further documented in this chapter, Mongolians 
have reacted to the Chinese cultural presence in Mongolia with violence.  Yet despite this 
aversion shared by many Mongolians towards Chinese culture, Beijing, in cooperation 
with the Mongolian Ministry of Education, Culture, and Science, opened a Chinese 
cultural centre in Ulaanbaatar in 2007 and plans to hold annual cultural events during the 
Chinese lunar New Year (Mongolia Web 2007).  While as of 2009 such events had not 
yet taken place, the decision to advertise the growing Chinese presence in Mongolia 
through an open display of unwanted cultural bravado is likely to create further tension in 
the future.  This is particularly true as Chinese New Year closely corresponds with 
Mongolia’s Tsagaan Sar; the country’s most important holiday. 
 
In a sense, the Mongolian people’s tepid response towards participation with China in 
cultural exchanges comes from animosity towards Chinese culture, but it is also rooted in 
modern fear of a rising China.  Many Mongolians believe that in order to maintain their 
own carefully guarded traditions, they must take care to preserve the ‘purity’ of 
Mongolian customs against Chinese influence.  The two countries have far too long a 
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history for Mongolians to doubt the power China has in drawing weaker nations into its 
cultural sphere.  
 
6.2 Mongolian-Sino Social Exchanges Through the IMAR 
 
Figure 6.1: Map Highlighting Mongolia and the Inner Mongolian Autonomous 
Region (IMAR) 
 
 
Source: Maps-of-China.com (http://www.maps-of-
china.net/p_inner_mongolia_map.html), accessed 25 April 2008. 
 
Mongolian Perceptions of the IMAR 
 
China’s IMAR presents a special set of challenges for analysis of Mongolian foreign 
policy and identity as it is simultaneously a part of the threatening Other and a part of 
ethnic Mongolian history (Bayasakh 2000).  It is a region inundated with Han Chinese 
where the minority Mongols use, and are used for, aspects of their ethnic Mongolian 
cultural history to maintain a distinct identity that simultaneously includes concepts of the 
Chinese nation.  In terms of Mongolian-Chinese relations, the IMAR is a window 
between the two states that serves both while remaining self-serving, making it a place 
where trust and suspicion mix for the Mongolian public. 
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The crux of Mongolian public ‘confusion’ towards the IMAR is that while there is a 
natural tendency to view the IMAR’s Mongolians as part of a larger ‘Mongolian’ ethnic 
community, so too is there an almost necessary need to keep Chinese cultural influence at 
a distance.  Indeed, while a number of Inner Mongolians can speak Mongolian, it is the 
penetration of the Chinese culture into their lives, manifest in such things as their ability 
to speak Mandarin, the clothes they wear, and the food they eat, that gives the Mongolian 
public pause when dealing with the people and the region (Bulag 1998:171-172).  Indeed, 
as the IMAR’s ethnic Mongols have been part of the Chinese state for 60 years, and 
subject to Chinese political, economic, and social control throughout the entire time, even 
their most fundamental ethnic Mongolian traditions have been affected.  This, in turn, has 
made maintaining a strictly ethnic Mongolian lifestyle impossible for the IMAR’s 
Mongols, particularly as Chinese immigration policy encourages Han Chinese to move to 
the region (Weiner & Russell 2001:273); (Hua li 2008).  
 
This has led to difficulty in the Mongolian public’s ability to conceptualise and define the 
country’s social relationship with the IMAR’s ethnic Mongolians, believing them as 
ethnically related while also seeing them as part of a feared Chinese Other (Bulag 
1998:171-172).  This contradiction is so fundamental as to be evident linguistically.  The 
Mongolian term for ‘Inner Mongolia’ is Oor Mongol, or Oor Mongol Chuud, for ‘Inner 
Mongolians’, which, simply translated, means the ‘different’ or ‘other’ Mongolia(n).  It is 
a useful analytical starting point when conceptualising the two people’s relations as the 
phrase encompasses all the seeming contrasts and paradoxes present in Mongolian public 
opinion in that it simultaneously acknowledges a shared ethnic and cultural background 
while emphasising the division and distance between the two groups (Hornby 2008). 
 
There are three different approaches Mongolian foreign policy and Mongolian identity 
politics take when dealing with the IMAR: acceptance, rejection, and uncertainty.  As all 
three are evident in this section’s examination of education and cultural exchange 
between the IMAR and Mongolia, it is worth developing the motivation behind each. 
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Acceptance of the IMAR’s ethnic Mongols as part of a pan-Mongolian, non-state based 
entity is most evident in the Mongolian government’s socially based foreign policy.  As 
shown in the detailed discussions of education and cultural exchanges below, the 
Mongolian government has pushed forward for closer relations with the IMAR much as it 
has with exchanges to greater China.  Yet a fundamental difference in its approach is that 
the state uses perceived ethnic ties as a means to facilitate closer Mongolian-Chinese 
relations.  In this sense, the Mongolian government attempts to draw on sub-state cultural 
relations in order to advance its larger China-focused foreign policy.  
 
Rejection of closer cultural and educational relations with the IMAR takes place mostly 
at a societal level in various groups with strong anti-Chinese, and anti-foreign, sentiments.  
It is based on ideas that the IMAR’s Mongols have become ‘polluted’ through intensive 
Chinese migration campaigns, mandatory minority education, and the sense that the 
IMAR’s Mongolian ‘culture’ is nothing more than a propaganda tool the CCP employs to 
demonstrate to the nation and the world that China is a multiethnic state (Baranovitch 
2001); (Hua Li 2008).  As, at the time of writing, Han Chinese made up over 80 % of the 
IMAR’s population, demographic support for rejection is strong.  Indeed, according to 
Bulag, an ethnic Mongolian Cambridge-based scholar who grew up in the IMAR, ‘as 
more [Han] Chinese are represented in the [IMAR’s] Party Committee, the government, 
the People’s Congress, and the PCC, the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region becomes 
increasingly a misnomer’ (Bulag 2005:95).  It is this penetration of Chinese into the 
IMAR that has led a portion of the Mongolian public to reject the IMAR’s ethnic 
Mongols as being in anyway ‘Mongolian’ by reconstituting them as part of the Other 
(Bulag 1998:171-172).  
 
Uncertainty towards how to understand the IMAR’s ethnic Mongols is the driving force 
behind Mongolian identity politics.  It is a more moderate position than either total 
acceptance or rejection, but includes aspects of both.  For the majority of the Mongolian 
public, the IMAR’s ethnic Mongols, while indeed different and even, perhaps, ‘polluted’, 
are not inherently corrupt but rather victims of Chinese cultural colonization (Hua Li 
2008).  Indeed, according to Professor Wang Jisi, Professor of International Affairs at 
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Beijing University, the essence of the IMAR is that it serves as a confluence of Chinese 
and Mongolian cultures that while having the potential to create animosity also has the 
ability to foster a sort of cultural melding (Interview 32).  From a Chinese perspective, 
Jiang Rong’s popular novel Wolf Totem shows such a union between cultures, even going 
so far as to elevate aspects of Mongolian culture (while claiming that the Mongols are 
‘Chinese’ in the process) above Han Chinese culture (Jiang Rong 2008).  While the book 
has gone widely unnoticed in Mongolia, perhaps as a Mongolian translation has not yet 
been produced, its sense of the IMAR as a cultural linkage between the two states is 
central to what Olson calls the ‘uncertainty’ approach’s moderate position (Olson 
1998:243).  
 
Mongolia-IMAR Education Exchange  
 
Mongolian foreign policy regarding education exchange with the IMAR is, therefore, 
best understood as a mixture of ethnic affinity, identity security concerns, and 
government initiatives to develop closer relations with the PRC.  Whereas the Mongolian 
public has been cool to the overall idea of education exchange with greater China, 
studying in the IMAR has become accepted and is growing in popularity.  Indeed, 
whereas only 100 Mongolians studied part-time or over short periods in the IMAR in 
2000, by 2007 the number had grown to 1000, including 100 of the total 320 full-time 
registered students in China (Xinhua 2007).  
 
In many instances, the IMAR government and IMAR universities have been the driving 
forces behind closer exchange from the Chinese side.  In 2005, the IMAR government 
signed an education exchange agreement with the Mongolian Ministry of Education 
called the ‘2005 Mongolian Students to Study Chinese in China and Chinese Teachers to 
Go to Mongolian to Teach Agreement’.  The agreement’s stated purpose was to facilitate 
bilateral exchange and to develop university-to-university relations (Overseas Chinese 
Affairs Office of Inner Mongolia 2008).  In 2006, the IMAR government also agreed to 
provide tuition and living expenses for 100 Mongolian students to study in the IMAR 
each year.   
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In further support of the agreement, the Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic 
of China agreed to provide funding for fifteen IMAR teachers to go to Mongolia and 
teach Chinese in 2008.  While many were slated to teach at the Mongolian National 
University’s Confucius Centre, others were sent to the Mongolian countryside to teach at 
more rural universities (Ministry of Education of the People’s Republic of China 2008).  
This dissemination of Chinese instructors throughout the country has allowed Mongolian 
universities to offer Chinese instruction at a before unheard of scope. 
 
IMAR universities and research institutions have also sought to develop relations with 
Mongolian universities.  For example, Inner Mongolian University provides funding for 
one volunteer teacher to go to Mongolia to teach Chinese each year in a concerted effort 
to further develop relations with Mongolia.  In addition, the IMAR’s Science and 
Technology Bureau co-hosted the ‘2005 China-Mongolian Dissemination and 
Cooperation for Science and Technology Forum’ in Ulaanbaatar (Inner Mongolia 
University 2008); (China-Erlian Website 2008).     
 
Yet even more than these state and state-institution sponsored agreements, it is the 
Chinese private schools in Erlian, some of which offer tuition in Mongolian, that have 
pushed forward education exchange between the Chinese region and the Mongolian state.  
Indeed, of the 1000 students studying in the IMAR, more than 400 study in Erlian.  
Central to the city’s appeal is the fact it is the first Chinese city after leaving Mongolia 
and less than a thirty-minute train ride from the border.  As a result, Erlian has become 
the de facto centre for Mongolian-IMAR education exchanges.  Indeed, according to the 
Mongolian Consulate in Erlian, more than 70,000 Mongols pass through the city each 
year (China-WTO website).  In this sense, the city has both the appeal of a window into 
China and strong ties to Mongolia. 
 
Yet, if Erlian is a good example of how the IMAR’s ethnic Mongols facilitate greater 
overall Mongolian-Sino relations, so too does the Chinese city offer instances when the 
sense of the Chinese Other and the degree to which the IMAR’s ethnic Mongols have 
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become part of that Other call into question the fundamentals of Mongolian-IMAR 
relations.  In December 2008, Chinese media widely published a story about an ethnic 
Mongolian-run boarding high school in Erlian that accepted Mongolian students only to 
effectively abandon them when their parents paid their school fees.  Reports recorded 
how more than 40 students at the Mongolian National High School were left without 
running water and electricity and given only gruel and bread to eat while also describing, 
with Dickensian detail, boils the children developed and lice they contracted due to 
improper hygiene (T. Tseleng 2008) 
 
At the centre of all the media reports about the Erlian Mongolian National High School 
scandal was a sense of anger among commentators and the Mongolian public at the 
parents who had enrolled their children at a Chinese school.  Rather than allow that the 
parents might have hoped to give their children the advantage of education in a foreign 
language and experience in China, newspapers chastised them for having been naïve 
enough to trust the ethnic Mongols in the IMAR.  In reacting to the horrible neglect, the 
Mongolian public once again turned on the ethnic Mongols inside the PRC, seeing them 
as a component of the Other rather than as ethnic relations (T. Tseleng 2008).     
 
Mongolia-IMAR Cultural Exchange 
 
The Mongolian public has been far more open to cultural cooperation between Mongolia 
and Inner Mongolia than it has been with China at large.  Indeed, cultural cooperation 
between the two regions has become the focal point of social exchange between the 
Mongolian and Chinese governments.  According to Ts. Jargalsaikhan, the common 
cultural history between Mongolia proper and the IMAR makes facilitating cultural 
exchanges and cooperation particularly easy.   
 
In this regard, Mongolian language plays a central role in facilitating such exchange.  Ts. 
Jargalsaikhan explains Mongolian language’s importance as it effectively excludes 
Chinese influence and reinforces the cultural and historical links between the IMAR’s 
ethnic Mongols and Mongolians in Mongolia.  This allows both the Mongolians and the 
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IMAR’s ethnic Mongols to build on a common cultural, historical, and linguistic past in 
which both sides are more or less equal.  This in turn can lead to further exchange as 
identity concerns give way to cultural affinity. 
 
Of particular importance for Mongolian-IMAR cultural and language exchange is the 
Urtyn duu, or ‘long song’.  While entirely culturally specific, it is similar in substance to 
the English folk song or the Spanish Cante.  The Urtyn duu is usually sung by one person 
(either man or woman) and is largely focused around historical and mythical events while 
often accompanied by the Morin khuur.  The Urtyn duu is also largely symbolic in that it 
has been used for centuries for traditional celebrations and festivals and has an almost 
spiritual aspect to it that is specific to Mongolian shamanism and nature worship 
(UNESCO 2008).  The songs are, therefore, laden with obscure Mongolian cultural 
references and poetic language that make understanding of their content particularly 
difficult for a non-native Mongolian speaker. 
 
During an interview, Ts. Jargalsaikahn emphasised that the cooperation Mongolia has 
with the IMAR on the preservation and development of the Urtyn duu is the most 
important bilateral cultural activity between Mongolia and China.  According to Ts. 
Jargalsaikhan, the Mongolian and Chinese governments reached an agreement at a 2006 
meeting in the IMAR’s capital Houhot that twenty representatives from both countries, 
for a total of forty people, will meet every two years to conduct research on the Urtyn duu 
as well as hold periodic competitions.  The programme is sponsored in part by UNESCO, 
which as of 2005 registered the Urtyn duu as a Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible 
Heritage of Humanity, and directly financed by both the Mongolian and Chinese 
governments (UNESCO 2008). 
 
In many ways, cultural exchange focused around the Urtyn duu is emblematic of the 
paradox surrounding Mongolian-Chinese relations in the IMAR.  While constituting a 
definitive instance of cultural cooperation between the two countries, the Urtyn duu relies 
entirely on Mongolian language, culture reference, and rituals formed entirely outside the 
Chinese cultural mainstream.  In this sense, while partially funded and encouraged by the 
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Chinese government, Mongolian-IMAR cooperation in large part depends on the absence 
of Chinese cultural influence for success.  Moreover, overt Chinese support for the 
exchange might undermine the very foundation of Mongolian-IMAR cultural cooperation 
as it could reinforce Mongolian public opinion regarding the IMAR’s ethnic Mongols as 
part of the Chinese Other. 
 
While a shared common past is an important catalyst for exchange, M. Chimedtseye of 
the National University of Mongolia’s Mongolia-China Friendship Association notes that 
the Chinese and Mongolian governments have also drawn on perceived differences 
between Mongolians and the IMAR’s ethnic Mongolians to further cooperation 
(Interview 19).  While agreeing that Chinese involvement in the IMAR has created a 
division between the IMAR and Mongolian identity, M. Chimeddtseye also believes that 
the very distance between the two ethnic groups provides an important ground for future 
cooperation.  
 
By way of example, M. Chimedtseye suggests that while the IMAR’s Mongols can serve 
as middlemen into greater China, Mongolians can reciprocate by introducing the more 
western aspects of culture they inherited from the former Soviet Union.  This includes 
such performance arts as opera and ballet that would otherwise be slow coming to the 
isolated, landlocked Chinese province (Arts Council of Mongolia 2008).  Moreover, 
while developing in relative isolation from one another for the last six decades, both the 
IMAR and Mongolia have managed to maintain different aspects of ‘traditional’ 
Mongolian culture that, together, compliment each other.  In appealing to the common 
sense of ethnic kinship, while building upon the inherent differences that have before 
caused concern among the Mongolian public, both governments hope to improve overall 
cultural ties. M. Chimedtseye believes that such cooperation has the potential to defuse 
concepts of ethnic IMAR Mongolians as ‘corrupted’ by Chinese influence and instead 
redefining them as part of a common ethnic group that has developed in parallel while 
separated geographically.  In doing so, the Mongolian and Chinese governments may 
hope to defuse Mongolian public opinion that closer relations are a threat to the country’s 
identity security.  At the same time, the Chinese government may hope stressing the 
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differences between the two ethnic groups will staunch any pan-Mongolian separatist 
movement in the IMAR by reaffirming their distinct identities and the IMAR Mongol’s 
inclusion in the Chinese state (Mackerras 203:22).  
 
M. Chimedtseye suggests that if government exchange programmes can focus on 
cooperation in areas where Mongolia and the IMAR are different while allowing for the 
ethnic and cultural similarities to become self-evident, younger generations of 
Mongolians will be more open to government sponsored social exchange.  He notes that 
this type of interaction with the IMAR not as a ‘lost’ territory of Mongolia, or with the 
IMAR’s ethnic Mongolians as Chinese ‘polluted’ Mongols, could clear the way for 
younger Mongolian generations to view the IMAR’s Mongols as different in a non-
threatening way while similar enough to be foster exchange.   
 
Professor Chen Shan of the Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS), agrees with this point and stresses that the Chinese government is very 
intent on encouraging cultural and education interaction between China’s young minority 
Mongolians and Mongolian youths (Interview 8).  Chen Shan notes that the Chinese 
government hopes the closer relations, based on newly found cultural affinity arrived at 
through the conscious perception that the IMAR’s ethnic Mongolians are Chinese first 
and Mongolian second, will allow for closer governmental cooperation in other fields. 
 
6.3 Mongolian Anti-Chinese Sentiment 
 
Relevant to any discussion of Mongolia identity security is the country’s growing degree 
of anti-Chinese sentiment.  Indeed, according to M. Chimedtseye of the Mongolian-
Chinese Friendship Association, such sentiments threaten to challenge the Mongolian 
government in so much as limiting its ability to maintain non-nationalist policies with the 
PRC.  Not only are anti-Chinese movements gaining political traction through both 
established parties like the MPRP and MDP, both of which attempt at times to use such 
sentiment to shore up their own support, but have provided an organising principle for a 
number of quasi-political, quasi-military fringe groups.  While ubiquitous throughout the 
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twentieth century, current anti-Chinese sentiment draws the majority of its support from 
fear and resentment at the increased Chinese labour presence in the country, which is a 
direct result of Mongolia’s growing economic dependency on the PRC (Moxley 2009).  
Yet while anti-Chinese sentiments are widespread among the Mongolian public, there are 
distinctions between the degree and type.  The following analysis will, therefore, treat 
anti-Chinese sentiments in Mongolia as consisting of two distinct types.  First in the more 
moderate form of anti-Chinese sentiment, which stems from a historical sense of China as 
the Other.  Second is the more radical sentiment that has spawned violent movements that 
seek to maintain Mongolian ‘purity’ through intimidation and force. 
 
Moderate anti-Chinese sentiments are ubiquitous throughout the Mongolian public, 
spanning different age, education, or social demographics.  They usually consist of a 
general prejudice against China as a whole, resentment at Mongolia’s weakness in 
relation to the PRC, and concern over Mongolia’s ability to mitigate its growing 
influence (Moxley 2009).  Indeed, one constant theme in interviews with Mongolian 
scholars, officials, or specialists in government and non-government agencies was the 
tendency of educated, cosmopolitan men and women to site China as a source of 
Mongolia’s problems even when such issues were apparently entirely domestic in nature.   
 
A prominent example of this type of scapegoating occurred in larger Mongolian society 
during early 2008 in response to a nationwide case of tainted vodka poisonings. While 
eventually attributed to a domestic vodka distillery, initially rumours that the Chinese had 
been involved in the sale and production of illegal vodka were widespread among the 
media and residents in Ulaanbaatar (Ts.Davadorj 2008).  These same media articles 
demanded a wide range of state response ranging from a national boycott of Chinese 
goods to a government sponsored expulsion of Chinese migrant workers from the country 
(Ts.Davadorj 2008).  Even after the Mongolian police arrested domestic manufactures 
and charged them with gross negligence, many in the Mongolian public and media 
steadfastly stuck to the claim that the Chinese had arranged it all in an effort to 
undermine Mongolia’s lunar New Year. 
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Even within the Mongolian business community, where relations between the 
Mongolians and Chinese are more practical and based on mutually beneficial financial 
gain, the overarching conceit is that Chinese are not to be trusted, particularly in regards 
to their intentions towards Mongolia.  Indeed, according to G. Togooch, an entrepreneur 
who owns men’s clothing stores, restaurants, and bars in Ulaanbaatar entirely stocked 
with goods from China, the general sense among those in the Mongolian business 
community is that all Chinese cannot be trusted.  G. Togooch goes further to say that 
even the IMAR Mongols are untrustworthy as they have too much Chinese ‘blood’.  
While this sense of Chinese as wicked and dishonest is rooted in historical Mongolian 
concepts of the Other, it has gained strength since the end of the Cold War as an 
increasing number of the Mongolian public look to China and Inner Mongolia for 
economic opportunities unavailable in their own country only to find they are taken 
advantage by the often more sophisticated Chinese businessmen (Inner Mongolian 
University 2006). 
 
Such modern anti-Chinese sentiments permeate Mongolian society, from lack of support 
for politicians with Chinese ancestry to school yard fights in which each child accuses the 
other of being a ‘Chinese spy’ (Asian Economic News 2005).  They are stoked by fear 
that the Chinese government still believes Mongolia is part of greater China and acting 
surreptitiously to bring the country under its control (Batbayar 2001:150). This sense is 
reinforced by the worrying realization among the public that Mongolia is becoming more 
and more economically dependent on Chinese goods and labour.   
 
While widely held, these moderate anti-Chinese sentiments are, for the most part, 
innocuous.  They tend to deal primarily with conceptions of national identity at the 
collective level and would not necessarily prevent a Mongolian from having a Chinese 
friend.  For example, those with anti-Chinese sentiments would not necessarily consider 
Chinese businesses in Mongolia as a force to rally against.  In this regard, there remains a 
sense of division between general prejudice and focusing hatred on an individual within 
the moderate anti-Chinese opinion (Moxely 2009).  
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Yet a far more violent and potentially destabilising form of anti-Chinese sentiment is 
taking shape in Mongolia that may have the potential to radicalise the more ‘moderate’ 
Chinese prejudice.  Such anti-Chinese movements rely on a xenophobic appeal to 
Mongolian ethnic and cultural purity and perceived external threats from the Chinese 
Other to the purity of the Mongol nation for their legitimacy (Global Times 2009). 
 
In particular, two anti-Chinese, anti-foreign youth movements have gained prominence 
within the last several years.  Both are based in Ulaanbaatar but claim to have branches in 
every provincial centre where Chinese are present.  Starting as little more than street 
gangs of late adolescent boys with a strong armed tendency to bully Chinese businesses, 
Dayar Mongol and Xox Mongol have morphed into armed, quasi-political movements 
that hold press conferences and receive public donations in support of their work (Tsetsig 
2007).8  Moreover, aside from occasional criticism of the two nationalist movements’ 
sometime radical measures, both Dayar Mongol and Xox Mongol enjoy popular support.  
This support comes mainly from the perception that they are engaged in preserving 
Mongolian ‘purity’ and ensuring a Mongolian state for Mongolians.  As more than 95% 
of the population claimed to be very proud of their ethnic Mongolian heritage, the two 
group’s underlying appeal to nationalist sentiment provides them both with a solid base 
(Tuya 2007); (San Maral 2008b:17) 
 
Founded in 2005, Dayar Mongol and Xox Mongol have been actively persecuting 
Chinese businesses and Chinese workers in what they profess is a reaction to generally 
held public beliefs that Chinese are infesting Mongolia and taking advantage of the 
Mongolian economy and society.  Their actions range from simple intimidation, such as 
storming Chinese owned and operated restaurants and demanding the owners change 
their signs from Chinese characters into Cyrillic, to shaving the heads of Mongolian 
women caught with Chinese men (Tsolmon 2005).  More violently, they publicly talk of 
branding women caught more than once with Chinese men while beating to death and 
burning those Chinese who ‘take advantage’ of Mongolian women.  Even more radical 
                                                
Dayar Mongol (Даяар Монгол) meaning ‘Pan Mongol’ and Xox Mongol (Хөх Монгол) 
meaning ‘Blue Mongol’. 
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are the two groups’ narrowing definition of ‘guilt by association’ as reports of their 
beating Mongolian taxi drivers who have accepted Chinese passengers are increasing.  
Moreover, both representative of Dayar Mongol and Xox Mongol have claimed they are 
actively involved in training armed urban combat units and are not against using deadly 
force against both Chinese and Mongolians thought to be engaged in activities 
detrimental to Mongolian cultural and ethnic ‘purity’ (Wong 2008).  Indeed, both Dayar 
Mongol and Xox Mongol have twenty-four hour hotlines where anyone can call and 
report Chinese or Mongolian ‘violations’ to which they respond with dozens of armed 
men (Erdentsetsig 2007). 
 
Mongolian government response to these growing nationalist groups has been mixed.  
While politicians distance themselves from the violence, Mongolian media has reported 
instances of police support and/or compliance (Wong 2008).  Indeed, tacit support for 
ethnic nationalist movements might even be institutional.   Through one of the state’s 
domestic defence strategy’s aims (see chapter seven for the specific legislation) of 
ensuring the security of ‘the national language, history, culture, customs and traditions 
that constitute the basis for the existence and development of the Mongolian nation and 
its statehood’ as well as the country’s gene pool, the government has afforded ethnic 
protection national security priority that both Dayar Mongol and Xox Mongol can draw 
upon for legislative support of their violent actions (Embassy of Mongolia 2007d); 
(Ministry of Defence of Mongolia 1998:25-29).  Moreover, according to Lieutenant 
Colonel Matthew Schwab, Defence Attaché and Chief, Office of Defence Cooperation 
US Embassy, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, protection of the Mongolian gene pool in particular 
is considered a major national security priority for the Mongolian Ministry of Defence 
and given what he considers a ‘disproportionate’ amount of high-level military attention 
(Interview 18).  Even more so, M. Schwab notes that there is ubiquitous concern among 
high-level Mongolian military officers of a covert attempt by the Chinese government to 
send Chinese men into Mongolia to steal Mongolian women.  Such institutional 
xenophobia surely adds to both Dayar Mongol and Xox Mongol’s sense of nationalist 
legitimacy. 
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Some Mongolian government policy has already started to move to placate society’s 
more radical anti-Chinese elements. Indeed, nationalist activities such as those 
perpetrated by Dayar Mongol and Xox Mongol are creating domestic pressure for 
Mongolian politicians to react more harshly to what many view as unbalanced foreign 
policy that is leading to dependency.  For instance, in 2007, the Mongolian Office of 
Immigration, Naturalization and Foreign Citizens inspected dozens of Mongolian-based 
Chinese enterprises and expelled previously tolerated illegal workers in a grandly 
orchestrated attempt to show the government’s willingness to act decisively against 
Chinese influence (The Mongol Messenger 2007).  In a similar response to growing 
nationalist criticism, the Mongolian government recently rescinded a license it had sold 
to a Chinese company for the Turmeti Iron-Ore deposit in Darkhan, claiming the license 
was obtained illegally despite it having gone through all the proper, legal channels (The 
Economist 2006).  While moderate in themselves, these policies are examples of a larger 
trend of the Mongolian government to seek legitimacy by appealing to more nationalist 
elements of society that short-sightedly believe the state would be better off without 
foreign, particularly Chinese, influence. 
 
Overall, however, state foreign policy remains largely focused on maintaining good 
relations with its foreign partners, particularly China.  Moreover, as Mongolia’s 
economic dependency grows, the state’s ability or desire to implement anti-foreign 
policies to appease radical nationalist sentiments will diminish.  Indeed, dependency has 
the potential to lead to a situation in which the periphery adopts the core state’s political 
and economic policy priorities as its own (Moon 1985:298).  Previous chapters on 
Mongolia’s economic and environmental sectors offer evidence that the state has already 
adopted more ‘China friendly’ policies than before its transition. 
 
Such foreign policy is very much in opposition to Mongolian anti-Chinese sentiment, 
which views economic dependency on China and increased foreign (particularly Chinese) 
migration into Mongolia as fundamental threats to the country’s societal security 
(Batbayar 2001:1-3).  In this regard, anti-Chinese sentiments in Mongolia contribute to 
state weakness as they directly challenge the state’s foreign policy towards China, which 
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opts for cooperation rather than confrontation.  Indeed, anti-foreign, anti-Chinese 
sentiments could easily turn against the Mongolian government if groups such as Dayar 
Mongol and Xox Mongol challenge the state’s relations with China as a form of 
capitulation.     
 
Conclusion  
 
Mongolian public perceptions of China as the Other, its uncertain relationship with the 
IMAR’s ethnic Mongols, and Ulaanbaatar’s growing dependency on the PRC are the key 
variables in understanding the limitations and opportunities within Mongolian-Sino 
societal relations.  Also an important component in regard to public opinion is the 
division between those Mongolians who see closer social relations as desirable in that 
they allow for increased economic and cultural opportunity and those who harbour 
radical anti-Chinese sentiments based in economic and cultural xenophobia.  Taken 
together, these factors indicate that while social relations between Mongolia and the PRC 
are expanding, it is not clear that they are easing the significant obstacles for closer 
exchange that remain.   
 
The long historical view of China as the Other has contributed to a lack of support for 
closer cooperation and concern among the Mongolian public over Chinese migration and 
the resulting influence this gives the PRC on the state’s social identity (Figures 6.1 and 
6.4).  These concerns are reinforced by China’s tendency to approach Mongolian culture 
through an asymmetrical dialogue in which it appeared interested in projecting a version 
of Chinese culture abroad but seemingly indifferent to Mongolian culture other than that 
already included in the PRC’s identity.  While evidence suggests that such identity 
concerns are abating for part of Mongolian society, fear over Chinese penetration into the 
state has also stoked xenophobia and racism towards Han Chinese in Mongolia.  
 
Social relations between Mongolia and China are, however, much improved when the 
two states focus on the IMAR as the majority of the Mongolian public tends to view the 
region’s Mongols as sharing ethnic markers and a common descent that help 
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counterbalance the sense of China as the Other (Harrell 1995:33).  The cultural ties 
between the regions’ peoples further allows for sub-state cooperation that is largely 
absent from the more general Mongolian-Sino relations described above.  Nevertheless, 
as Mongolian identity perceptions towards the IMAR’s Mongols includes an aspect that 
they have been ‘polluted’ by Chinese cultural penetration, public opinion can quickly 
turn against them by reconstituting them as part of the Chinese Other in instances when 
they perceive the IMAR’s Mongols as acting against these cultural bonds (T. Tseleng 
2008). 
 
Domestically, the state’s foreign policy towards China is coming under pressure from 
anti-Chinese sentiments resulting from the increased number of Chinese workers and 
businessmen living in Mongolia as the result of the two countries’ economic relations.  
This sentiment may gain in prominence as groups such as Dayar Mongol and Xox 
Mongol move from their foundations as hooligan groups towards a greater political 
legitimacy in which their views become increasingly more mainstream.  Such anti-
Chinese sentiments have the potential to cause further state weakness as they directly 
challenge the state’s more China friendly social foreign relations.   
 
Yet to say the Mongolian public is closed to closer social and cultural relations with 
China is an over simplification.  With cultural and educational interactions on the rise, 
younger generations of Mongolians who are able to draw some personal benefit from 
relations with China are starting to see the PRC in a different light, as exemplified in the 
chapter’s description of Interviewee 22.  Moreover, as Mongolians are already interacting 
more freely with China’s IMAR, subsequent generations may choose to disregard what 
many now perceive as threats to societal security and build on this foundation for further 
penetration into China as a whole.  This closer development of cultural ties has the 
potetential to lead to a greater willingness on the Mongolian people’s side for societal and 
cultural exchange.  Whether this will result in an increasingly confident and autonomous 
Mongolian identity or one subjected to Chinese cultural dominance remains uncertain.  
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Chapter Seven: Mongolia’s Military and Security Relationship with 
China 
 
 
For weak states, limited physical resources such as weapons systems, highly trained 
personnel, and an effective command and control system can greatly limit their ability to 
affect a military outcome.  In order to mitigate this vulnerability, weak states often seek 
to leverage their relative strengths through either balancing or bandwagoning (Walt 
1987:31-33).  Notable is the differentiation between internal balancing, which requires a 
state to use available resources to build up its domestic ability to offset perceived threats, 
and external balancing, which suggests alliances with a variety of states and organisations.  
As weak states often lack the necessary resources to internally balance, most focus on 
external balancing (Miller 2006:14-15).  Such policy actions are very much in line with 
Mongolia’s security strategy in relation to the PRC. 
 
Mongolian economic dependency on China, coupled with its institutional weakness, 
would suggest that the country adopt a policy of bandwagoning in relation to the PRC.  
Indeed, such a military strategy is often the logical extension of economic dependency 
(Elgstrom 2000:27).  Mahler best describes this natural progression from economic to 
military dependence (as well as other sectors) through his concept of the dependency 
‘syndrome’, in which he notes that weaker states often gravitate more closely towards 
their ‘principal partners’ once economic linkage has taken place (Mahler 1980:119).  In 
this sense, considering China’s core position in East Asia, as well as its growing military 
‘might’ and ambition to further project military power regionally by 2020, Mongolia’s 
decision to simply ‘cast its lot’ militarily with that of the PRC would be logical and 
farsighted (Lampton 2008:37).  
 
However, the Mongolian military, Mongolian state, and Mongolian society continue to 
view China as the country’s biggest security threat (Scalapino 1999).  Indeed, as earlier 
chapters have shown, Mongolia’s security strategy for most of the twentieth century was 
precisely a bandwagoning with the former Soviet Union against the greater Chinese 
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‘threat’.  For this reason, the government has opted not to align its military interests with 
the Chinese state through bandwagoning, despite the already existing collinearities of 
dependency.  Instead the Mongolian state has attempted to employ an extensive policy of 
‘third neighbour’ balance of power alliances aimed at counterbalancing the PRC’s 
military prowess.  
 
Such external balancing, or ‘countering alliances’, is typically a less popular strategy for 
weak states because it involves more actors and thereby has more inherent risk (Walt 
1985:4).  Indeed, Walt notes that most weak states choose bandwagoning as they simply 
cannot afford to align with the ‘losing’ side if they wish to survive (Walt 1990:173).  For 
Mongolia, however, the attractiveness of external balancing seems to be in the safety 
such countering alliances afford.  This is particularly true as the state would likely face 
significant opposition from the Mongolian public if it were to adopt an overt policy of 
military bandwagoning with the PRC.   
 
Two characteristics of the Mongolian state contribute to its ability to engage in balance of 
power activities.  These are Mongolia’s geographic location between Russia and China 
and the state’s non-alignment stance.  While individually both are inherent weaknesses 
and would further suggest that the Mongolian state should bandwagon with China so as 
to ensure its regional security, together they provide an attractive strategic opportunity for 
potential allies to establish military relations with a democratic country in the rather 
volatile Northeast Asian and Central Asian regions.  Indeed, Mongolia’s geographic 
location, its attempts at neutrality, and its desire to participate in international 
peacekeeping activities all contribute to what Walt calls the ‘availability of allies’ (Walt 
1990:30).  This ‘availability of allies’ comes from the fact that states, particularly those 
like the United States that fear a ‘rising’ China, view Mongolia as a potential ‘foothold’ 
between two great powers that could serve a strategic military purpose should they find 
themselves in a military engagement in the region.   
 
Perhaps just as important for Mongolia’s successful balance of power is China’s 
commitment to practice non-military interference in the state’s security strategy with the 
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insistence that it must remain unaligned and not allow foreign powers to use its territory 
for bases or for surveillance activities aimed at the PRC.  While voluntarily limiting its 
overall military influence over Mongolia, this stance serves the purpose of reinforcing the 
PRC’s commitment to acting as a conservative regional military power with little or no 
direct involvement in its neighbour’s domestic affairs (Wang 2004:12).  Indeed, as the 
PRC already enjoys a growing degree of leverage over Mongolia’s economic structures, 
there is little reason for Beijing to expend the resources and effort to bring Mongolia into 
a forced position of military dependency, so long as the country remains unaligned.    
 
The following chapter will examine Mongolia’s foreign and security policy in order to 
determine whether the country’s dependency on China is causing it to develop more of a 
bandwagoning approach, whether it is moving more towards a policy of balance of power, 
or whether it is engaged in both.  The chapter will conclude with a critique of Mongolia’s 
current strategy focusing on whether it is contributing to the state’s sovereign ability to 
maintain human and territorial security or whether it is moving the country closer to 
greater dependency on China. 
 
7.1 Mongolia’s Security Strategy 
 
Mongolia’s security strategy is divided into two parts: internal national defence, focused 
on issues relating to social stability, and external aspects of defence related to military 
security.  These two aspects clearly divide the priorities of the Mongolian government 
and the Mongolian Armed Forces (MAF) between foreign and domestic security 
concerns. Yet the two are, in fact, closely related in so much as the Mongolian military 
focuses on external sources of threat when defining national defence priorities rather than 
identifying potential internal sources of unrest (Enkhsaikhan 1995).  This is primarily the 
result of Mongolia’s relative internal stability and the state’s resulting perception that the 
country’s largest military threats are exclusively external. Indeed, Mongolia’s principal 
security documents pay scant attention to the country’s internal threats when discussing 
the need to maintain social stability (Embassy of Mongolia 2007d).  Rather, the MAF’s 
security documents concentrate primarily on Russia and China as potential sources of 
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internal and external instability (Defence & Foreign Affairs 2006a).  This focus suggests 
the Mongolian government and military largely believe the country’s greatest threats 
come from its neighbours, both of which have historically viewed Mongolia proprietarily 
(Defence & Foreign Affairs 2006a).   
 
The Mongolian government first conceptualised the country’s internal national defence 
strategy in the 1991 Constitution, expanded upon it the 1994 document on National 
Security and Foreign Policy, and further refined it in the 1997-98 Mongolia Defence 
White Paper.  In summary, the internal national defence strategy’s stated purpose is that 
the Mongolian state assumes the responsibility to protect the ‘vital national interests of 
Mongolia consistent with the existence of the Mongolian people and their civilization, the 
country’s independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of state frontiers, 
relative economic independence, sustainable ecological development and national unity’ 
(Embassy of Mongolia 2007d).  It expands on the state’s primary role by giving it control 
over the MAF and stating it must actively engage both defensively and pre-emptively in 
military action when necessary to secure these national interests.  The strategy goes 
further to state that the Mongolian government recognises the need for economic security 
and, as such, takes upon itself the responsibility for developing the country’s economic 
diversity and domestic strength (Ministry of Defence of Mongolia 1998:26).  Similarly, 
the Mongolian government is responsible for expanding cultural, environmental, and 
scientific security so as to further ensure the ‘vital national interests of Mongolia’ 
(Embassy of Mongolia 2007d).  In order to ensure national security, the strategy provides 
that the government is free to act unilaterally or under the auspices of an alliance or 
multilateral organisation.        
 
While Mongolia’s internal defence is an important part of its national security, 
particularly in relation to China, the remaining chapter will focus exclusively on the 
state’s external security concerns and strategy.  This is not to downplay the importance of 
Mongolia’s internal defence, but rather to suggest the complexities and multidimensional 
approach needed to understand the state’s domestic security are more evident in non-
military related security sectors.  Indeed, as Mongolia’s internal defence is a complex 
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balance of political, economic, social, and environmental concerns, the preceding 
chapters all deal with elements of national securities in much greater detail by examining 
what are generally considered non-traditional security threats.  Moreover, as earlier 
chapters specifically focus on Mongolia’s foreign policy in relation to China, this chapter 
seeks not to summarise those findings, but rather to build upon the general inquiry into 
Mongolia’s national security in relation to China by providing a detailed examination of 
its external military strategy; an area of concern largely unaddressed in other chapters.       
 
The 1994 National Security and Foreign Policy and the 1997-98 Mongolia Defence 
White Paper both stress that Mongolia should have an army for self-defence while 
cultivating its international and regional military relations ‘to balance against China’ 
(Bayarmagnai 2005:14).  The 1998 Basis of the State Military Policy of Mongolia first 
introduced the concept of peacekeeping as a priority for the MAF. In addition to this, the 
Strategic Vision 2015 whitepaper on defence focuses on reorganising and reforming 
Mongolia’s armed forces and conscription system and strengthening Mongolian 
peacekeeping capabilities (Bayarmagnai 2005:14); (Embassy of Mongolia 2007b).  
According to O. Mashbat, Senior Researcher for the International Centre for Strategic 
Studies (ICSS), Mongolian National Security Council, these documents, while varying in 
that they reflect security priorities at the time of conception, are mutually supportive of 
one another in that they all stress the need to expand Mongolia’s role in the international 
community through cooperation, training, and a reaffirmation of its commitment to 
peaceful military development (Interview 23).  O. Mashbat notes, however, that they 
were all drafted with China specifically in mind.   
 
According to J. Mendee, Chief of the Foreign Cooperation Department, Mongolian 
Ministry of Defence (MOD), the most important element of Mongolia’s military security 
is the continued principle of participation in peacekeeping activities with likeminded 
democratic institutions and states such as the United Nations and United States as well as 
the effort Mongolia is making to build up the MAF’s professional capabilities through 
regional and international military cooperation (Interview 13).  J. Mendee noted that the 
State Great Hural (Parliament of Mongolia) first outlined the importance of the 
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Mongolian military’s cooperation with international peacekeeping activities, whether 
under a coalition or the United Nations or coalition forces, in the 1994 National Security 
and Foreign Policy and later built upon the concept with the 1998 Basis of the State 
Military Policy of Mongolia.   
 
Such a commitment to peacekeeping contributes to Mongolia’s overall external military 
security in that it reinforces the commitment to peaceful military development, thereby 
making it increasingly difficult for any country to act aggressively against the country 
without intense international condemnation.  Although the first instance of Mongolian 
troop deployment in a peacekeeping operation occurred only in 2002 when Mongolia 
committed two military observers for the United Nation-led peacekeeping force in Congo, 
further deployments have taken place in recent years and have become an attractive way 
for the Mongolian government to increase military-to-military cooperation, develop the 
international experience for Mongolia’s soldiers, and raise Mongolia’s military stature on 
an international stage (Mendee 2007:3).  Indeed, since 2002 Mongolia has committed 
more than 2,000 troops to various peacekeeping missions around the world in conflicts as 
diverse as Kosovo, the Congo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.  As, according to O. Mashbat, the 
country is essentially incapable of defending itself against invasion without the help of its 
allies, the MOD believes the best way to ensure military security is to become enmeshed 
in the international community’s peacekeeping efforts as a reliable and stalwart actor.  
 
In line with this rationale, the Strategic Vision 2015 whitepaper on defence states that 
Mongolia’s external military strategy must have as a policy goal the desire for greater 
participation regionally and with its ‘third neighbours’.  The whitepaper states the policy 
aims as both balancing China and developing the Mongolian military through 
cooperation in coalition military activities.  J. Mendee noted Mongolia’s participation 
with the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC), which deals with such 
issues as border control, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) as examples of institutions through which Mongolia is seeking to 
engage more directly with regional partners.  He cited military relations with the United 
States, Japan, India, and, to a much lesser extent, other non-regional countries, as 
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examples of what Mitchell refers to as greater ‘third neighbour’ cooperation (Mitchell 
2001:221).  
 
The purpose of such alliances, according to O. Mashbat, while seemingly awkward for a 
landlocked country several thousand miles from its main ‘third neighbour’ partners, is to 
diversify Mongolia’s interaction with as many militaries as possible in order to increase 
technology exchanges and to build international experience among Mongolia’s career 
military officers.  The alliances can additionally provide Mongolia a lifeline to the 
international security community that it hopes will lessen the country’s geographic 
isolation between China and Russia.   
 
In relation to reform, the Strategic Vision 2015 whitepaper on defence seeks to further 
the MAF’s peacekeeping image by modelling the MAF in line with the Swiss and 
Swedish armed forces in so much as it does not seek to build an army capable of 
defeating a ground invasion but rather of stressing the need for sustained, short-term 
defence.  The ultimate goal, according to O. Mashbat, is to have a Mongolian army of 
roughly 300,000-400,000 troops (100,000 permanent troops, 200,00-300,000 reservists) 
assuming that any foreign force would have to have five times that amount to launch a 
successful invasion.  While quick to point out that any invasion would likely be a part of 
a regional conflict or war and not a simple instance of China (to use his example) 
focusing the entirety of its forces on Mongolia, O. Mashbat stressed that the MAF’s 
sizable number would mostly act as a deterrent incapable of providing for the state’s 
actual long-term defence.  In the instance of actual sustained combat, Mongolia would 
have to depend on its regional and international partnerships for military and diplomatic 
support.              
 
Mongolia’s reliance on its allies for military aid, according to O. Mashbat, requires a 
commitment to supporting their own security concerns, which in turn re-enforces the 
MAF’s determination to increase the country’s peacekeeping abilities.  The MOD has 
figured the best way to do this is to reform the MAF so that units of its overall armed 
forces are consistent with international peacekeeping criteria.  The MAF hopes to 
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accomplish this by focusing on the training of one brigade (2,500 soldiers) to meet 
United Nations’ peacekeeping standards so that it might participate in more peacekeeping 
activities, thereby raising the MAF’s overall military quality.   
 
The Mongolian government also hopes to use the soldiers it is training towards UN 
peacekeeping standards to further develop the MAF’s overall ability to participate in 
regional and international peacekeeping development.  As the UN provides USD11,000 a 
month per soldier to the MAF’s general account for each of the 2,500 soldiers, the 
Mongolian government hopes to divert a significant percentage of the funds to develop 
an internationally recognised peacekeeping training facility in the Gobi desert.  To 
accomplish this, the MAF will have to work closely with the international military 
community, particularly with its ‘third neighbours’, in order to gain the necessary 
experience in conflict zones and reputation of working with coalition peacekeeping 
forces needed to convince institutions like the UN and NATO that it has the capacity to 
maintain such a training centre.  While O. Mashbat admits such reform goals are quite 
ambitious and will be difficult to achieve, they are indicative of the direction the MAF 
hopes to take in further developing its military security.   
 
Having better trained professional armed forces would allow Mongolia to use its 
conscription system to focus more on issues of border security and to build up a reserve 
that could be easily mobilised for national defence.  While conscription would remain 
mandatory for all Mongolian men and the current one-year duration left unchanged, those 
willing to volunteer for two-year duty would receive training incentives and bonuses.  
Such policy would extend the number of qualified soldiers serving at more sensitive posts, 
such as border patrols and military base security, while simultaneously creating a much-
needed group of semi-trained reservists.  This is particularly important in light of the 
Mongolian military planners’ estimation of how many troops are necessary to prevent a 
successful invasion from China and the current gap in actual troop levels.   
 
The MAF and conscription reforms, therefore, renew commitment to peacekeeping while 
reinforcing the country’s long-standing strategy of maintaining international and regional 
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partnerships to balance China.  They also contribute to the state’s expressed military 
strategy of building defensive capability through cooperation.  According to O. Mashbat, 
MOD and MAF officials designed this approach to military security particularly with 
China in mind (with Russia considered a secondary threat), despite what he called a lack 
of evidence the PRC has aggressive military intentions towards Mongolia.  While J. 
Mendee disagrees with O. Mashbat in that he stresses the MFA did not conceptualise the 
country’s overall military strategy with any one country in mind, he does admit that it is a 
defensively designed document and that China is a key consideration.  Yet J. Mendee 
also stated that it is the MOD’s expressed purpose to maintain good relations with China 
as it is a country that plays an extremely important role in Mongolia’s security conception.   
 
7.2 Mongolian-Sino Military Relations 
 
Predictably, Mongolian military defence strategies focus far more on China as a security 
factor than China’s consideration of Mongolia.  Indeed, whereas China mentions 
Mongolia in security dialogues only in relations to border defence, non-proliferation 
treaties, and the larger field of the PRC’s security concerns regarding other countries, 
Mongolia’s key defence documents were either formulated specifically for a Chinese 
threat or with China implicitly in mind.   
 
The reasoning behind this disparity of threat perception is self-evident.  Mongolia’s 
military capacity is minute compared to China’s forces and presents no serious logistical 
concern to the PRC or the PLA.  In contrast, China’s growing importance militarily in the 
Central Asian and Northeast Asian regions has Mongolia rightly concerned.  Although 
China has stressed its commitment to a peaceful Asian-Pacific Region since first 
publishing a white paper on defence and security in 1995, it has not been as benign in 
action as in principle (Gill 2005).  China’s decision to test two large scale nuclear 
weapons in the Chinese-Mongolian border region in 1994, and again in Xinjiang in 1996, 
is a clear example of this contradiction in its self professed ‘good neighbour policy’ 
(Madhok 2005).  So, too, does the PLA’s deployment of 630,000 ground troops in the 
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PRC’s Beijing and Lanzhou Military Regions (MR), both of which border Mongolia, 
give Mongolia’s MOD cause for concern (Shambaugh 2004:147-153). 
 
According to O. Mashbat of the Mongolian National Security Council, there are two 
generally held views among Mongolian military leaders and strategists in regard to the 
Mongolian-Chinese military cooperation and the Chinese ‘threat’: one optimistic, one 
pessimistic.  Both views are helpful in an attempt to understand Mongolian-Chinese 
military cooperation, or lack thereof, as they focus on different aspects of the two 
countries’ military relations while also considering different future scenarios in an 
attempt to forecast the opportunities and obstacles facing Mongolia’s military security 
vis-à-vis China.     
 
Key to the optimistic viewpoint is the assumption that as China grows it will follow its 
self-declared policy of a ‘peaceful rise’ and learn to settle its disputes within the confines 
of regional and international organisations in a peaceful manner.  The evidence 
supporting this point of view is compelling as despite the PLA’s occasional belligerent 
activities in the IMAR or Xinjiang, there is a real sense of sustained willingness on the 
part of the Chinese military to cooperate with Mongolia that seems to have, for the 
moment, helped alleviate the Mongolian MOD’s fear of imminent Chinese military 
aggression (Scalapino 1999).  Indeed, while Mongolia is not a hugely important element 
of China’s security strategy, the two states have cooperated for more than a decade in 
instances where Mongolia serves a specific purpose in China’s larger military concerns.  
Motivation behind Chinese military cooperation with Mongolia is, therefore, geo-
strategic and stems from two primary objectives: the need for border control and assuring 
the absence of regional great power military projection (particularly by the United States) 
by encouraging Mongolia to remain non-aligned (Zhang Liujie 2005).   
 
In 1999, China and Mongolia signed the ‘Sino-Mongolian Agreement on Cooperation in 
Frontier Defence’.9 While important for Mongolia in so much that the agreement 
                                                
9 In the Sino-Mongolian Agreement on Cooperation in Frontier Defense border cooperation is defined as, ‘efforts to 
keep peace and stability on the boundary between China and Mongolia; exchange information in the interest of 
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contributed to overall border security and the ability to control cross-border smuggling, 
the defence agreement was far more important for China as it addressed issues directly 
relating to its overall domestic security and stability, particularly in the sense of securing 
one of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region’s eight shared borders (Shambaugh & Yang 
1997:349; Sutter 2005).  Limiting illegal cross-border traffic is essential for China’s 
control over Xinjiang and, to a lesser extend, Inner Mongolia.  Indeed, a nightmare 
scenario for Beijing is increased cross-border support for Xinjiang’s separatist 
movements, especially from Muslim extremists from Central Asia.  Mongolia’s role in 
relation to this Chinese security concern is in its control over its western provinces, 
Khovd and Bayan Olgi, which are home to Mongolia’s sizable Muslim (Kazak) minority 
as well as sharing a border with Kazakhstan.  For this reason, the Chinese government is 
particularly anxious to monitor border activity from western Mongolia into Xinjiang and 
requires Mongolia’s cooperation (Zhang Liujie 2005).  As most analysts believe that the 
greatest threat to the CCP is internal, failure to ensure cross border traffic that could 
foment ethnic unrest could be catastrophic for the Chinese government (Shirk 2007).  
According to optimists, participation on border defence, a key element of Mongolian-
Chinese military cooperation, has, therefore, benefited military relations between the 
PRC and Mongolia as both sides are able to address issues of military security through 
partnership that further decreases regional security tensions.   
 
Of equal importance in Mongolian-Chinese military cooperation is the issue of 
Mongolia’s non-alliance, which is, according to S. Ross, Country Director for Mongolia, 
Office of the Secretary of Defence, United States, of primary concern for the PRC.  
Conveniently, Mongolia’s security strategy stresses the need for the state to remain 
unaligned in order to maintain the ability to balance China and Russia while also 
cultivating security relations with as diverse an array of international and regional 
                                                                                                                                            
maintaining normal order in the border areas and other related information; discuss measures and share experiences in 
guarding and managing the border and maintaining normal order there; prevent accidental incidents or disputes in the 
border areas; crack down on illegal activities across the border, such as smuggling of weapons, trafficking in narcotics 
and other contrabands, robbery and theft; strengthen cooperation between boundary representative bodies of the two 
countries in handling border incidents through consultation, and assist each other in the search for and timely transfer 
of the people crossing boundaries illegally, together with their transportation means, livestock and other belongings; 
and inform each other of any possible natural disasters or epidemic diseases which may cause losses to the other and 
measures to be adopted to prevent them from crossing the boundary.’ (Information Office of the State Council of the 
People's Republic of China 2000).   
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partners as possible.  Thus, Mongolia’s own desire to limit the influence of any one state 
on its military security has also had the added effect of mollifying the PRC’s concern, 
according to J. Mendee, that Mongolia could become part of a US Military strategy to 
encircle China. For Mongolian optimists, Mongolia’s non-alignment strategy has 
strengthened China’s willingness to cooperate and further reinforced Mongolia’s military 
security while effectively costing the state nothing.  Indeed, Mongolia’s commitment to 
non-alliance and foreign troop restriction is the result of the entirely domestic, 1994 State 
Great Hural adopted document entitled ‘Fundamentals of the Military Doctrine of 
Mongolia’.  This legislation clearly states that Mongolia will not only not allow foreign 
troops to be stationed in, or pass through, Mongolian territory in peace time but that the 
State will remain non-aligned (Ministry of Defence of Mongolia 1998).  Drafted with 
Mongolia’s seventy years of dependence on the former Soviet Union in mind, as well as 
the desire to state a clear position of neutrality in relation to the regional balance of power, 
the legislation extended to all nations with the intention of Mongolia retaining the ability 
to balance power while bolstering its fledgling military sovereignty.  Regardless of the 
motivation behind the strategic decision, the Chinese government, according to J. 
Mendee, was very pleased as it clearly benefited from Mongolia’s self imposed non-
alignment in so much as it saw Mongolia’s willingness to remain unaligned as key to its 
own regional security concerns.   
 
China’s focus on issues related to border security and a fear of military encirclement 
indicate that Mongolia is a key component of China’s ‘periphery countries’ (zhoubian 
guojia) security policy and, therefore, part of integrated regional policy, known as 
‘zhoubian zhengce’ (periphery policy); both of which stress the need for China to 
maintain good military relations with the numerous countries in the Asian region, 
particularly those with which it shares a border (Zhao Suisheng 2003).  Indeed, in a 
showing of Mongolia’s importance to China’s overall periphery security, the PRC 
suggested the two countries establish a bilateral annual security dialogue, alternating 
between Ulaanbaatar and Beijing, including foreign ministry and military official 
exchanges (Shambaugh 2005).   
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In short, Mongolian optimists believe the country has successfully insulated itself from 
Chinese military influence while also benefiting from good military relations with China 
that have led to exchanges and training opportunities.  Evidence to support this position 
can be seen in the country’s ability to maintain a rather independent security strategy 
emphasising neutrality while successfully building alliances and joining regional and 
international security organisations.  For optimists, present day Mongolian-Chinese 
military cooperation translates to a stronger military security that will likely grow as 
Mongolia further develops its relations with regional and international partners.    
 
Mongolian pessimists see Mongolian-Chinese military relations in a very different light.  
According to J. Mendee, some of Mongolia’s military leaders believe that China’s 
insistence on Mongolia’s remaining non-aligned should not be interpreted as simply in 
line with Mongolia’s own military security principles, but as an attempt to isolate 
Mongolia from the international community so that China can take the place of the 
former Soviet Union as Mongolia’s ‘protector’.  Moreover, pessimists view China’s 
willingness to provide military funding, around USD1 million a year for military housing, 
transportation, and social welfare issues, as a direct attempt to gain influence over the 
MAF.  This suspicion was reinforced when, according to J. Mendee, China suspended its 
annual military aid following the Dalai Lama’s visit to Ulaanbaatar in 2006. 
 
Yet, according to O. Mashbat, the real pessimist concern is not over the PRC, but what 
might happen if China were to collapse and how current policies of helping China control 
non-Han Chinese nationalism in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia might affect Mongolia’s 
relations with those potential regions in the future.  In the event the CCP or any future 
political party or parties could not maintain unity of the PRC, either the result of an 
economic, military, or social catastrophe, Mongolia could find itself sharing its border 
with any number of new ‘states’.  Such a radical change in regional dynamics would 
create new threats for the Mongolian government that could result in increased regional 
instability.  While a hypothetical scenario at this point in time, O. Masbat stressed that 
Mongolian military policy makers and strategic think tanks such as his own ICSS devote 
a great deal of energy conceptualising the eventualities should China collapse.  O. 
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Mashbat elaborated that the ICSS has even gone so far as to include the need for 
Mongolia to have the ability to defeat any of these potential neighbours should they rise 
as aggressors in recommendations for current and future troops levels.  According to S. 
Ross, such a contingency plan is an essential part of any nation’s defence when 
considering China.            
 
Furthermore, O. Mashbat stated that while the MOD is just focusing on its relations with 
the PRC at a systems-level, it should not allow its support of China’s military policy to 
override its concerns with minorities in the Chinese state such as the Kazaks, Uighurs, 
Tibetans, ethnic Koreans, or, of course, Inner Mongolians.  While current security 
policies tend to focus on China as a whole, the reality, according the O. Mashbat, is not 
that simple and should not be treated as such. While O. Mashbat agrees Mongolia must 
maintain good relations with China and assume it will continue to rise peacefully, he does 
not believe that enough evidence points to China’s ensured survival that the MOD can 
afford to ignore the more disturbing, far more threatening, ‘collapse’ theory.    
 
Despite these differing approaches to conceptualising Mongolia’s military security in 
direct relation to China, both the optimists and the pessimists agree that Mongolia must 
diversify the military actors the state currently has contact with to strengthen its military 
security.  In short, neither side believes that bilateral relations with China are enough to 
secure Mongolia and that it should actively engaged in peacekeeping and military 
cooperation with international agencies such as the UN and ‘third neighbour’ countries 
like Japan and the US.  
 
Furthermore, both optimists and pessimists believe Mongolian participation and 
observation in regional security organisations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), which encourages security cooperation and diplomatic dialogue among 
participant states in the Asia-Pacific, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), 
an organisation founded to facilitate trade and security exchanges throughout China, 
Central Asia, and Russia, are essential for Mongolia’s regional security stability.  
Participatory status with the ARF, of which China is an active part, assures Mongolia of 
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regional security support and legitimacy.  Membership in the SCO (of which Mongolian 
is currently an ‘observer’) would strengthen Mongolia’s position vis-à-vis Central Asia 
and Russia.  China’s interests in turning the ARF into a more comprehensive East Asian 
Security Community (EASC) and its dependency on the SCO to address non-traditional 
security issues such as cross border terrorism in Central Asia, greatly increase the chance 
that Mongolia’s participation in both could cement China’s already formal declaration of 
non-military aggression (Shambaugh 2005).  
 
7.3 Mongolian-Russia Military Relations 
 
Russia’s role in Mongolia’s military security is prominent in that the two countries enjoy 
close cultural relations and a history of military-to-military cooperation.  Until the late 
1980s, the former Soviet Union dominated Mongolia’s military affairs by posting more 
than 100,000 troops in Mongolia and directly training several generations of Mongolian 
officers.  Indeed, Russian remains the predominant spoken second language for older 
generation Mongolians and the Soviet socialist legacy is still entrenched in Mongolia’s 
institutions and cultural perceptions.   
 
Yet following the collapse of the former Soviet Union and subsequent withdrawal of 
economic and military support from Mongolia, the significance of Russo-Mongolian 
military relations from a Mongolian perspective shifted from a desire for collaboration to 
an attempt to replace Russia’s military support through other regional and international 
partnerships (Blagov 2005b).  In many ways, the end of the Cold War created a situation 
where Russia, with a renewed security strategy stressing a need to engage with the Asia 
Pacific to balance its relations with Western countries, found itself far more anxious to 
pursue strategic military cooperation with Mongolia than Mongolia was to have such 
relations with Russia (Watanabe & Senta 1999:48).  Furthermore, instances of cross 
border violence related to smuggling and immigration, which increased 60% in 1991 
between Mongolia and Russia’s Tuva region in Siberia, created security tension in the 
early 1990s that led to a relative cessation of military cooperation between the two 
countries for much of the decade (Hodder, Lloyd, & McLachlan 1998:150).   
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The strategic loss of Mongolia as a military ally, most especially as Mongolia sought 
closer cooperation with its ‘third neighbours’ Japan and the United States, was of 
considerable strategic concern for Moscow.  This is particularly true as following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Federation of Russia sought to recast itself as a 
Eurasian power with an equal presence in the Asia Pacific as in Europe.  This new policy, 
referred to as the ‘two headed eagle’ in that it stressed Russia’s need to focus at the same 
time and in similar efforts on Europe and Asia, began in 1992 with Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin’s Asia tour of India, China, and South Korea (Watanabe & Senta 1999:48).  
These new policies were formulated in a 1993 strategy report that summarised Russia’s 
interests in the Asia Pacific as the desire to establish a ‘good neighbour security zone’ in 
order to secure Russia’s economy in Siberia and the far East, the need to engage in 
security affairs in the region to increase its status as a Eurasian country, and the need to 
maintain and expand its influence in the region (Watanabe & Senta 1999:48-49).     
 
While Russia does not necessarily want to reinstate its direct military support for 
Mongolia any more than Mongolia wants its military security to come in the form of a 
Russian held security umbrella, Mongolia remains a geo-strategically important country 
for Russia as it serves as a gateway for Moscow into East Asia, particularly for Russia’s 
Siberian-based relations with China (Blagov 2006).  Indeed, in Russian projected security 
scenarios in which it engages with China in war, Mongolia is expected to try to remain 
neutral, but will be of utmost importance for either country for the traditional geo-
strategic rational that it serves as a buffer between the two great nations (Cimbala 
2001:44); (Buzan & Wæver 2003:432).   
 
Mongolia keenly realises its importance in Russian-Chinese strategic relations and has 
attempted to act to increase its advantages as such.  This includes, in part, a distancing 
from Russia, which Mongolia pursued throughout much of the 1990s, while cultivating 
other bilateral or multilateral military relationships to provide for its security (Sutter 
2000:146).  Yet, in recent years, in part due to Russia’s 2003 decision to cancel the 
majority of the debt Mongolia incurred while under its Soviet patronage, Russo-
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Mongolian military cooperation has improved.  This indicates that after a decade of 
hesitant military interaction the Mongolian government has managed to re-conceptualise 
Russia as a strategic partner, rather than a former suzerain. 
 
The renewed Mongolian-Russian military partnership started in 2000 with the signing of 
a military cooperation plan between the two nations (BBC 2000).  In 2001, Russian and 
Mongolian Defence Ministers Sergei Ivanov and Jugderdemidyn Gurragchaa agreed to 
joint exercises involving the two country’s border guards as well as a Russian 
commitment to help the Mongolian military modernise Soviet-era military equipment 
(RIA Novosti 2001).  The two countries’ military involvement was given a boost by the 
11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and the United States’ subsequent ‘War 
on Terror’.  Indeed, in 2004, the Russian military announced it would provide an 
undisclosed amount of ‘free’ military assistance in the form of weapons and training to 
the Mongolian military for use against regional terrorism (BBC 2004).  The Russian 
military further stated that it hoped to help Mongolia establish regional ‘subunits’ for the 
fight against terrorism. 
 
Despite the newfound security cooperation between the two states, Mongolia remains 
committed to maintaining a military distance from Russia.  Most Mongolian-Russian 
military interaction takes place under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperative 
Organisation and is, therefore, balanced by Central Asian cooperation and China.  Border 
incidents in which raiding Russians attack local Mongolian villages, often killing herders 
for their livestock, are still common and still serve as touch points for diplomatic tension 
as Mongolian politicians feel pressured to respond vigorously to any Russian originating 
encroachment (Blagov 2005a).  To be certain, Mongolia remains wary of Russian help as 
it has an all too familiar shape and memory.  Whereas, culturally, many older Mongolians 
maintain sentimentality towards the way things were under Soviet control, Mongolia’s 
military security strategy has been specifically designed in the post Cold War era with a 
particular stress laid upon distancing the state from Russian security dependency.  
Moreover, Russia serves as one part of a binary regional system upon which the entire 
Mongolian security strategy is based.  Just as in the case of China, Mongolian leaders 
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believe that military dependency on Russia would lead to an imbalance that could 
threaten the current equilibrium under which Mongolia has managed to find an 
independence strengthened by regional and international partnerships.   
 
Russia’s role in relation to Mongolia’s military security vis-à-vis China is that it acts as a 
direct balancer.  Indeed, the Mongolian government’s maintenance of a constant 
perceived threat of having Russia as a potential ally while maintaining enough of a 
distance to give the impression of not having become aligned with Moscow is essential to 
balancing China.  Through this strategic give-and-take policy, Mongolia’s military 
relationship with Russia is a strength in that China will remain committed to competition 
over Mongolia’s loyalties rather than attempt to coerce the state to adopt a Chinese-
slanted military alignment.  As the Mongolian government learned well under Soviet 
suzerainty, too close a relationship with either one of its neighbours means having to 
maintain an antagonistic stance towards the other.  
 
According to Masbat, Russia is the only state upon which Mongolia could rely for 
support in a ground war against China in addition to serving as an important balancer.  
While Mongolia relies on its ‘third neighbours’ for strategic technologies development, 
training, international recognition, and diplomatic clout, it is under no illusion that these 
same partnerships would translate into direct military assistance should China act 
aggressively and invade Mongolia.  The same is not, however, true for Mongolia’s 
relations with Russia.  According to O. Mashbat, the Strategic Vision 2015 white paper 
clearly states that Russia could contribute troop support to Mongolia’s Armed Forces in 
the case of invasion.  This indicates that channels for military cooperation between the 
two countries still exist and could be effectively utilised should Mongolia find itself in 
direct need, despite Mongolia’s move away from Russian military protectorship. 
 
7.4 Mongolian-US Military Relations 
 
The Mongolian-American military partnership, while seemingly awkward and difficult to 
maintain in light of regional opposition, has proved strategically important and mutually 
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beneficial for both states.  As an important component of Mongolia’s security policy 
regarding potential regional threats is to cultivate a ‘third neighbour’ relationship with 
non-regional powers, the alliance with the United States, the dominant military force in 
the Asia-Pacific, is considered a great success in this regard.  For the United States, 
Mongolia’s geographic position between China and Russia, its commitment to remaining 
unaligned, as well as the Pentagon’s perception since President Clinton’s tenure that the 
United States should have security interests in every possible East Asian state to contain 
growing Chinese military capacity, all make Mongolia particularly attractive as a regional 
strategic partner (Bandow 2006:105).  Despite increasing displeasure from China at 
Mongolian-American military cooperation, particularly in response to the belief that 
America is establishing listening stations on Mongolian soil that it uses to spy on nuclear 
instillations in Xinjiang, the two countries’ military ties have increased in recent years 
and are likely to become even closer in the future (Tow 2006:17).   
 
While the United States did not consider Mongolia a feasible partner in its East Asian 
security strategy until the mid-1990s, American diplomats and military leaders 
recognised the importance of the country’s geographic location during the Cold War.  
United States’ officials made several attempts to establish diplomatic ties with Mongolia 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s, but were unable to do so partially because of the 
Mongolian People’s Republic’s close ties with the Soviet Union as well as the United 
States’ own fear that increased diplomatic interaction with Mongolia would upset the far 
more important relations it maintained with the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan.  As 
the ROC believed Mongolia was part of greater China, and therefore refused to 
acknowledge the country’s independence, the United States opted towards a self-
appointed moratorium on all political action directed towards Mongolia.  This policy of 
non-interference continued after the United States’ recognition of the PRC as China’s 
official government (Garthoff 1994:670).   
 
American policy towards Mongolia changed in the late 1980s as the Soviet Union 
withdrew its troops and economic support from the country.  Initially, diplomatic contact 
came in the form of economic advisors and transition ‘experts’ who sought to facilitate a 
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total transformation of the Mongolian state from socialism to a liberal democracy. In this 
sense, Mongolia became of strategic importance because it offered a friendly, pro-
western democracy between authoritarian Russia and socialist China.  Under the Clinton 
administration, however, the Pentagon re-examined its interests in Mongolia and 
concluded that the United States could benefit from closer military ties with the 
Mongolian government in addition to a close economic relationship (Bandow 1999:4).  
 
The 1998 United States Security Strategy for the East Asia–Pacific Region states clearly 
that America is committed to remain the predominant military force in East Asia 
indefinitely and, as such, will pursue diplomatic relations with all Asian countries, 
regardless of their initial relevance to its national security.  One section of the report, 
entitled ‘Enhancing Nascent Relations with Mongolia’, spells out in detail that although 
Mongolia had never before been figured into American security policy, the United States 
would henceforth engage with bilateral training exercises and education through the 
International Military Education and Training programme (IMET).  The report 
specifically shifted the United States’ support for Mongolia away from solely economic 
to include military cooperation (Bandow 1999:8).  To meet with the shift in strategy, the 
U.S. Department of Defence (DOD) initiated a wide range of distance learning actives 
with the Mongolian military, as well as conducting numerous training seminars in 
Mongolia (Bayarmagnai 2005:6).  Moreover, the Special Operations Command, Pacific, 
a subordinate unified command of U.S. Pacific Command, has conducted annual 
Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET) codenamed BALANCE MAGIC in Mongolia 
since the late 1990s.  These training exercises focus on different elements of military 
capacity building each year (Denecke 1999).      
 
Mongolia gained further stature in American security strategy following 11 September 
2001.  The attacks and subsequent ‘war on terror’ provided the MAF with an opportunity 
for closer military cooperation as the US military invaded Afghanistan and Iraq while 
calling on all willing allies to contribute forces for both.  Immediately condemning the 
attacks in New York and Washington DC as acts of terror, the Mongolian military sent 
troops to join the US-led coalition in Iraq while similarly contributing troops to the 
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American-led NATO forces in Afghanistan.  According M. Schwab, the MAF were, and 
remain, particularly valuable allies in Afghanistan as they are the only coalition partner 
with experience using many of the nascent Afghan Army’s more antiquated Soviet 
supplies weapons and equipments.  Moreover, the Mongolian military’s involvement in 
‘Iraqi Freedom’ also contributed to the US-led ‘coalition of the willing’, which sought to 
create greater international legitimacy for the US military invasion.  For Mongolia, 
operation ‘Iraq Freedom’ marked the country’s first ever participation in a non UN-led 
coalition military activity and it has proven its commitment to continued support through 
the National Security Council of Mongolia’s decision to extend its troops presence in 
Iraqi to an ninth rotation in 2008 (Mongolia-Web 2008).   
 
The United States military responded to Mongolia’s voluntary partnership by instituting 
the American funded ‘Khaan Quest’ military exercises in 2003.  Held annually since 
inception, ‘Khaan Quest’ joint military exercises staged in Mongolia includes, as of 2008, 
participants and observers from 32 countries as diverse as India, Brussels, Thailand, and 
Japan.  Notably, Mongolia extended observer status invitation to Russia and China for the 
2006 ‘Khaan Quest’, which both states accepted as of 2007 (Defence & Foreign Affairs 
2006b).  According to M. Schwab, Mongolia, with the United State’s support, hopes to 
increase Chinese and Russia participation in the military exercises for transparency’s 
sake and to prove a commitment to regional stability.    
 
The United States has also invited the Mongolian military to observe the US-Thai annual 
‘Cobra Gold’ military exercise in Southeast Asia while supporting the MAF’s bid to 
participate in the International Institute of Strategic Studies-organized (IISS) ‘Shangri-la’ 
dialogue in Singapore.  The US government has further supported Mongolia’s 
peacekeeping development strategy by proving military equipment through the US 
financed ‘Global Peace Operations Initiative’ (GPOI) (Blair 2001); (Gertz 2005).  
Moreover, in acknowledgement for Mongolia’s continued support for the US ‘war on 
terror’, US President George Bush, accompanied by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
and Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill, paid the first 
ever presidential visit to Ulaanbaatar in 2005, meeting with Mongolian President 
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Nambaryn Enkhbayar to express his appreciation for Mongolia’s continued military 
support (Office of the Press Secretary 2005). 
 
For Mongolia, the chance to develop closer ties with the United States is an opportunity 
to develop its own military capacity through cooperation and technology exchange, to 
add to its portfolio of allies the world’s only military ‘hyper power’, and to cultivate a 
military partnership that has real effect in diplomatically balancing both Russia and 
China’s military forces.  While, according to J. Mendee, Mongolia does not want to 
become any more dependent on the United States than it does on any other country, the 
access Mongolian-American military cooperation gives Mongolia to the international 
community and to world class training opportunities is invaluable.   
 
As a result, the strategic advantage the United States provides Mongolia’s military 
security in relation to China is the support it gives to the Strategic Vision 2015’s stated 
goal of developing the country’s peacekeeping forces.  According to J. Mendee, a large 
factor in considering whether Mongolia would contribute troops for participation in 
operation ‘Iraq Freedom’ was whether or not the war was a chance to provide the MAF 
with the necessary experience it needed in an international, coalition-led military 
operation to raise the level of its peacekeeping troops to UN international standards.  The 
same, according to O. Mashbat, is true in relation to the MAF’s participation with United 
States-led forces in Afghanistan.  Moreover, according to Suzanne Ross, Country 
Director for Hong Kong and Mongolia, Office of the Secretary of Defense, the United 
States has contributed to enhancing Mongolia’s peacekeeping abilities by not only 
allowing it to participate in the US-led ‘Global Peace Operation Initiative’ (GPOI) in 
Thailand, but even going so far as to suggest Mongolia act as a temporary host to the 
activities when Thailand’s 2007 coup made it impossible to stage the operation in their 
traditional location (Interview 26).  Mongolia hosted the event and has since, with US 
support, attempted to turn the international prestige the GPOI brought to Mongolia’s 
peacekeeping development into a regional peacekeeping training centre.   
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In this regard, the Mongolian-US military partnership serves Mongolia well and will 
likely continue to do so into the near future.  China’s rise, its increased influence in the 
Asian region, and regional organisations like the SCO that purposefully exclude the 
United States, will all add to Mongolia’s strategic value in the eyes of United States 
military leaders.  Mongolia, in turn, can use these advantages to increase its own military 
capacity.  Indeed, as it becomes ever more difficult for the United States to maintain its 
‘perpetual military dominance’ in Asia, its stalwart Asia regional allies will benefit 
exponentially.  As one likely cause of this increased difficulty will be China’s rise, both 
militarily and economically, the Mongolian government should be able to capitalise on its 
inherent and strategic value to US military goals for many years to come.       
 
7.5 Mongolian-Japanese Military Relations 
 
Mongolia’s military relations with Japan, although not as direct as those with the United 
States in terms of military-to-military training cooperation, remain an important element 
of its overall regional strategy to diversify the number of great power partners it has in 
East Asia to balance one off the other.  Indeed, as Mongolia’s security strategy stresses 
the need for regional ‘third neighbour’ integration, Japan is the ideal candidate in East 
Asia.  Moreover, as Mongolia and Japan are both ‘China wary’ states, and both ideally 
situated to add an element of strength to their otherwise isolated positions, cooperation 
between the two nations is natural and mutually beneficial (Sisodia & Naidu 2005:466); 
(Kumaraswamy & Subrahmanyam 2004:132).  While Mongolia and Japan have not held 
bilateral military exchanges, their mutual attendance at regional forums on security such 
as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as well as their respective attendance to country 
hosted defence activities (Mongolia to Japan’s annual ‘Tokyo Defence Forum Summary’, 
Japan to Mongolia’s ‘Khaan Quest’ exercises) have added to a healthy alliance. 
 
For Japan, a nation still hesitant to project military power, Mongolia does not figure in its 
security strategy in the same way it does for the United States military.   While the 
Japanese self-defence forces realise the geo-strategic advantages Mongolia’s position has 
in relations to Russia, North Korea, and China, it does not have the same need, or desire, 
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to project its military presence onto the East Asian continent.  This is due to Japan’s US-
centric defence policy in which Japan voluntarily remains under a United States provided 
security umbrella rather than remilitarise as well as its imperial past which limits the 
nation’s ability to project military power without re-stoking regional animosities (Kliman 
2006:32).  Indeed, regionally, Japan prefers to strengthen security alliances such as the 
ARF rather than act unilaterally, or even bilaterally.  While some increased military 
cooperation between Japan and South Korea might be expected through the US-led 
‘minilateral’ alliances like the US-Japan-Republic of Korea (ROC) Trilateral 
Coordination and Oversight Group, increased bellicosity from North Korea and an 
increased commitment to defending Taiwan in the event of PLA aggression make a 
unilateral break from the current US-Japanese military status quo highly unlikely in the 
short to medium term (Krauss & Pempel 2003:50).   
 
For these reasons, Japanese military relations with Mongolia are limited to diplomatic 
and political cooperation with a high degree of importance placed on symbolism.  Indeed, 
as Japan and Mongolia currently enjoy good state as well as social interactions, 
symbolism, in which each country respectively moves to show respect and friendly 
support for the other’s security and popular concerns, plays a very important role in the 
two countries’ relations. 
 
A very good example of the importance of symbolism is the issue of Japanese soldier’s 
remains in Mongolia.  Starting in 1994, the Japanese government launched a programme 
to repatriate the remains of Japanese soldiers killed in the 1939 Battle of the River Halka 
(known in Japan as the Nomonhan Incident) as well as the bones of prisoners of war sent 
to Mongolia from Siberia—an estimated twenty thousand—interred in Mongolian soil 
(Japanese Economic Newswire 1994).  While unable to convince the Chinese 
government to return Japanese soldier’s remains, Mongolia was largely cooperative in 
Japanese endeavours to find and recover lost soldiers.  In 2004, a Japanese military team, 
assisted by Mongolian Foreign Minister Erdenechuluun, succeeded in finding and 
extricating more than ten thousand soldiers (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2004).  
Japanese officials, as well as the Japanese public, greatly respect and appreciated the 
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continued gesture and Japanese-Mongolian military affairs improved to the point of 
conducting a mutual event to commemorate the two countries’ fallen soldiers (The Daily 
Yomiuri (Tokyo) 2003).   
 
Moreover, Mongolia’s continued support for the Japanese bid for a seat of the United 
Nations’ Security Council is viewed both by Mongolia and Japan as largely symbolic, 
political support.  Mongolia, ever appreciative of Japan’s role as the largest of its 
development aid donor countries, has followed this line of support since 1992, when 
President Dashiyn Byambasuren assured Japan’s Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa at the 
Second Annual Mongolian Assistance Meeting Group in Tokyo that Japan could count of 
Mongolia’s support for a permanent seat (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1992).  
Support for a permanent seat continued in 2005 while in 2007 Mongolia renounced its 
right to apply for a non-permanent seat on the Security Council, opening the way for 
Japan to bid for the position (Mongolia Web 2007).  As Mongolia’s continued support 
offers Japan a friendly voice in an otherwise hostile East Asian region, symbolically its 
friendship means a great deal to Japan’s attempt to move forward rather than focus on its 
imperial past.   
 
More important diplomatically in regards to Mongolian-Japanese military relations is the 
role Mongolia has been able to play in indirect talks between Japan and North Korea.  
While Japan does not have official diplomatic ties with North Korea, Mongolia has a 
rather congenial relationship with the ‘hermit kingdom’ and has been able to act as a 
successful intermediary between the two countries (Mitchell 2001:221).  Indeed, on 5 
September 2007, Japan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) met in 
Ulaanbaatar as a breakaway working group to the six party talks in order to work towards 
normalisation of diplomatic relations.  While Mongolian government officials did not 
attend the meeting, the country’s relations with both countries assured a moderate, neutral 
setting for the discussions. 
 
In this sense, Japan has offered an international platform upon which Mongolia could 
potentially serve as an important actor in one of the international community’s most 
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contentious diplomatic endeavours.  While, according to O. Mashbat, the Mongolian 
government does not want to directly participate in the six party talks as it tends to view 
the negotiations as three against three (the US, Japan, South Korea versus China, the 
DPRK, and Russia) and does not want to damage its relations with any country over an 
issue that does not necessary directly concern it, it still believes it could build on the role 
it played between Japan and North Korea in so much that it is a neutral Northeast Asian 
country that is willing and able to act as mediator.  Moreover, as the MAF believes that a 
successful outcome of the six party talks could be the establishment of a continuing 
Northeast Asian Security Dialogue of which Mongolia would absolutely want to be a part, 
a certain degree of active participation in the current process makes sense.  Regardless of 
the outcome, Mongolia believes helping to neutrally negotiate an end to North Korean 
isolationism and the resulting regional instability would significantly help it achieve its 
expressed desire to establish itself in the international community as a proponent of peace.    
 
Mongolian-Japanese security relations are, therefore, not based upon tangible military 
aspects such as technology transfer, weapons provisions, or joint training exercises (as in 
the case of Mongolian-US relations), but rather on a more symbolic, image-based need 
that both countries have and which they can fulfil for each other.  For Japan, Mongolia is 
a friendly country in East Asia where the people harbour no ill feelings towards the 
country’s imperial past, but are more interested in the two countries’ common culture and 
future cooperation.  Indeed, according to a survey of Mongolian perceptions towards 
Japan conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan in 2004, more than 70% of 
Mongolians reported having an ‘affinity’ towards Japan while 37% ranked it as the 
‘country with which Mongolia should be the friendliest’—the highest single ranking of 
any country listed (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2005).  When questioned about 
the 1939 Battle of the River Halka (Nomonhan Incident), more than 70% said it was 
either in the past or that they had no feelings about it while more that 65% reported they 
expected Japanese-Mongolian ties to improve in the future.  For Japan, Mongolia is a 
truly valuable ally in that it is willing to look forward rather than dwell on the past 
whereas other East Asian countries, notably the Koreas and China, are often unwilling to 
forget the past for the sake of the future.  
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For Mongolia, ties with Japan represent a successful manoeuvring towards regional 
integration as well as a chance to increase the nation’s voice and perception on a regional 
and international stage.  That Mongolia is able to assist Japan in the United Nations and 
through regional initiatives such as the Six Party Talks increases the country’s experience 
within some of the international community’s most important institutions while similarly 
allowing the Mongolian military and government the chance to develop strategic 
diplomacy.   
 
In relation to China, Japan is a powerful regional ally that is all too familiar with the 
potential destabilising effect China’s rise might have on the region and, as such, can 
provide Mongolia with a regional security partner.  While it is perhaps naïve to suggest 
Japan would sacrifice its much more important relationship with China for the sake of 
Mongolia, the closeness of the modern Japanese-Mongolian relationship suggests that 
Japan would be a high profile diplomatic opponent to any country acting aggressively 
against Mongolia.     
 
7.6 Regional and International Security Cooperation 
 
While Mongolia has managed successfully to cultivate bilateral military relations with 
China, Russia, the United States, and Japan, the Strategic Vision 2015 gives equal 
importance to the participation of the Mongolian Armed Forces in international and 
regional collective security organisations.  Regionally, cooperation with multilateral 
security organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO) acts to balance, or engage so as to limit, any potential 
regional military hegemonies, China in particular (Ball 2000:130).  Internationally, the 
motivation behind participation in multilateral military operations, such as those under 
the auspices of United Nation-led peacekeeping missions, is similar to that behind 
Mongolia’s ‘third neighbour’ policy.  Specifically, the Mongolian government hopes to 
capitalise on cooperation to provide the MAF with opportunities to develop peacekeeping 
experience in international military affairs while simultaneously lending the nation 
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credibility as a participant in the international security community and a proponent of 
stability and peace (Sisodia & Naidu 2005:489).  In this sense, the Mongolian 
government understands that, for a weak state anxious to preserve its sovereignty and 
position in the international and regional communities, participation in multilateral 
security organisations is an essential element of survival. 
 
The rationale behind collective security for Mongolia developed at the end of the Cold 
War when subsequent changes in the Asian-Pacific and Central Asian greatly altered its 
regional and international security environments.  The disappearance of the previously 
prevailing bilateral security agreements, which had successfully maintained a regional 
balance of power for decades, in many ways fostered a far more volatile arena in which 
newly independent countries found the need to develop their own security strategies and 
partnerships.  Despite historical division among the region’s distinct cultures, newly 
independent states, as well as those already independent, had to redefine their security 
strategies and did so by focusing on cooperation rather than competition.  The result for 
Mongolia was the rush to join the regional and international multilateral organisations 
through which it could ensure its own security while simultaneously maintaining a 
standard of military transparency and preventative diplomacy (Hoshino 2000:276).   
 
Mongolia first sought access to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as it was, according 
to O. Mashbat, a mature organisation that stressed transparency and shared intelligence 
from which it believed all members benefited equally.  An offshoot of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ARF was established in 1994 and now includes 
27 countries (ASEAN Regional Forum 2008).  Focused on fostering interregional 
dialogue and diplomacy between member states in order to reduce the threat of the use of 
force as a means by which member states solved disputes, it was, and remains, the ideal 
regional medium through which Mongolia could interact with the larger Asian-Pacific 
community (Emmers 2003:32).   
 
For Mongolia, the ARF is a useful forum in that it includes the region’s three principal 
military forces—China, Japan, and the United States—as well as many of Asia’s smaller 
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and weaker states such as Laos and Papua New Guinea.  As all members of the ARF have 
agreed to act by the organisation’s principle rules, which include transparency in relation 
to defence policy and a commitment to mediation rather than a resort to force when 
solving regional conflicts, the larger powers have effectively agreed to limit their military 
power projection for the sake of peace.  For Mongolia, a weak state interested in 
balancing China, the ARF allows it to pursue bilateral and multilateral military relations 
under the mandate of an organisation to which China subscribes and which is supported 
by two of Mongolia’s closest great power allies, the United States and Japan.  In this 
sense, any aggression made towards Mongolia by China, or any other ARF member state, 
would elicit a multilateral diplomatic response much adding to Mongolia’s defensive 
capabilities.   
 
In this regard, the presence of both Russia and China in the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO)10 is particularly valuable to Mongolia.  Established in 2001, the SCO 
is a self-described intergovernmental international organisation with a mandate to 
increase security cooperation (as well as trade) throughout the Central Asia region while 
simultaneously reducing the number of military forces in the states’ respective border 
areas (The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 2007).  Cast in many ways as an ‘anti-
NATO’ coalition seeking to diminish American military influence in the region, in 
particular since 11 September 2001, the SCO is gaining momentum as a collective 
military organisation despite both Russia’s and China’s claim that it is not the SCO’s 
intention to become a regional security block (BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit 2007).  
Yet, as the SCO is committed to dealing with terrorism, separatism, and extremism, that 
outside countries consider the SCO as primarily security focused is not surprising.  Nor 
have the recent annual Sino-Russian ‘Peace Mission’ military exercises, involving an 
average of ten thousand troops, done much to assuage Western concerns (Nickeson 2007).    
 
Mongolia currently has Permanent Observer Status with the SCO and has, along with 
Iran and Pakistan, expressed interest in membership.  Yet, according to O. Mashbat, the 
                                                
10 The current members in the SCO are as follows: the Republic of Kazakhstan, the People of Republic of China, the 
Kyrgyz Republic, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan (The Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation 2007). 
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MAF are currently reviewing their application in light of worries that the SCO is 
developing into an ‘anti-western’ organisation as well as concerns over the lack of 
transparency and the seemingly two-tiered approach to information sharing through 
which China and Russia often withhold intelligence while expecting full transparency on 
the part of the smaller, weaker states.   Yet, according to M. Schwab, the US MOD 
believes Mongolia’s participation in the SCO remains beneficial as it does not affect its 
relations with the United States and other ‘third neighbours’ and would benefit from 
permanent membership as it could achieve greater regional integration that would help 
balance China.  Indeed, membership in the SCO offers the Mongolian government and 
MAF a historic chance to enter into a cooperative organisation in which its two greatest 
perceived security threats have voluntarily agreed to respect its sovereignty and its 
borders.  This natural balance of power between Russia and China, in which both 
countries would keep a check on the other, could benefit no other country in the region, 
indeed the world, more than Mongolia (Paul, Wirtz, & Fortmann 2004:279).         
 
While the ARF and SCO are cooperative security organisations that have contributed to 
Mongolia’s regional integration and stability, the United Nations has played a similar role 
in Mongolia’s constant struggle to project its claim to sovereignty and independence onto 
an international stage.  So, too, does NATO offer Mongolia the chance to participate in 
some of the world’s most robust peacekeeping activities and trainings while reaffirming 
Mongolia’s bilateral and multilateral Western alliances.   
 
Strategically, the Mongolian government believes that the United Nations is the single 
greatest contributor to the nation’s independence and that participation in the United 
Nations through peacekeeping activities has lent Mongolia international legitimacy it 
could have found nowhere else (Embassy of Mongolia 2007c).  The importance of the 
United Nations for Mongolia as a weak state is great as, theoretically, in the UN General 
Assembly each nation has an equal voice.  As discussed earlier in the chapter when 
examining Mongolian-Japanese relations, Mongolia has strategically used its UN vote to 
increase its importance regionally and internationally. 
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More important in considering the role Mongolia has with the United Nations in terms of 
military involvement is the role Mongolia has played in UN-led peacekeeping missions.  
This role differs greatly from that Mongolia has with the ARF or SCO in that it has, on 
numerous occasions, contributed troops to actual combat whereas the ARF in particular 
does not endorse the same ‘force for good’ pre-emptive military doctrine the UN does 
through its various peacekeeping missions (Emmers 2004:146).  This contribution of 
troops has raised Mongolia’s commitment in terms of actual costs while simultaneously 
increasing the benefits.  Indeed, Mongolia’s close relationship with UN peacekeeping, for 
which Mongolia is considered a Troop Contributing Country (TCC) responsible for 
training and preparing its own troops for peacekeeping missions, has led to greater 
bilateral and multilateral ‘third neighbour’ military exchanges with countries like the US 
and Japan that are able to engage with Mongolia in part under UN auspices (DeRham-
Azimi 2001:256);(Sisodia & Naidu 2005:498).          
 
Mongolia’s relations with NATO, while far from established, would serve its military 
security in similar ways to its relations with the United Nations albeit in a less 
multinational sense.  Indeed, according to J. Mendee, Mongolia is extremely keen to 
pursue closer relations with NATO, despite Chinese and, even more so, Russian 
expressed opposition, because it is intent on further developing its military in line with 
other free market democratic nations.  Mongolia has contributed troops to Kosovo, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq and is actively working to cooperate with NATO’s Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) programme to increase its peacekeeping abilities and further strengthen ‘third 
neighbour’ relations (North Atlantic Treaty Organization 2008). 
 
That NATO has not extended an offer for greater cooperation to Mongolia is difficult to 
understand as, according to O. Mashbat, the MAF would prefer to belong to NATO than 
establish closer ties with the SCO.  O. Mashbat stresses that the MAF believes NATO is 
less political, more structured, more enduring, and not as ambiguous in its agenda as the 
SCO.  Indeed, he points out that the basis for greater cooperation already exists between 
NATO and Mongolia in that the MAF is active in Afghanistan and Mongolian military 
officers and officials are actively invited to train at NATO’s Marshall European Centre 
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for Security Studies.  Yet, according to Suzanne Ross, Mongolia’s participation in 
Afghanistan is under the auspices of coalition cooperation, not NATO.  Indeed, NATO 
remains lukewarm to Mongolia’s desire for greater participation. 
 
Both O. Mashbat and J. Mendee agree Mongolia’s failure to convince NATO to extend 
an invitation for greater cooperation is the result of several factors.  Most importantly, the 
two men believe NATO already has a number of Asian partners and might simply view 
Mongolia as irrelevant to the organisation’s security needs. O. Mashbat and J. Mendee 
also believe NATO officials might be worried about further upsetting Russia and China 
by extending membership to Mongolia as it occupies a rather vulnerable and unique 
position in both states’ military security and strategy.  Finally, and more technically, is 
the issue of cost-sharing which Mongolia would not be able to fulfil.  Regardless of the 
precise reasoning behind NATO’s failure to accept the MAR’s overtures towards 
cooperation, the likelihood of Mongolian membership in the organisation in the near 
future is unlikely.       
 
The strategy of working through multilateral cooperative organisations like the ARF, 
SCO, UN, and NATO is particularly attractive to the Mongolian state and MAF because 
of the government’s own stated military security development goals and its desire to 
strengthen its regional and international military security.  While the importance of 
balancing China and Russia is, in part, enacted through Mongolia’s bilateral military 
relations with each respective country, regional security organisations such as the ARF 
and SCO are also important balancing tools in that they provide an intra-mural set of 
allies committed to maintaining the security status quo and an agreement by the two great 
powers to limit their own military actions in relation to member states.   
 
On an international level, cooperation within the framework of the United Nations has 
enhanced Mongolia’s own defence capabilities while creating an environment through 
which it might pursue other military working relationships with UN member states.  This 
has increased Mongolia’s position in the international community and allows the country 
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to overcome its relative geographic isolation and increase the projection of its domestic 
security strategy onto the world stage.   
 
Relations with NATO would also serve a similar military security need in so much as 
Mongolia would develop its own armed forces in line with more advanced democratic 
nations while allowing for a more diverse array of international partners.  Through 
indicatives like the PfP, Mongolia could also further its commitment to peacekeeping. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In large part, Mongolia’s military strategy is focused on maintaining sovereign control of 
the country’s physical and territorial security in the face of its geographic vulnerability 
between Russia and China.  Yet, while the Mongolian Armed Forces must consider each 
country in relation to the state’s security, Mongolia’s growing economic dependence on 
China, China’s own growing stature as the East Asian ‘core’ state, and Mongolian 
perceptions of the PRC as the country’s greatest threat contribute to a security strategy 
focused more on mitigating China’s military influence than any other actor.  While 
Mongolia’s security strategy now encompasses the expanded goals of developing the 
country’s ability to act as a regional centre for peacekeeping activities and training and as 
a neutral mediator in relationship to North Korea, such strategic goals originate in large 
part from its need to diminish China’s influence on the country’s military security.  
 
In contrast to Walt’s claim that small states are ‘more likely to bandwagon…if the 
threatening power [is] believed to be appeaseable’, the Mongolian government and the 
MAF appear to have primarily adopted a balance of power policy that draws heavily on 
‘third party’ allies so as to limit the state’s geographic and physical security vulnerability 
in relation to China (Walt 1990:173).  While such alliances do maintain elements of 
bandwagoning, particularly in Mongolian-US military exchange, the Mongolian 
government has successfully diluted the possibility of overdependence on any one actor 
by working with a wide range of like-minded allies committed to the state’s sovereignty 
and its military development.   
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Examples of successful balance of power relations are evident throughout Mongolia’s 
current bilateral and multilateral military cooperation.  Both the United States and Japan 
have become key allies in providing development and political support for Mongolia’s 
military development.  Russia remains an important ally in that it has the potential to 
contribute to the country’s physical resources in the event of Chinese military aggression.  
In addition, Mongolia’s participation as a member in the ARF and the SCO has added 
regional legitimacy to its sovereignty while also limiting China’s ability to act 
aggressively against it without undermining its regional commitments to the same 
organisations and its professed intent on ‘rising’ peacefully.  Lastly, the Mongolian 
government’s and MAF’s participation with the United Nations has contributed to its 
international standing among countries committed to peacekeeping while allowing 
Mongolia to increase the MFA’s overall quality.       
 
Noteworthy, however, is that Mongolia’s success in engaging in bilateral and multilateral 
balance of power activities aimed against China are only possible because of the PRC’s 
own integrated regional policy of maintaining good relations with its periphery states 
(Lampton 2008:61-62).  In this sense, Mongolia’s foreign policy is in fact limited in that 
it depends in large part on consensus with the PRC for its effectiveness.  Indeed, such 
‘freedom’ to act in terms of its internal development strategy has not come without a cost 
as the Chinese government has insisted Mongolia remain unaligned and not allow foreign 
powers to operate bases from its territory.  While seemingly in line with Mongolia’s own 
professed multilateral security strategy, the inability of the Mongolian government to 
allow foreign troops to establish a presence on its own soil without ‘violating’ China’s 
own security strategy effectively undermines the state’s sovereignty in deciding the 
degree and level of cooperation it maintains with foreign countries.   
 
Indeed, without the Chinese government’s ‘approval’, Mongolia would find it difficult to 
maintain multiple partnerships with individual countries and security institutions as they 
would likely be unwilling to strain their relations with the PRC in order to pursue military 
relations with Mongolia.  An example of this is NATO’s disinclination to extend 
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membership to Mongolia as the organisation, according to officials from both the US 
MOD and Mongolia’s National Security Council, worries such a move might anger the 
PRC, as well as Russia.   
 
In this sense, Mongolia’s balance of power strategy is seemingly in line with the PRC’s 
own regional security strategy. Indeed, it is possible to argue that the Mongolian 
government and MAF are engaged in a complex type of bandwagoning with China that 
focuses on appeasing the PRC while pursuing intra-mural relations that pose no serious 
threat to it.  Evidence that this is indeed the case is present in the MAF’s persistent 
military policy towards China as found in its 1994 National Security and Foreign Policy, 
1997-98 Mongolia Defence White Paper, 1998 Basis of the State Military Policy of 
Mongolia, and Strategic Vision 2015 white paper in which its stresses cooperation with 
the PRC rather than alignment against it.  
 
Such military relations make sense for the PRC on several different levels.  First, its 
economic relations with Mongolia assure it maintains the ability to economically ‘coerce’ 
the country should the need arise, thereby allowing it to maintain tight control over 
Mongolia’s foreign policy directives while adhering to its principles of a ‘peaceful rise’ 
(Lampton 2008:66).  Second, in ‘allowing’ Mongolia to develop an array of allies, it has 
effectively passed a large portion of the cost and effort of maintaining Mongolia’s 
internal and external security to the regional and international communities.  As the 
Chinese government benefits more from a stable, weak country on its northern border 
than an unstable state with the potential to become either allied with a competing country 
or home to transnational organisations that could encourage separatism in Xinjiang or 
Inner Mongolia, such security is essential.  And, finally, in encouraging Mongolia to 
diversify the number of actors it cooperates with militarily, the PRC’s soft power in 
Mongolia will grow and subsequently challenge the persistent sense of it as the country’s 
greatest ‘threat’.   
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Conclusion: Mongolian Weakness, Foreign Policy, and the PRC 
 
 
Whether a state is strong or weak, according to Krasner, depends in large part on a 
government’s relationship to society (Krasner 1978:55).  As ‘strong’ government 
institutions serve the function of representing the ‘general will’ rather than specific 
interests, state weakness stems from a dissonance between political and social structures.  
While more tangible variables such as geographic, demographic, and economic factors 
also contribute to state weakness, a strong state can mitigate these physical limitations 
through concerted domestic and foreign policy.  Conversely, a weak state may be unable 
to successfully manage a domestic development agenda even if the country enjoys an 
abundance of resources.   
 
Mongolia’s post-Cold war transition to a liberal democracy and market capitalism created 
such a rift between the state and society.  This is largely due to the government’s decision 
to allow international financial institutions and foreign actors to shape its domestic 
institutions with no consideration of Mongolian identity.  This led to an abrasive break 
between the state’s institutions of control and the country’s existing political and social 
identity, as well as any remaining concept of a Mongolian ethnos.  
 
The post-Cold War development of Mongolian identity has further exacerbated the 
division between the Mongolian state and society.  Whereas the state has turned to the 
regional and international communities for development support, recent increases in 
Mongolian anti-foreign sentiments suggest that elements of Mongolian society are 
becoming increasingly what Parekh calls ‘monoculturalist’ and exclusionary (Parekh 
2002:226).  These simultaneous developments of Mongolian government and society are 
in fact contradictory and would suggest a further weakening of the state.    
 
The relationship between such weakness and the state’s foreign policy is difficult to 
determine.  While Katzenstein notes that domestic structures are one component of a 
government’s foreign policy, it is not possible to draw a direct correlation between the 
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two as neither is an exclusively dependent variable (Katzenstein 1976:13).  Indeed, 
Krasner notes that ‘a state that is weak in relation to its own society can act effectively in 
the strategic arena [when] its preferences are not likely to diverge from those of 
individual societal groups’ (Krasner 1978:70).  Conversely, it is also necessary to 
consider whether a weak state can institute a foreign policy that the majority of society 
believes is detrimental to its interests.     
 
The Mongolian government’s foreign policy is instructive in this regard.  While a weak 
state, it has been able to implement foreign policy that maximises its strengths.  This is 
particularly true of the Mongolian government’s security strategy.  So, too, however, has 
the state exacerbated domestic political-social tensions in pressing forward with a foreign 
policy that contradicts the identity concerns that are found in society.  This is evident in 
the Mongolian government’s economic and environmental foreign policies as well as its 
attempts to push forward with greater cultural exchange with the PRC. 
 
This complicated linkage of foreign policy with social concerns presents problems for 
Mongolia’s growing dependency on China.  Whereas state weakness is an essential 
component of Mongolia’s dependency, in many ways China has helped the Mongolian 
government become stronger.  Chinese support for Mongolia’s international legal 
sovereignty, Chinese FDI, and military cooperation have all contributed to a more stable 
domestic and international situation.  In this sense, it is possible to view Mongolia’s 
policy towards the PRC as at least partially successful in that it has provided stability and 
domestic growth potential. 
 
Yet increased dependency on China contains within it all the necessary ingredients to 
undermine the Mongolian state.  Indeed, while the Mongolian government and special 
interests may stand to gain from Chinese economic relations, Mongolian public opinion 
is turning against such involvement as evidence of dependency’s negative aspects 
becomes clearer at a societal level.  These include lost domestic economic development 
opportunities, resources exploitation, and pollution.  Moreover, increased dependency is 
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contributing to societal fears of a Chinese ‘threat’ based on a historical sense of China as 
the Other. 
 
8.1 State Weakness: The Dissonance Between the Mongolian State and Mongolian 
Identity 
 
It has been argued above that some of the most serious problems in the relationship 
between state and society in Mongolia are not directly due to China but are products of 
adjustments externally imposed under the Washington Consensus since the end of the 
Cold War. Opinion polls focused on the Mongolian public’s satisfaction with the 
country’s current political system, parliament, and judiciary offer a mixed picture.   
While mostly divided between those who are ‘fairly satisfied’ and ‘rather not satisfied’, 
the number of respondents who report they are ‘totally unsatisfied’ have on average 
grown (tables 3.2, 3.3, 3.4).  This is particularly true of the judiciary system as in 2008 
72% of residents polled noted they believe there was more injustice than justice in the 
country (Sant Maral 2008b).   
 
Public support for both major political parties has also steeply declined since 2000, with 
the MPRP’s approval rating dropping from just under 60% in 2000 to 25% in 2008 (table 
3.1).  While support for the MDP has been more constant over this time period, it 
nevertheless remains consistently below that reported for the MPRP.  Moreover, a 
growing number of respondents claim that they either ‘rather disagree or ‘totally 
disagree’ when questioned as to whether the government is acting in the people’s best 
interest (table 3.5).      
 
Conversely, 95% of respondents polled as to whether or not they had pride in their ethnic 
Mongolian identity answered that they were either ‘very proud’ (78%) or ‘rather proud’ 
(16%) (Sant Maral 2008b).  This would suggest that while public support for the state and 
current political structure is lessening, identity based on Mongolian ethnicity is strong. 
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Lack of public support for the state’s institutions of control coupled with a strong social 
identity is not, however, enough to definitively prove state weakness.  While weak state 
theory does suggest this division can lead to vulnerability in that it mirrors what Midgal 
calls a strong social base versus a weak institutional state, it is also necessary to consider 
the severity of such dissonance.  Indeed, while many states have a strong social identity 
with varying degrees of dissatisfaction with their government, it is not appropriate to 
simply classify them all as ‘weak’.  Clearly additional variables are necessary when 
considering such a classification. 
 
For Mongolia, the key to determining weakness lies in an examination of both post-
transition concepts of identity and the government’s ability to implement successful 
domestic policies.  Only then is it possible to speculate on whether these two factors are 
mutually compatible of whether they are diverging to such a degree that suggests 
weakness. 
 
Identity 
 
Mongolian identity politics are complex and dynamic, leaving them easily influenced by 
domestic and foreign factors as well as historic and modern day norms.  Yet several 
trends in Mongolian identity’s development since the end of the Cold War are worth 
considering, particularly as their underlying causes are intensifying rather than abating. 
 
Firstly, while stifled during socialism, Mongolian ethnic identity has experienced a 
resurgence since the country’s transition.  This is evident in the pan-Mongolian 
movements of the early 1990s, increased instances of ethnic pride, and attempts to 
reclaim ethnic symbols ranging from Chinggis Khan to the Morin khuur (horse-head 
fiddle).  This revival of ‘Mongolian’ identity is largely based on an imagined past that 
places the Khalh Mongols at the centre of Mongolian identity (Campi 2006:23-33).   
 
This, in turn, has led to nationalist sentiment among a small number of increasingly 
influential groups that equate Mongolian identity with Mongolian ‘purity’, thereby 
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marginalising the country’s multiethnic make-up by focusing on the Khalh Mongols. At 
the extreme end of this nationalist sentiment is a growing anti-foreign sentiment, 
particularly focused on Chinese residents and visitors to the country, which has 
occasionally erupted into violence.  While this type of anti-foreign sentiment is still very 
much a fringe element of the larger Mongolian identity, it is nevertheless gaining in 
prominence as its proponents become more organised and politicised.  
 
These factors together indicate that there are elements in Mongolian society that are 
pushing towards a more exclusionary stance under the guise of maintaining national 
cohesion.  Indeed, while the more extreme examples of violent anti-foreign sentiment 
remain limited, concerns over the effect foreigners are having on Mongolian identity are 
widespread (Batbayar 2001:150).  
 
Although Mongolia remains a multiethnic and multicultural state based on ethnic Kazak 
and Buriat identities, the trend to assimilate into a Khalh-centric state identity represents 
a move towards monoculturalism.  According to Parekh, monoculturalism occurs when a 
state with two or more cultures does not encourage multiculturalism, but rather opts for a 
communal identity around a single, dominant culture.  Such an alignment has both 
positive and negative effects on social stability.  Negatively, it can contribute to cultural 
‘asphyxiation’ as the dominant culture shuns external influence out of fear of its potential 
influence. Positively, it can create a ‘single communitarian order’ that can use identity to 
influence social policy (Parekh 2008:45-46).     
 
Regardless of whether the effects of monoculturalism on Mongolian identity are positive 
or negative, shaping the post-transition cultural and ethnic Mongolian identity poses a 
challenge to the state.  Whereas the state seeks regional and international cooperation to 
enhance its legitimacy at both the state and sub-state levels, increasingly prominent 
aspects of Mongolian identity are questioning whether or not such cooperation is 
beneficial for the Mongolian public in general.  That such dissonance between the two 
can erupt in violence and social instability became clear during the 2008 Ulaanbaatar 
riots.  
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The Mongolian State 
 
Key variables in determining whether a state is weak domestically are the effectiveness 
of its institutions of control, its ability to supply public goods, and its means to provide 
security (Buzan 1983:53).  By examining each in turn, it is also possible to determine 
relative strengths separate from what may be overarching weakness.  This is necessary as, 
according to Krasner, no state is entirely weak (Krasner 1978:55).   
 
For the post-transition Mongolian state, the outcome is bleak. Corruption, petty political 
infighting, and nepotism have become prevalent throughout the country, affecting both 
government efficiency and security.  Domestically, the state has been largely unable to 
direct the country’s development, improve living standards and the delivery of public 
goods equally between urban and rural areas, and implement legislation designed to 
protect the country’s environment.  Moreover, Mongolian public opinion has at least 
partially turned on the country’s two main political parties, creating a perception of 
weakness that the government has done little to assuage.  In short, while examination of 
the state’s foreign policy suggests the Mongolian government has been able to leverage 
its geographic, economic, and demographic weakness for strength, the same is not true at 
a domestic level.   
 
Many of the state’s underlying inefficiencies stem from a lack of transparency that has 
allowed for an increase in government corruption (U.S. Agency for International 
Development 2005:3).  Indeed, corruption among government agencies, institutions, and 
politicians has increased exponentially since the country’s transition to capitalism as the 
private sector have gained political influence (Asian Foundation 2006).  This, in turn, has 
led to an increase in a ‘spoils system’ that encourages legislation aimed at appeasing 
special interests rather than Mongolian society at large.  So, too, has it contributed to an 
increase in nepotism that has greatly eroded the state’s legitimacy in the Mongolian 
public’s eyes (News Today 2007a).  In this regard, corruption has directly contributed to 
a weakening of public support for the Mongolian government.   
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The state’s failure to implement domestic policies aimed at providing public goods such 
as housing, basic sanitation, employment, and access to clean water also indicates that it 
is fundamentally weak.  The most manifest examples of this failure are Ulaanbaatar’s ger 
districts’ worsening conditions (T.Tsevegmis 2007).  While specifically allowing for a 
laissez-faire approach to the issue of in-migration, the Mongolian government has not 
provided necessary resources to mitigate increased urbanisation.  Nor has the state 
implemented an urban development plan that effectively manages the ger districts growth 
and resources use.  As the result, residents in the capital’s ger districts are increasing 
more likely to suffer from non-communicable diseases, poisonings, injuries, and 
cardiovascular disease (World Health Organisation 2008).   
 
State inaction has also allowed for widespread environmental degradation.  Failure to 
implement legislation, or to enforce existing laws, has allowed for resource exploitation 
that has contributed to desertification.  State and local government corruption has allowed 
polluting industries to operate in and around the country’s protected areas.  So, too, have 
the ger districts’ unmitigated growth contributed to air pollution in Ulaanbaatar. 
 
Lastly, the Mongolian government and customs agency have been unable to secure the 
country’s borders, thereby failing to provide an essential component of national security.  
Such border insecurity has allowed extensive goods smuggling, illegal trafficking in 
natural resources, and the cross-border flow of illegal workers from China.   
 
In short, the Mongolian government’s domestic record contains all the variables 
necessary to classify it as a weak state.  This is further enforced by Mongolian public 
opinion, which has expressed a decreasing amount of confidence in the state’s institutions, 
the country’s main political parties, and its ability to govern on behalf of society.    
 
Theoretical Implications 
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The tension between the Mongolian identity and state draws attention to the centrality of 
Mongolian cultural identity in opposition to the government’s institutions of control.  
Indeed, Mongolian society’s perception that the state is ineffective in meeting the 
people’s needs is at least partly the result of its failure to address socio-cultural issues 
specific to a Mongolian ethnos such as preservation of the environment and protection 
against immigration.  The result has been the state’s and Mongolian identity’s failure to 
manifest into nationalism or a nation. 
 
This identity-state division supports Smith’s ethno-symbolic paradigm in that it stresses 
the importance of cohesion between a perceived ethnic community and the state.  
Whereas an ethnos that either maintains or perceives a historical and geographic 
continuity in the development of its state can achieve nationalism and a resulting nation, 
an ethnic community forced into an externally constructed political structure cannot.  
This understanding of nation building stands in contrast to modernist paradigms that 
stress the importance of socioeconomic and socio-political variables in shaping 
nationalism (Smith 2001:47).   
 
It also breaks with modernist conceptions of socio-cultural causes of nationalism in that it 
clearly shows the elite alone are incapable of creating a nation with their ‘high culture’ 
(Smith 2001:47).  This is evident in the Mongolian public’s high level of disapproval of 
the country’s major political parties and the growing sense that the government is acting 
against the people’s best interests.  While such sentiments can and do exist in states with 
a high level of nationalism, in Mongolia’s case they are symptomatic of the state’s 
inability to translate its political agenda into a cultural-based ideology that the public can 
support. 
 
This understanding of the dissonance between the country’s elite and non-elite also 
provides greater insight into questions related to Mongolia’s sovereignty.  Indeed, while 
Mongolian’s sovereign weakness was initially the result of foreign imposed political and 
economic systems, elite corruption and nepotism have further undermined the state’s 
ability to effectively maintain its institutions of control.   
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In this regard, it is possible to view Mongolia’s inability to establish a sovereignty of 
control, or ‘positive’ sovereignty, to two factors.  The first is the existing framework 
within which the government must work.  The second is an assumed divergence in norms 
between those Mongolians holding power and the non-elite that contributes to weakness 
with the Mongolian identity.   
 
Together, these variables contribute to state weakness in line with both Buzan’s and 
Migdal’s paradigms.  Indeed, Mongolia state-society relations clearly show the negative 
effect that a dissonance between the ‘physical base of the state’ and ‘the institutional 
expression of the state’ can have on the ‘idea of the state’ (Buzan 1983:40).        
 
8.2 Mongolian Dependency  
 
While through its foreign policy successes the state has formed a variety of regional and 
international relationships that help balance any one country’s influence, it is not at all 
certain it has done enough to avoid dependency on China.  Indeed, examination of the 
country’s economic and environmental sectors suggests that Mongolian dependency on 
Chinese goods and the Chinese market is growing.  Moreover, while the state’s political 
foreign policy has sought to mitigate over-dependence, evidence suggests that it is largely 
responsible for economic conditions that have allowed for dependency.   
 
While no evidence suggests that the Chinese government is purposely seeking greater 
control over Mongolia’s sovereignty, its interest in securing Mongolia’s mineral 
resources as its own is undeniable.  This suggests that rather than working to establish 
direct control over the country’s domestic and foreign policy, the Chinese government’s 
motivation behind closer ties with Ulaanbaatar is primarily economic in nature.  That this 
increasingly asymmetrical relationship translates into what Strange calls ‘unconscious 
power’ is, however, currently taking place and likely to increase (Strange 1996:26).        
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The potential impact on Mongolia’s government and society is great.  Among the 
Mongolian public, China remains a perceived threat as well as a much feared historical 
Other.  For this reason, social perception of expanding Chinese influence in the country 
has the potential to trigger social instability.  This is particularly true if Mongolian public 
opinion correlates growing dependency on China with its existing perception that the 
state is inefficient, corrupt, and acting to satisfy special interests.  This conception will 
also gain traction if dependency leads to a decrease in domestic production and 
disproportionate exports of the country’s natural resources.  Both, indeed, are already 
occurring.     
 
So, too, does the Mongolian state’s increased dependency on China have the potential to 
challenge the country’s environmental security.  Indeed, through examination of 
Mongolia’s environmental sector, it is possible to see how such dependency is turning 
into a multi-sector ‘syndrome’.    
 
Economic Dependency 
 
Chinese demand for Mongolia’s mineral resources is at the centre of the country’s 
growing economic dependency.  It has led to ‘asymmetrical trade’ is so much that the 
Chinese government and Chinese business benefit from the import of raw materials while 
the outflow of resources prevents Mongolia from developing the ability to produce value-
added goods domestically.  As more than 70% of Mongolia’s natural resources end up in 
the Chinese market, and as Chinese businesses and the Chinese government become 
more invested in Mongolia’s mining industry, such dependency is likely to increase.     
 
This trend is particularly evident in Chinese originating FDI, which accounts for close to 
90% of all foreign investment in Mongolia.  Indeed, in response to this large percentage 
of overall FDI, the Mongolian government has adjusted the country’s domestic 
development strategy to match Chinese government and business interests.  As such 
investment largely goes to mineral or mineral related industries, the Mongolian domestic 
economy has grown disproportionately with an emphasis in natural resources exploitation.  
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As a result, the country has seen a correlated decline in domestic industries such as 
construction or manufacturing.  This contributes to an unsustainable growth dynamic that 
increases Mongolian dependency for funding while also contributing to a stripping of its 
resource wealth for the benefit of the regional core. 
 
Mongolia has also become dependent on Chinese imports for basic manufacturing goods 
and food.  This has also led to a decrease in domestic production as Chinese goods are of 
a higher quality and more cheaply produced than those in Mongolia.  This is particularly 
true of the country’s food production, which has decreased dramatically as imports of 
fruits, vegetables, and other essential foodstuffs from China have risen.  Indeed, the 
Mongolian market is now so dependent on Chinese food imports that a recent rise in 
import prices contributed to a 15.5% spike in inflation in 2007.  In this regard, it is 
possible to conceptualise Mongolia’s food dependence on China as a fundamental 
vulnerability to the state’s economic security.         
 
Environmental Dependency 
 
As the Chinese government has limited domestic use of natural resources such as timber 
in order to mitigate its own environmental concerns, Chinese businesses have 
increasingly turned to neighbouring countries to supplement the lack of domestic supply.  
This demand has, in turn, led to an increase in activities in Mongolia such as poaching 
and illegal resource harvesting.  In this sense, Mongolia’s economic dependency on 
China has directly affected the country’s environmental health.  
 
While the Mongolian government is largely responsible for the country’s environmental 
degradation, as it has failed to curb environmentally damaging activities, it is limited in 
what it can realistically accomplish.  This is evident in state’s inability to provide newly 
arrived migrants with housing in Ulaanbaatar as the price of building materials has 
become restrictive due to Chinese demand.  So, too, has the decrease in non-resource 
based domestic economic activities limited the government’s ability to provide an 
economic alternative to those engage in environmentally damaging activities.    
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The Potential for Societal Dependency  
 
Societal exchange between Mongolia and China has the potential to contribute to what 
Harrell calls an asymmetrical dialogue of cultures between the two countries.  Harrell 
uses this term to describe the process of a dominant core ideology subsuming a periphery 
state’s ethnicity and identity through what Lampton calls ‘ideational power’ and Nye 
calls ‘soft power’ (Lampton 2008:164).  This ideological dependency can occur at both a 
state and society level and is often the result of longer-term economic dependency.   
 
The increased number of young Mongolians interested in studying in China or studying 
Chinese in Mongolia would suggest the potential for an asymmetrical dialogue to form 
between the two states.  Indeed, Walt notes that the education of a weak state’s 
population in a dominant state contributes to deepening of asymmetrical alliances (Walt 
1987:43-45).  
 
So, too, does the steadily rising amount of Chinese workers and travellers to Mongolia 
suggest that Chinese presence of ‘soft power’ in the country is increasing (table 6.2).  
This presence of Chinese nationals in the country will continue to expand as Mongolia’s 
economic dependency on China grows.    
 
Potential for Political Dependency 
 
Lastly, Mongolia’s economic dependency has the potential to influence the state’s 
political and foreign policy domains.  Indeed, Moon’s bargaining and dependency 
consensus theories clearly demonstrate how a strong, dominant state can use economic 
strength to affect change in a weaker state’s domestic political development and foreign 
policy agenda.  Should Chinese businesses gain an even more dominant position in 
Mongolia’s domestic market, it will become increasingly difficult for the government to 
enact legislation that works against their collective best interests.  This displacement of 
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Mongolian business interests for dominate Chinese interests would result in policy 
decisions that increase Mongolia’s dependency and weaken its sovereign control. 
 
Such a scenario will be difficult for the Mongolian state to avoid.  Despite growing anti-
foreign sentiment present in Mongolian society, Moon suggests that as a state becomes 
increasingly tied to a dominate state’s economy, so, too, will the dependent state’s elite 
begin to imagine their own interests enmeshed with the dominant state.  This suggests 
that rather than occurring in contrast to the Mongolian state’s wishes, greater Chinese 
government and business control over the domestic economy would be in line with the 
state’s own agenda.  The resulting convergence of economic agendas could then result in 
the Mongolian state’s aligning its foreign policy to support Chinese priorities.  Such an 
occurrence would further weaken the state, allowing for even greater penetration by 
Chinese-based actors from both the private and public sectors.      
 
That the Mongolian state is already considering the Chinese government’s demands in 
formulating its foreign policy is evident in the unanimous decision by lawmakers to shun 
the Dalai Lama during his monumental visit to Mongolia, despite intense public support 
for the Buddhist spiritual leader.  It is also apparent in the state’s decision to limit all 
contact with Taiwan to commercial and educational exchange, despite the Taiwanese 
government’s attempt to forge closer ties.  As both examples of Mongolian state policy 
are very much in contrast to Mongolian identity politics, which advocate greater diversity 
among foreign partners, they indicate a willingness on behalf of the state to align its 
interests with the Chinese state despite potential social backlash. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
This understanding of Mongolian dependency suggests that it may be in the process of 
shifting from Moon’s dependency consensus theory towards a bargaining model.  This is 
evident in the state’s unwillingness to regulate Chinese economic activity in the country 
and its growing alignment of its development agenda in line with Chinese originating 
ODA.  While dependency consensus theory accounts for such linkage between systems if 
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it results from a ‘community of interests’, it does not explain why a state would allow 
dependency to continue unchecked when it has negative effects on its security.  In this 
regard, Moon’s bargaining model is far more applicable for understanding why a state 
would disregard its own policy preferences so as to increase its material capacity.   
 
Nevertheless, it is not yet possible to classify Mongolian dependency on China as entirely 
within a bargaining framework as it still maintains elements of mutual beneficence that 
are best understood through dependency consensus theory.  This suggests that some 
movement between the two models is possible.  Moreover, in considering Mongolia’s 
path towards dependency, one can infer that transition from dependency consensus 
towards a bargaining model may be inevitable.   
 
Indeed, as dependency over time naturally leads to an ‘asymmetrical relationship’ that 
perpetuates a state’s weakness in relation to its industrialised core, it is naïve to assume 
the dependent state will always have the ability to formulate policy that is in its own best 
interest.  This suggests that Moon’s dependency consensus model is best understood as 
an early stage dependency that is not sustainable.  It also implies that dependency 
consensus theory may likely lead to a bargaining model over time. 
 
Yet Moon’s bargaining model is not entirely appropriate for explaining Mongolia’s 
situation in that it focuses on a dependency’s influence on foreign rather than domestic 
policy.  While the Mongolian state has altered (or failed to alter) its domestic policies to 
meet Chinese’ demand, it maintains a rather independent foreign policy.  This would 
suggest that either Moon’s bargaining model is inappropriate for understanding 
Mongolian dependency or that extending its understanding of dependency to a state’s 
domestic policy would strengthen it as a theoretical framework. 
 
It is this dissertation’s position that Mongolian dependency offers a strong case for 
reconceptualising bargaining model theory to include dependency’s effects on domestic 
policies as well as foreign.  Indeed, in doing so, the bargaining model would gain the 
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ability to prescribe varying levels of dependency severity, as it would increase the 
number of variables available to its analysis.   
 
8.3 Mongolian Foreign Policy and China 
 
The Mongolian state’s post-Cold War foreign policy does not fall as neatly into a weak 
state paradigm as do its domestic politics.  While limited in many ways due to 
demographic, economic, and geographic concerns, the Mongolian government has been 
able to carry out a comprehensive foreign policy aimed at maximising its strengths.  In 
order to maintain such a policy, the state has worked efficiently within international 
institutions, with its neighbouring countries, and with ‘third party’ foreign partners.  In 
this regard, Mongolian foreign policy defies weak state theory, which would suggest that 
its ‘weakness’ would allow external forces to shape its foreign policy.    
 
This is not, however, to suggest that the Mongolian state has been entirely successful in 
avoiding overreliance on one state.  Indeed, as the previous section detailed, Mongolian 
dependency on China has grown dramatically since the country’s transition.  This 
dependency, in turn, has at times influenced Mongolian foreign policy and has the 
potential to do so more in the future.  What is significant in relation to the Mongolian 
state’s foreign policy ‘successes’ is that is has used all the tools at its disposal to lessen its 
dependency.  To this end, Mongolian foreign policy has been at least partially effective.   
 
Mongolia’s ‘China’ Foreign Policy 
 
The principle foreign policy challenge for the post-transition government was to solidify 
its independence in light of its geographic position.  In order to achieve this, the state had 
to establish relations with China that would satisfy its security concerns while allowing 
Mongolia to maintain a wide array of regional and international partnerships.  This 
political balancing act was difficult in so much that post-transition Mongolia was 
undergoing an economic crisis domestically that left it especially vulnerable to foreign 
actors.   
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Central to this foreign policy strategy was the decision to remain militarily unaligned.  
This commitment to neutrality has allowed Mongolia to pursue foreign relations and 
military ties with China based on balancing, despite its proximity that would suggest a 
weak state strategy of bandwagoning (Walt 1987:29-30).     
 
The state’s nonalignment has assuaged the PRC’s main security concern in so much that 
Mongolia has promised that no foreign military will use its territory as a base.  In turn, 
the Chinese government has agreed to respect Mongolian territorial sovereignty and 
independence.  The PRC has taken concrete actions towards this end by cooperating with 
the Mongolian government to strengthen the countries’ borders through the bilateral 
‘Sino-Mongolian Agreement on Cooperation in Frontier Defence’ (Information Office of 
the State Council of the People's Republic of China 2000).  The Chinese government has 
also responded to Mongolia’s non-alignment by initiating bilateral annual security 
dialogues and military exchanges (Shambaugh 2005).   
 
The Mongolian government has leveraged its resulting stable relations with the PRC to 
increase the amount of ODA it receives from China.  It has done this by aligning its 
domestic development needs with Chinese commercial interests.  This has allowed the 
Mongolian state to direct aid towards infrastructure building rather than the social 
development projects most Western aid agencies insist upon.  The Mongolian 
government has also successfully negotiated a USD 300 million loan from China that it 
will use to develop infrastructure around mining.  While there is some danger that 
increased aid could contribute to greater economic dependency, the state believes that 
such development assistance is beneficial in that it is contributing to the country’s 
sustainable domestic development. 
 
Lastly, the Mongolian government has successfully leveraged its ethnic relations with  
China’s IMAR’s Mongols to expand education and cultural exchange throughout the 
PRC.  The Mongolian Ministry of Education and the National University both benefit 
from funding and expertise originating in the IMAR.  So, too, do does the Chinese 
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government provide a growing number of full scholarships to Mongolian students 
anxious to study in the IMAR or other parts of the PRC. 
 
Alliance with  ‘Third Neighbour’ States and Russia 
 
Mongolia’s ‘third neighbour’ strategy has been central to its ability to maintain non-
alignment, which is important considering its isolation and historical inclusion in 
concepts of greater China.  The policy has allowed for a diversification of external 
partnerships that has strengthened Mongolian international legal sovereignty and the 
government’s legitimacy.  Its ability to maintain relations with states such as the United 
States and Japan has increased Mongolia’s political support and added to its international 
visibility.  Most importantly, Mongolia’s ‘third neighbour’ relations act as important 
balancers against China and Russia.   
 
In regard to the United States, the Mongolian government has successfully utilised 
common ideology, as well as its geographic proximity to China and Russia, to establish 
an alliance with the world’s predominant military power.  Indeed, since the end of the 
Cold War, US cooperation with Mongolia has increased substantially.  The Mongolian 
government has benefited from this relationship as the US Military has contributed to the 
country’s development of its peacekeeping forces while also providing it opportunities to 
participate in regional security forums and exercises.   
 
So, too, has the Mongolian government been able to cultivate relations with Japan that 
provide the country with diplomatic support and opportunities to participate in regional 
security forums.  Most important, however, is Japan’s use of Mongolia’s neutrality to 
serve as a mediator with North Korea.  Such opportunities greatly enhance Mongolia’s 
role as a regional actor and are very much in line with its hope to develop into the 
‘Switzerland’ of Northeast Asia.     
 
Perhaps most important is Mongolia’s relationship with Russia.  While the Mongolian 
government has been careful to distance itself from its former ‘protector’, it has 
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maximised on existing ties to develop close state relations that support Mongolian 
independence.  Central to Mongolia’s desire for good relations with Russia is its need to 
balance China.  In this regard, Russia plays a hugely important role in Mongolia’s 
security strategy in that it provides a large part of the equilibrium it needs for ensuring a 
form of regional stability that does not evolve into dependency.  Moreover, the 
Mongolian MOD believes Russia would provide troops in the unlikely event of any 
Chinese military aggression against Mongolia.    
 
Participation in international military operations 
 
The Mongolian government has also been largely successful in pushing forward a foreign 
policy aimed at developing the state’s military capacity through cooperation in 
international military operations.  The state has achieved this by participating in coalition 
military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan and in security operations with the United 
Nations.  While both types of participation contribute to the MAF’s increased capability 
and modernisation, they are markedly different in nature.  While Mongolia’s participation 
in Iraq and Afghanistan has allowed the MAF to develop its international military 
relations, the purpose behind its contribution of troops to the UN is to build its 
peacekeeping capabilities. 
 
Mongolia’s troop commitment to Iraq and Afghanistan has helped forge closer relations 
with the United States military.  This relationship has been hugely beneficial to the MAF 
in that it has allowed a small number of Mongolian soldiers and officers to gain 
experience in a coalition-led military campaign while also creating opportunities for its 
participation in international and regional military exercises.  Indeed, since 2003 the US 
military has funded and supported the annual ‘Khaan Quest’ military games in Mongolia.  
As participants and observers from 32 countries now attend this annual exercise, it has 
become a centrepiece of the state’s strategy for military development. 
   
The Mongolian government has adapted its security policy to translate this international 
military experience into peacekeeping potential.   The purpose behind this move is to 
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further emphasise the country’s position as a non-aligned, neutral state.  While the MAF 
has been able to advance this policy through participation in such events as the US-led 
‘Global Peace Operation Initiative’ (GPOI), the main focus in increasing its peacekeeping 
capacity comes through the Mongolian military’s cooperation with the United Nations.    
 
Indeed, the MAF cooperation with the United Nations on peacekeeping has been a 
significant policy success for the state.  In addition to direct funding it receives from the 
United Nations to maintain a battalion of troops trained to international peacekeeping 
standards, participation with the United Nations helps strengthen Mongolia’s position in 
the international community.  Indeed, the Mongolian government hopes MAF 
participation in UN-led peacekeeping activities will contribute to its goals of establishing 
itself as a regional peacekeeping centre.     
 
Cooperation with regional and international organisations 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the Mongolian government has established diverse multi-
sector partnerships with regional and international organisations that have helped offset 
its domestic weakness with expertise and funding.  In many ways, these relationships 
have served as the linchpins that have held Mongolia’s post-transition society together.  
Indeed, whereas the Mongolian government alone has been largely unsuccessful in 
pushing forward meaningful domestic development, it has been more effective at 
addressing development concerns when working in conjunction with regional and 
international organisations.   
 
Examples of the role such organisations play in Mongolia’s domestic development are 
most prevalent in the country’s environmental sector.  While unable to confront the 
country’s most pressing environmental concerns alone, the Mongolian government has 
been able to address some issues through foreign cooperation.  Most notable in this 
regard are the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and United Nations.  All three 
organisations have pushed forward projects aimed at mitigating environmental problems 
ranging from desertification to illegal wildlife trafficking.  They have supported these 
  258 
projects by providing funding and expertise where the Mongolian government alone was 
unable.  In this sense, the Mongolian government has successfully maximised a domestic 
weakness through its foreign policy.     
 
The same is true for Mongolia’s cooperation with the ASEAN Regional Forum and the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation.  Mongolia’s participation in both these regional 
security organisations has strengthened its regional security, particularly in relation to 
China.   
 
Theoretical Implications 
 
By all accounts, the Mongolian state’s foreign policy has been successful in that it has 
allowed it to overcome inherent material weakness through diverse partnerships with a 
variety of states and organisations.  It has done this despite its weak domestic control 
over the country’s institutions of authority and lack of public support.  In this regard, 
Mongolian foreign policy confirms Katzenstein’s position that there is not necessarily a 
correlation between domestic weakness and foreign policy.      
 
It is, however, necessary to consider the state’s foreign policy from both an economic and 
political perspective.  The distinction is important when considering the state-society 
relationship as political policy tends to affect the public equally while economic policy 
can affect groups differently (Krasner 1976:70).   
 
For Mongolian foreign policy, this conceptual approach presents a mixed message.  
While the state has been successful in its political foreign policy, its economic foreign 
policy has resulted in dependency.  As the public, according to Krasner, will focus on 
policy related to economics first and foremost, it is questionable whether political foreign 
policy successes can translate into state ‘strength’. 
 
Indeed, in conceiving of state weakness in line with Buzan and Migdal, a state’s foreign 
policy is only an important variable as it contributes to the ‘idea of the state’ or brings the 
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state’s institutions in line with social identity.  This implies that a public’s perception of 
the government’s foreign policy is more important than the actual policy outcomes in 
regard to state-society relations.  
 
Mongolian public opinion polls indicate a widespread dissatisfaction with political parties, 
the government’s efficiency, and its ability to act on behalf of the people’s best interests.  
So, too, have elements of Mongolian society gained in stature and influence by casting 
foreign countries and companies as a primary cause of the country’s economic ills.  
Together, these two variables contribute to a sense that the state’s political foreign policy, 
in which it relies heavily on foreign expertise and aid, will not provide it with sufficient 
legitimacy to offset its domestic weakness.      
  
In this sense, it is not at all clear that the government’s foreign policy accomplishments 
have the potential to fundamentally mitigate the state’s weakness.  Indeed, public 
perceptions of corruption and a government run by a self-serving elite have the potential 
to undermine the country’s foreign policy when the outcome is not clearly beneficial to 
society at large.  This is particularly true so long as the state’s policies continue to allow 
for greater economic dependency on China without addressing the country’s pressing 
development needs.   
 
8.4 Implications for Mongolian-Sino Relations 
 
By all accounts, Mongolia-Sino relations are becoming closer at the state-to-state level.  
This is primarily the result of the two countries’ economic relations and resulting 
Mongolian dependency.  Subsequently, ties between the two countries are deepening 
multi-sectorally and appear to be on track to continue to do so into the immediate future.   
 
For the Mongolian state, the linkage of the country’s economic sector to China has both 
positive and negative implications.  Positively, closer ties with the Chinese state and 
Chinese businesses will allow the Mongolian domestic economy to develop faster than it 
would otherwise.  Chinese FDI will allow Mongolia to construct infrastructure in and 
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around the country’s more important mining sites while Chinese originating investment 
will help development the mines themselves.  Closer ties between the two countries have 
also translated into more generous commitments of Chinese ODA.  This has allowed the 
Mongolian government flexibility in its development that was previously absent.   
 
The Mongolian state will also benefit from cooperation with the Chinese government in 
dealing with some of the country’s most pressing environmental concerns.  For example, 
the two states are now working towards a joint approach to dealing with Mongolia’s 
desertification.  As the Mongolian government does not have the resources or the 
technical expertise to deal with such issues alone, Chinese involvement is essential.   
 
Various Mongolian industries are also benefiting from increased access to Chinese 
workers and expertise.  This is particularly true of the country’s construction industry, 
which is becoming more reliant on Chinese labour for its operations.  Chinese workers 
are also active in the country’s small-scale mining industry, helping develop mines that 
would otherwise lay fallow.  
 
Negatively, Mongolian dependency on Chinese goods and investment has the potential to 
limit the country’s political autonomy.  The more reliant the state becomes on Chinese 
FDI, labour, and ODA, the more leverage the CCP will have over the country’s 
institutions of control.  While evidence does not suggest that the Chinese government is 
currently pursuing such goals in relation to Mongolia, the country’s dependency is 
naturally increasing the PRC’s influence.   
 
Additionally, in pursuing closer ties with China, the Mongolian state runs the risk of 
weakening elements of its sovereignty.  Both the state’s democratic and interdependence 
sovereignty are largely dependent on limiting the role foreign actors play in the country’s 
domestic affairs.  If the PRC does gain a disproportionate influence through a monopoly 
supply of essential assets like food, it could translate this into direct pressure over these 
aspects of the state’s control.   
 
  261 
For China, however, the potential gains from enacting such control over Mongolia’s 
domestic institutions would be limited.  Indeed, Chinese businesses (some state-owned) 
have already largely penetrated the country’s economic system by operating within the 
existing political system.  In this regard, Mongolia’s economic and political ‘openness’ 
have served Chinese-based interests well as it has allowed them to establish an economic 
relationship very much like a patron-client state without having to spend any resources of 
their own to maintain the relationship.  It has also kept them largely insulated from 
criticism of having become enmeshed in Mongolian domestic politics.   Rather, the main 
criticism the Mongolian public aims is at the Chinese ‘presence’ in the country’s 
economy and society.   
 
Were the Chinese government to leverage its economic clout for political advantage, it 
would likely undermine the Mongolian state’s legitimacy.  This is due to the fact that 
Mongolian public opinion would likely turn against a government perceived to be acting 
as a Chinese government ‘puppet’.  In this sense, the Chinese government has a vested 
interest in not using its economic leverage to institute change in Mongolia’s domestic 
political sector.  
 
This is not to say, however, that the Chinese government or Chinese-based companies 
will not continue to seek a more prominent role in Mongolia’s economic sector.  Nor is 
this to imply that Mongolia’s resulting dependency will not have political consequences 
of its own.  Rather, it is to suggest that the current status quo is in the PRC’s best interest 
and that any deviation from this runs the risk of causing instability. 
 
Yet, failure to augment the country’s growing dependency could have serious 
consequences for the Mongolian government.  As a weak state, it runs the risk that 
perceived ties to the PRC might provide Mongolian society with an impetus to challenge 
its authority.  Moreover, as growing anti-Chinese and anti-foreign sentiments grow 
among parts of Mongolian society, the state will face pressure to show that the country is 
free from overreliance on any foreign actor.  To address these social concerns, the 
Mongolian state may be tempted to push forward a more nationalistic foreign policy.     
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Such a change in foreign and domestic policy would not, however, be without 
consequence.  While the Chinese government and Chinese businesses may currently be 
satisfied with working within Mongolia’s economic and political system, they could very 
well respond to an increase in anti-Chinese policies by increasing political pressure 
through economic coercion.  This would further undermine the Mongolian government’s 
legitimacy as it would not be able to provide such necessities as food and manufactured 
goods. 
 
So, too, would an increase in state sponsored anti-foreign policies challenge the 
Mongolian government’s ability to maintain the relationships it has established through 
its successful foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.  As these relations are a vital 
component of its ability to balance Chinese influence, a break in these alliances would 
undermine the country’s political security.    
 
This would suggest that regardless of the state’s policy, Mongolian dependency on China 
will grow.  The possible variations in this dependency are whether the state works within 
these confines to achieve domestic development or whether it chooses to adopt more anti-
Chinese and anti-foreign policies to appease public concern.  As overt opposition to 
Chinese dependency would only serve to highlight the state’s already existing 
vulnerability, the Mongolian government may find continuation of its current policies 
most beneficial.    
 
Conclusion  
 
Despite a post-transition foreign policy aimed at strengthening its position in the 
international and regional communities, the options available to the Mongolian 
government are constrained by its remaining a weak state.  While its geographic isolation 
between Russia and China, its small population spread over expansive territory, and its 
underdeveloped economy contribute to this weakness, the most significant constraint on 
maximising the optimal use of these meagre resources is the division between the state 
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and society.  This would imply that Mongolian ‘weakness’ is domestic in nature and that 
the state’s foreign policy cannot mitigate this weakness.  It would also suggest that the 
state’s foreign policy is hindered by its inability to successfully attend to the country’s 
domestic affairs.  
 
This complicated account of state weakness supports the dissertation’s use of a synthesis 
of FPA and constructivism as a theoretical framework.  Whereas FPA has provided 
insight into the state’s institutions and policy, constructivism has allowed the interplay 
between identity concerns and the international system to play a more central role in the 
analysis.  The result has been a nuanced approach to state weakness that has helped 
highlight the Mongolian government’s strengths as well as its vulnerabilities.  It has also 
provided a theoretical foundation upon which it was possible to identify the sources of 
Mongolia’s dependency on China.  This, in turn, contributed to the chapter’s use of 
dependency theory to explain post-Cold War Mongolian-Sino foreign policy relations. 
 
While not entirely applicable to Mongolian foreign policy, dependency theory is essential 
to understanding Mongolian-Sino relations.  In focusing on Mongolia’s growing 
economic dependency on the Chinese market, it is possible to view much of the two 
states’ remaining relations within a patron-client paradigm.  This allows for a widening of 
dependency from a purely economic perspective across various sectors including the 
environment, society, and the military.  While Mongolia’s security strategy has 
successfully cultivated an array of allies to balance Chinese power, fear of dependency 
remains central to the government’s motivations and is, therefore, a variable in need of 
consideration. 
 
Noteworthy is how this multi-theoretical approach functions holistically.  Indeed, the 
synthesis of FPA and constructivism shows how different factors work together in an 
almost cyclical manner: As the country’s dependency on China increases, so identity 
becomes a more important component for analysis.  As identity gains influence, it 
directly challenges the state’s institutions and foreign policy.  This then contributes to 
further state weakness that may lead to greater dependence on China as the Mongolian 
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government seeks to strengthen itself.  The implications of the ‘marriage’ of FPA and 
constructivism are thus promising for the development of theory.  Whereas both remain 
powerful explanatory frameworks in themselves, a synthesis of the two serves to 
accentuate each theory’s respective weakness.  This would suggest singular use of one 
theory to discuss state weakness is inadequate.   
 
When looking at the case of Mongolia’s relations with the PRC, taking either FPA or 
constructivism on its own can only account for one-half the overall picture.  For while 
FPA provides theories and methods that are useful for understanding Mongolia’s 
institutional weaknesses, its dependency, and its foreign policy successes, it does not pay 
enough attention to exploring the way in which identity interacts with the international 
system.  It has been argued above that identity is in fact essential to understanding post-
Cold War Mongolian-Sino relations as well as present day societal stability, and should 
therefore hold a central position in any analysis of the foreign policies of weak states.  
This bears out Houghton’s argument that constructivism’s focus on identity and norms is 
a useful complement to FPA discourse. 
 
The need for combining constructivism with FPA is thus amply illustrated by the 
dissertation’s selection of Mongolia’s policy towards China as the case study as well as 
the decision to examine Mongolian-Sino relations across a variety of sectors.  As the 
analysis has shown, China is without a doubt Mongolia’s most important bilateral 
relationship.  It is also the country with the most potential to influence the evolution of 
Mongolia’s domestic institutions, society, and overall security.  This is apparent as both 
the CCP and Chinese businesses occupy central roles in Mongolia’s political, economic, 
environmental, societal, and military sectors.  Indeed, no other country has succeeded 
more than China in establishing links between its own national needs and Mongolia’s 
domestic development.  These established ties between the two countries are likely to 
influence Mongolian political and societal developments for years to come.        
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